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Abstract
This thesis contains a series o f related studies about the human capital outcomes o f 
children as consequences o f school subsidy reform and natural disasters. All the 
studies in this thesis rely on the Indonesia Family Life Survey data 2000 and 2007. 
The first study is an evaluation o f the impact o f the school operational assistance 
program (BOS) on child test scores. This study uses three different methods: Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS), Instrumental Variable (IV) and Propensity Score Matching 
(PSM) estimation. OLS is used as conventional method and estimates the effect of 
school subsidy on average by assuming that BOS is exogenous, while IV estimation is 
used to deal with endogeneity o f BOS and also correct for selection bias based on 
unobservable characteristics. PSM is used to estimate the average treatment effect in 
the absence o f selection on unobserved characteristics. The results confirm that the 
BOS can increase student performance. Paradoxically it does not help very poor 
students, yet it helps less poor students.
The second study is an examination o f the impact o f natural disasters on child test 
scores and child health. Arguably natural disasters are exogenous events, so we use 
the exogenous variation from natural disasters as a natural experiment design to 
estimate the effect o f disasters on child test scores and child health. When a certain 
group is exposed to the causal variable o f interest, such as a disaster, and other groups
are not, Difference in Difference model (DID) can be used in estimation. For child 
health, we use two types o f data: child height under 5 and self-reported general health 
condition, while test scores are obtained from the national child test scores at age 11. 
In conjunction with the DID model, for analysis o f the impact o f disasters on child 
health, we also used zero inflated negative binomial and an ordered logit model for 
analysing self-reported data on child health. The results confirm that child test scores 
are significantly affected by disasters, but there are no serious impacts o f disasters on 
child health, conditioned on survived.
The third contribution is a study on the impact o f disasters on household expenditures 
and food demand. We employ a DID model to estimate the total impact o f disasters on 
various types o f household expenditures. For comparison, we use a Linear 
Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System (LA-AIDS) model to estimate the net 
impact o f disasters on expenditures. In the LA-AIDS model we control for the price of 
foods, while in the DID model we do not. Furthermore, the LA-AIDS model also 
estimates the price elasticities o f demand and the expenditure elasticity o f demand. 
The findings show that there is a negative impact o f disasters on educational 
expenditures, and no impact o f disasters on total household expenditures. Yet, we 
found a net negative impact o f disasters on expenditures when controlling for prices.
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According to Sweetland (1996), the development o f human capital theory can be 
classified into two stages: early economic viewpoints and economic foundation 
studies. The first stage was dominated by the thoughts o f prominent economists such 
as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall and Irving Fisher. The discussion 
o f human capital theory in this first stage began in 1776 when Adam Smith, in his 
book “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f  the Wealth o f  N ations”, discussed the 
importance o f human beings as labour, specifically with regard to national wealth. 
Smith mentioned two major components o f human capital which created productive 
labour. The first component was the importance o f the quality o f labour inputs, and 
the second was about the development o f human capital through education, or 
training. Almost a century after Adam Smith, in 1848, John Stuart Mill considered 
human abilities as economic values by recognizing all activities that could improve 
their productivity. He also stated that it was impossible to measure wealth per person. 
In 1890, Alfred Marshall argued that we could measure wealth per person by 
examining all the things which contribute to making people more efficient, 
technologically. He defined human abilities as an agent o f producing wealth. In 1906, 
Fisher posed an empirical problem in valuing human abilities. His argument 
encouraged other economists to design empirical methods for human capital analysis.
After no significant development in human capital theory for more than five decades, 
in the 1960s there was a beginning o f an economic foundation for human capital 
theory. At least three economists contributed significantly to human capital theory. In
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1958, Jacob Mincer, a father o f modern labour economics, developed, with Gary 
Becker, an empirical foundation o f human capital theory. Mincer also developed the 
so called Mincerian equation, which models personal income as a function o f human 
capital. The model pioneered the use o f years o f schooling and years o f work 
experience as measures o f human capital. His work confirmed that more years used 
for schooling was compensated by higher earnings in the future.
In 1960, Gary Becker examined the determinants o f the rate o f return to human 
capital. He compared the income o f college graduates and the income o f high school 
graduates to measure the impact of education. The difference in income reflected the 
cost o f pursuing study in college. He designed an important methodology in 
measuring human capital investment, or rate o f return on human capital investment. 
He used the costs o f education and the economic returns on education investment as 
inputs into the internal rate of return on the investment. Becker concluded that 
education is an investment that adds to human capital, just like investments add to 
physical capital. Becker was awarded the Nobel Prize for his contributions to the 
development o f human capital theory.
A year after Becker, in 1961, Theodore Schultz introduced human capital theory, 
particularly human capital investment in education, training and health. He argued that 
investment in human capital could increase worker earnings and the national output. 
He argued that knowledge and skill from education can raise productivity, so that 
workers can compete with others, and increase their earnings. Furthermore, Schultz 
also discussed how differences in earnings cause differences in access to education 
and health. For instance, in poor countries basic needs still take first priority rather
2
than education, but in order to raise the standard o f living and increase economic 
growth, those countries should be concerned about long-term investment in education. 
He believed that investment in education can lead to an increase in productivity.
l.l.H um an  Capital Situation in Indonesia
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) measures national 
development with the Human Development Index (HDI). If human capital theory 
categorises human beings as inputs in the production process for raising income and 
wealth, HDI focuses on the results o f the development process for human beings. This 
index tells us about the situation o f a country in term of the level o f income per person 
and other indicators related to human development, such as health and education. As 
HDI is a result o f the development process o f human beings, it is therefore very 
important to pay attention to several indicators o f human development in order to 
know the level o f human development in a country.
Human development indicators are classified into three dimensions: health, education 
and living standards. The health indicator uses a life expectancy at birth indicator. For 
education, there are two main indicators: mean years o f schooling for adults and 
expected years o f schooling for children. The UNDP defined mean years o f schooling 
as the average number o f years o f education received in a life-time by people aged 25 
years and older, while expected years o f schooling is the total number o f years of 
schooling that a child o f school entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing 
patterns o f age-specific enrolment rates stay the same throughout the child’s life. For 
living standard, UNDP uses gross national income per capita as a measure.
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There are two steps to calculating the HDI. The first step is creating the dimension 
index for life expectancy index, education index and GNI index. Dimension index is 
calculated by using the following formula:
Dimension index  =  value
m axim um  va lu e-m in im u m  value
The maximum values are the highest values for each indicator in the time series 
(1980-2011), and the minimum values are set at 20 years for life expectancy, 0 years 
for both type o f education indicators, and $100 for GNI per capita. The education 
index is calculated from the geometric mean o f the mean years o f schooling index and 
the expected years o f schooling index. The second step is calculating the HDI by 
using the geometric mean of the three dimension indices. The HDI formula can be 
written as:
u d i  =  \ f i u f 7 *  1education  * hncom e (1.2)
Figure 1.1 presents the situation o f HDI in Indonesia in 1990 and 2011 in comparison 
with other countries. From Figure 1.1, we can see that there is a relative position of 
the country to other countries and how the position can be changed over time. We 
picked the top 40 populous countries whose HDI data was measured in 1990 and 
2011. The United States had the highest HDI among the most populous countries in 
the world, and was followed by Canada and Japan in second and third place in 1990. 
Indonesia was positioned after China and categorised in the medium human 
development level. In comparison with other countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia 
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In 2011, the position o f some countries was changed, but some still retained the same 
position. The United States was still the highest, and was followed by Canada and 
Germany in second and third place. Japan moved to fourth place. Indonesia seemed to 
have a similar position to 1990, in medium human development, and was still behind 
Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines in the Southeast Asia region. By looking at the 
HDI, we can see in comparison with other countries that Indonesia is relatively low in 
terms o f human development.
Based on the value o f HDI, countries are classified into four levels o f human 
development (HD): (1) very high HD, (2) high HD, (3) medium HD, and (4) low HD. 
According to the most recent Human Development Report, in 2011, Indonesia was 
classified at a medium human development level with HDI equal to 0.617, and was 
ranked in 124th place in 187 countries. For comparison, in the same year, the highest 
HDI is Norway with an index o f 0.943, and the lowest HDI is Congo with an HDI of 
0.286. Indonesia is below the average o f the world which is 0.682 or the regional 
average o f 0.671. In addition, the latest human development indicators show that as 
regards the health situation in Indonesia, life expectancy at birth is 69.4 years. For 
education, expected years o f schooling for children are 13.2 years, and mean years of 
schooling for adults are 5.8 years. For income, UNDP uses Gross National Income per 
capita converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates. 
Indonesia is $3716 in 2011.
Table 1.1 presents Indonesia’s progress in each indicator every five years from 1990 to 
2011, based on the Human Development Report o f UNDP. Between 1990 and 2011, 
Indonesia’s life expectancy at birth increased by 7.3 years, expected years o f schooling
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increased by 2.8 years, mean years o f schooling increased by 2.5 years, and Indonesia’s 
GNI per capita increased by approximately 85%. Although all HDI indicators and the 
HDI value itself seem to be increasing over time, the HDI value is always under the 
HD I’s world average and the rank o f Indonesia’s HDI did not improve over time. 
However, the total number o f countries included is also bigger. These phenomena may 
be because other countries also improve all HDI indicators over time, so the rank tends 
to be steady.
Table 1.1: Indonesia’s HDI Trends
HDI value and Indicators 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011
World HDI average 0.594 0.613 0.634 0.660 0.679 0.682
HDI value 0.481 0.527 0.543 0.572 0.613 0.617
Life expectancy at birth 62.1 64 65.7 67.1 68.9 69.4
Expected years o f  schooling 10.4 10.5 11.1 11.8 13.2 13.2
Mean years o f  schooling 3.3 4.2 4.8 5.3 5.8 5.8
GNI per capita (2006 PPP$) 2007 2751 2478 2840 3544 3716
Rank o f  HDI 76 104 109 110 125 124
Total number o f  countries 130 174 174 177 187 187
Source: UNDP 2013 in h t t p : / / h d r s t a t s . u n d p .o r R / e n / c o u n t r i e s / p r o f i l e s / i d n .h t m l
Figure 1.2 to Figure 1.5 shows the indicators o f the human development index across 
countries in 1990 and 2011. All the Indonesia figures are in black. Figure 1.2 presents 
the life expectancy at birth. Japan has the highest life expectancy at birth in both 1990 
and 2011. In comparison with other countries, Indonesia’s life expectancy at birth in 
both 1990 and 2011 seems to have the same position, which is in the middle group. 
Among the top four populous countries in the world, with the United States, China, and 
India, Indonesia still has a better value o f life expectancy than India, but it is inferior 
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Figure 1.3 illustrates the mean years o f schooling in 1990 and 2011 across the chosen 
countries. The United States has the highest mean years o f schooling in 1990 and 
2011. In comparison with the USA, Indonesia’s mean years o f schooling is almost 
half o f the USA in both years.
Table 1.3: Mean years o f schooling in 1990 and 2011
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In comparison with Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia is also far behind Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Thailand in 1990 and 2011, although in 2011, Thailand is close to 
Indonesia and seemed to have a lower relative position. In 2011, Indonesia succeeded 
in increasing the mean years o f schooling, but it is still in the middle group and seems 
to be in a similar position to 1990.
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Figure 1.4 shows the expected years of schooling in 1990 and 2011. This education 
indicator is regarded more highly than the mean years o f schooling. In comparison 
with other countries, especially Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia has the highest 
values in 2011, but just behind the Philippines in 1990. It indicates that in Indonesia 
children receive more education than adult had received, on average. Figure 1.5 
presents the income indicator o f HDI, Gross National Income per capita. In 1990 and 
2011, the highest GNI per capita is the United States. The position o f Indonesia’s GNI 
per capita in 1990 and 2011 seems similar in both years and is still very low in 
comparison with other countries, especially developed countries.
Moreover, according to the Ministry o f Manpower and Transmigration, in 2012 the 
unemployment rate was about 6%. O f the people who were unemployed, 28% 
graduated only from primary school, 23% from junior high school, 26% from senior 
high school, 13% from vocational senior high school, and about 10% from university. 
These statistics show that unskilled and less educated workers have a greater chance 
o f becoming unemployed. In addition, the labour force o f Indonesia in 2012 was 
119.39 million people, of which the number o f people in employment was about 112.9 
million people. In general, the labour force is still dominated by primary school 
graduates, who comprise 55.7 million people (46.66%). The educated labour force 
that has graduated from University and Diploma courses is about 11.17 million people 
(9.36%). If we look at the proportion o f working people, based on their main job, it is 
around 40% o f Indonesian people work in the agricultural sector, 15% in trade, 10% 
in manufacturing, 15% in services, and the rest are distributed across construction, 
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With regard to education, the net enrolment rate1 in Indonesia in primary schools was 
around 95%, followed by junior high school, which was approximately 70% in 2010. 
The net enrolment rate o f senior high school was around 50% and the lowest one is 
university enrolment rate, which is around 12%. There has been a moderate increase 
in the percentage o f net enrolment rate at junior high school, senior high school level 
and higher education in Indonesia from 2000 to 2010.
1.2.Overview of Natural Disasters in Indonesia
Indonesia is an archipelagic island country in Southeast Asia with approximately 
17,500 islands, but only around 6,000 o f these are inhabited. There are five big 
islands: Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua. Java is the most populous 
island; Jakarta the capital city o f Indonesia is located here. Indonesia’s total land area 
is 1,919,317 square kilometres and the population is 242.3 million people. 
Geographically, Indonesia is situated on the world’s ‘Ring o f Fire’, where a large 
number o f earthquakes and volcanic eruptions occur in the basin o f the Pacific Ocean, 
and also lies at the meeting point o f Pacific, Australian, Eurasian and Philippines 
Plates. All these conditions make Indonesia vulnerable to many kinds o f natural 
disasters. Almost every year Indonesia experiences natural disasters such as floods, 
landslides, earthquakes, tsunamis and droughts.
1 N et enrolm ent rate is calculated from the total number o f  students in a certain age o f  schooling at 
primary school, divided by the total number o f  the population in that age o f  schooling and then 
m ultiplied by 100%. The sam e method is used to calculate for junior, senior high school and university 
level net enrolm ent rates.
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In addition, around 6,200 people were killed and 700 thousand people were affected 
by disasters on average per year between 1980 and 20 1 02. Around 90% of the regions 
o f Indonesia are vulnerable to disasters. For instance, the west coast o f Sumatra and 
the southern coast o f Java, are vulnerable to earthquakes and tsunamis. In addition, 
Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, East Java, North Sumatra and Riau are vulnerable to 
floods and landslides. Drought usually occurs in Riau, South Sumatra, North Sumatra, 
East Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, West Kalimantan and East 
Nusa Tenggara. Neumayer and Plumper (2007) measure the strength o f disasters in 
each region using the number o f people killed during the disasters divided by the total 
population. In the last decade, Aceh has the highest percentage o f fatalities with 
3.71%, and is followed by Yogyakarta with 0.15%. Other regions such as West 
Sumatra, West Papua, and North Sumatra are around 0.01%.
According to the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) in Indonesia, more 
than 4000 disasters occurred in the last decade, 2000-2011 and some o f them were 
very destructive, killing many people in several Indonesian regions. The most 
destructive one was the earthquake and tsunami in Aceh on 26th December 2004 with 
a 9.1 - 9.3 moment magnitude scale and the longest duration in the world o f around 10 
minutes. This disaster killed approximately 230,000 people in fourteen countries, 
more than half o f whom, 126,915, were from Indonesia. In addition, according to 
BNBP, 37,063 people were missing and 655,000 people were made homeless across 
Aceh Province. The second destructive disaster was an earthquake on 26th May 2006 
in Yogyakarta Province. Estimates claimed that more than 6,000 people were killed in 
a 6.3 magnitude earthquake and about 130,000 were left homeless. Another serious
2 Prevention web, serving the information needs o f  the disaster reduction com m unity, January 2013. 
http://wwvv.preventionweb.net/em >lish/eountries/statistics/?cid^80 [accessed 3 January 2013].
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disaster was the floods in Jakarta in February 2007. Around 30 people died and 
approximately 340,000 were left homeless. Another earthquake in West Sumatra, 5.8-
6.4 on the Richter scale, killed approximately 50 people on 6 March 2007.
1.3.Contribution of the Thesis
As already discussed above, Becker (1964) argued that human capital is an important 
characteristic o f each individual which may affect their output o f economic value. It 
has an extraordinary characteristic o f being accumulated over a long period o f time, 
since the growth o f human capital can be affected by its inputs. For instance, human 
capital outcomes for children are influenced by several inputs, such as nutrition, 
education and their health condition when they were young. Considering that children 
are the future generations who will take over all roles in future development, it is very 
important to seriously examine any factors which may affect human capital outcomes 
for children.
The concept o f human capital is very important in a country with a large population, 
like Indonesia. As the fourth most populous country in the world after China, India, 
and the United States, Indonesia has abundant human resources, especially since the 
population is relatively young. Because o f this, turning human resources into human 
capital is urgently needed, otherwise unemployment will be a serious problem for this 
country. In the process o f transforming human resources into human capital, 
investment in the education and health sectors o f the national economy must become 
the first priority, since only with education and health will it be possible to produce 
highly productive human capital with knowledge and skills.
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The total population o f Indonesia was about 242.3 million people in 2011, and 
approximately 20% of the population were children under 10 years old. It is suggested 
that the Government o f Indonesia must pay serious attention to providing both good 
education and good health services for children, as education and health are the most 
important factors that may affect human capital outcomes for children. In addition, the 
government should also consider other factors that may affect the outcome that cannot 
be controlled by human beings, such as natural disasters, as Indonesia is located on the 
Pacific Ring o f Fire, which makes it very vulnerable to disasters. By learning from the 
previous experience o f disasters, it is hoped that Indonesia can have a better response 
in coping with disasters, especially for young children, who are believed to be the 
most vulnerable to the disasters.
To the best o f my knowledge, there is still limited research on human capital 
outcomes for children in Indonesia, especially as regards the effects o f disasters. One 
study conducted by Cameron and Worswick (2001) focused only on the impact o f 
crop failure on educational expenditures. This research is interesting, since they 
analyse whether households could cope with their normal consumption during hard 
times, by defining permanent income and transitory income. Educational expenditure 
was chosen instead o f other expenditures because o f the social benefits. Using 
Indonesian Family Life Survey data from 1993, Cameron and Worswick (2001) found 
that households were not able to smooth out consumption fluctuations during the time 
o f crop loss so they were most likely to reduce educational expenditure, especially for 
girls.
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On the other hand, there are several papers on school subsidies in Indonesia, such as 
Sparrow (2007), Duflo (2001), and other research institutions such as SMERU (2006). 
Sparrow (2007) evaluated the impact o f the social safety net in education (Jaring 
Pengaman Sosial, JPS) on school enrolment after Indonesia was hit by a financial 
crisis in 1997/1998. Using instrumental variable regression, he confirmed that the JPS 
program was an effective instrument for protecting the education o f the poor, 
especially for those who are most vulnerable to the effects o f the crisis. This program 
could increase the school attendance by 1.2% for children aged 10-12 and 1.8% for 
children aged 13-15.
Another famous study was conducted by Duflo (2001), which examined a school 
subsidy by Indonesia’s government for a school construction programme (The 
INPRES program). Between 1973/1974 and 1978/1979, 61,807 new schools were 
constructed and it spent over 500 million USD, calculated using the exchange rate in 
1990. The World Bank (1990) observed that it was the fastest primary school 
construction program ever undertaken in the world. The research suggested that the 
INPRES program increased the years o f education by 0.25 to 0.40 years, and 
increased the probability o f a child completing primary school by 12%. The results 
also suggest that the program led to an increase o f 3 to 5.4% in earnings. The program 
successfully increased not only education levels but also wages. All the previous 
papers discussed the impact o f school subsidies on educational attainment. In 
comparison with previous studies, the school subsidy studied in this thesis is different 
in terms o f the type o f school subsidy, the measure o f educational attainment, and also 
different in its methods o f evaluation.
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The main focus o f this thesis is to examine the factors that may affect human capital 
outcomes for children, specifically the effects o f a school subsidy and natural 
disasters. In addition, we also look at the effect o f disasters on household 
expenditures, including educational expenditures, which may affect investment in 
human capital for children. We analyse the latest school subsidy program which was 
designed by the government o f Indonesia in 2005, the School Operational Assistance 
Program (the so-called BOS). This study is important since BOS, nationally, is the 
biggest school subsidy program, as BOS is distributed to all primary schools in 
Indonesia and receives a bigger allocation from national budgets compared to 
previous school subsidies in Indonesia. Therefore, this study evaluates an early phase 
o f the implementation of the BOS program and considers whether there is a 
significant impact of the BOS program on children’s outcomes, as measured by test 
scores. This evaluation could be used in advising the government in making decisions 
relating to school subsidy policies in Indonesia in the future. More detail about the 
effect o f the BOS program on child test scores in Indonesia is presented in Chapter 3. 
Furthermore, as Indonesia experiences natural disasters almost every year, by studying 
this impact on human capital outcome for children from previous experiences, we can 
have a better respond to future potential disasters, especially in relation to children.
This thesis contributes to the international literature in this area in several aspects. 
First, compared to other literature generally, this study uses survey data with self- 
reported information. In Chapter 3, this study uses self-reported information on 
whether children get school subsidies from the government. This allows us to estimate 
the impact o f the treatment rather than the intention to treat. Chapters 4 and 5 use self- 
reported data on whether they are affected by disasters or not. In the main data set that
is used in this thesis, the IFLS survey, individuals are categorized as affected by the 
disasters if they reported that their households experienced death or major injuries to a 
household member, direct financial loss to the household, or relocation o f a household 
member. To the best o f my knowledge, almost all earlier studies defined an affected 
individual only by measuring the policies or shock before and after, and there is no 
definition that describes an individual as affected or unaffected.
Second, this study used a measure o f school quality, test scores, as a measure of 
educational outcomes, while most o f the earlier studies used a quantity measure o f 
schooling, such as school enrolment, school attendance, number o f years completed or 
drop-out rate. Chapter 3 examines the impact o f school subsidies on test scores, and 
Chapter 4 investigates the impact o f disasters on child test scores.
Thirdly, the BOS program is an example o f a specific school subsidy program aiming 
to support basic education in Indonesia. The subsidy for each student who is eligible is 
distributed to the school directly and will be managed by the school for operational 
expenses so that the students will be free from all kinds o f fees during their schooling. 
The students themselves only receive a small amount o f money for their transportation 
allowance. An evaluation o f this school subsidy policy may also have relevance for 
other countries considering adopting similar ideas.
Fourthly, in Chapter 4, we examine the impact o f disasters across the distribution o f 
test scores using Quantile Regression, so we can see in detail the effects o f disasters 
by groups o f outcomes. Fifth, this study presents the impact o f disasters on child 
health using two different measures o f child health: height o f child as an objective
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measure and self-reported health condition as a subjective measure. The purpose o f 
using these two measures that height is a permanent effect whereas self-reported 
health is likely to be a short effect.
Sixth, in Chapter 5, compared to other literature that discusses the impact o f disasters 
on expenditure or budget, this study uses a variety o f data o f household expenditures 
and also o f income (wages). In addition, regarding food expenditures, we allow for 
those who get food from market purchases and those who get food from their own 
production from their farm. Seventh, we also investigate the net effect o f disasters on 
expenditures o f main foods, such as rice, vegetable, fish and meat. Another important 
contribution is about the consequences o f natural disasters on food demand. Here, the 
impact o f disasters can be manifested in two ways: through increases in the price of 
goods and through an affect independent o f food prices. Lastly, we also provided the 
impact o f disasters on living standards regarding different levels o f household 
expenditure.
1.4.Organization of the Thesis
The remainder o f this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the main data 
that is used in this thesis. This thesis primarily uses micro-survey data at individual 
and household level from the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) data for the years 
2000 (IFLS3) and 2007 (IFLS4). In this chapter, we discuss sample design, response 
rate and data collection for both individual and household level data, and also for 
community and facility data. In addition, all variables that we use in the thesis are 
also presented in this chapter with brief descriptive statistics. Furthermore, this
2 0
chapter provides a brief discussion about selected papers which have used IFLS data 
that are relevant to our study.
Chapter 3 discusses the impact o f the school operational assistance program (BOS) on 
child test scores. This study provides an early observation o f the impact o f BOS on 
child test scores, since BOS was launched in 2005 and the survey was conducted in 
2007 and 2008. BOS was designed for all students at primary schools and junior high 
schools. The original idea o f BOS was to provide the operational costs o f schooling 
per student, so that each student could go to school without paying any fees. The 
funding goes to the school directly as school operational costs and is managed by the 
teachers and also controlled by the school committee (school principal and student’s 
parent representative). The school operational costs that can be financed from BOS 
are: procurement o f consumables, student activities (enrichment programs and other 
extracurricular programs), textbooks, admission fees for new students, school 
maintenance, examination fees, transportation cost for poor students and other 
operational expenses - as long as they are not for staff salaries.
By transferring money directly to the schools, students do not receive any money 
except for poor students, who are eligible to get the assistance for transportation cost. 
In the beginning o f the BOS program, the funding could not cover all students at 
schools so only selected students who were categorized as poor students were eligible 
to get the BOS and the remaining students, who were categorized as rich students, had 
to pay school fees. This study uses three different methods: Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS), Instrumental Variable (IV) and Propensity Score Matching (PSM) estimation. 
OLS is used as conventional method and estimates the effect o f school subsidy on
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average by assuming that BOS is exogenous, while IV estimation is used to deal with 
endogeneity o f BOS and also correct for selection bias based on unobservable 
characteristics. PSM is used to estimate the average treatment effect in the absence of 
selection on unobserved characteristics. The results confirm that the BOS can increase 
student performance. Paradoxically it does not help very poor students, yet it helps 
less poor students.
Chapter 4 examines the impact of natural disasters on child test scores and child 
health. As there have been an increasing number o f intensely destructive disasters in 
the last decade in Indonesia, and also considering that children are believed to be the 
most vulnerable to natural disasters, studying the impact o f disasters on human capital 
outcomes for children is very important in Indonesia. This chapter examines the 
impact o f disasters, especially big earthquakes, small earthquakes and floods, on child 
test scores and child health. These three disasters were picked up because they have a 
higher percentage o f the ratio between fatalities to the population and evacuated 
people to the population. The detailed explanation is contained in Chapter 4.
As natural disasters might be considered an exogenous condition that may affect the 
economy, so we use the exogenous variation from natural disasters as a natural 
experiment design to estimate the effect o f disasters on child test score and child 
health. According to Wooldridge (2010) for example when a specific group is exposed 
to the causal variable o f interest, such as a disaster and others are not, a difference in 
differences method (DID) can be used in estimation. The DID method can be used to 
predict the missing counterfactual or the potential outcome of treatment group in the 
absence o f natural disasters. This chapter discussed child test scores and child health.
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For child health, we use two types o f data: child height under 5, and self-reported 
general health condition. In addition to DID method, for the impact o f disasters on 
child health analysis, we also used zero inflated negative binomial, and also ordered 
logit model for analysing self-reported data on child health. The results confirm that 
child test scores are significantly affected by disasters, but that there are no serious 
impacts o f disasters on child health.
Chapter 5 extends the analysis by estimating the effects o f disasters on household 
expenditures and food demand. Disasters not only kill and injure local people but it 
also disrupt local economies, so in addition to observing the impact o f disasters on 
human capital outcomes for children, it is also important to examine the response o f 
households in coping with disasters, especially in trying to maintain the same standard 
o f living after disasters. There may be destruction o f infrastructure, property, assets 
and production processes that may affect the local economy as well as household 
welfare. We used several types of household expenditure as household welfare 
indicators, such as total expenditures, food expenditures, and educational 
expenditures. For food expenditures, we looked separately at market-purchased and 
own-produced expenditures. In addition to household expenditures, we also looked at 
the impact o f disasters on income using the wages o f heads o f households.
For estimation, we employed a difference in differences (DID) method in this chapter 
to estimate the total impact o f disasters on various types o f household expenditure. In 
the DID model we did not control the price o f goods. For comparison, we used Linear 
Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System (LA-AIDS) model. The purpose o f 
estimating using this model is to isolate the effect o f disaster induced prices changes
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from other effects. In contrast DID regression is reduced form and captures the total 
effect but does not isolate the price effect from other effects. Furthermore, the LA- 
AIDS model also estimates the price elasticity o f demand and the expenditure 
elasticity o f demand. Overall, this chapter provides estimates o f the effect o f disasters 
on the living standards o f households. The analysis shows that there is no impact o f 
disasters on total household expenditures, but we found a net negative impact on 
expenditures when we control for prices. These finding suggests either that 
households are possibly able to anticipate disasters and smooth their consumption, or 
that the government and aid agencies are good at distributing disaster relief to offset 
the entire effect o f the disasters.
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the findings and provides conclusion and policy 
recommendations. This chapter also suggests some policy implications related to 





The main data source for all chapters in our research is the Indonesia Family Life 
Survey (IFLS). It is a longitudinal survey that was started in 1993. There are 4 waves: 
IFLS1 (first wave) in 1993, IFLS2 (second wave) in 1997, IFLS2+ in 1998 with a sub 
sample o f 25% of IFLS households, IFLS3 (third wave) in 2000, and the latest wave 
IFLS4 in 2007. IFLS2+ was conducted to look at the impact o f the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997-1998. The first and the second waves o f IFLS were conducted by 
RAND in collaboration with Lembaga Demografi, University of Indonesia. The third 
and the fourth waves were conducted by RAND in collaboration with the Population 
Research Center, University o f Gadjah Mada. IFLS is a survey that has been 
conducted to provide economic, social and demographic information o f the household 
and community facilities in Indonesia. The survey data was collected at individual and 
household levels and there is also information from the communities where 
households and individuals were located. Since IFLS is a longitudinal survey, data are 
available for the same individuals from multiple points in time, so it is possible to 
observe information o f the dynamics o f behaviour at the individual, household, family 
and community levels, for instance, changes in education, labour income, or health 
condition.
At individual and household levels, the IFLS survey is about behaviours and outcomes 
related to wealth (consumption, income and assets); human capital (education, health, 
migration and labour market outcomes); marriage, fertility and contraceptive use;
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processes underlying household decision-making, such as the choice o f food eaten at 
home, child education and other decisions on how they spend money; transfers among 
family members and inter-generational mobility; and participation in community 
activities. Moreover, the survey is also accompanied by information from the 
communities, such as physical and social environment, infrastructure, employment 
opportunities, food prices, access to health and educational facilities, and the quality 
and prices o f services available at those facilities.
2.2. Sample Design and Response Rate of IFLS Household Survey
This section discusses the sampling and how the sample changed from IFLS1 as the 
basis for the next waves. Moreover, response rates from each wave are also explained, 
Considering the complexity o f the IFLS data, RAND and its partner decided to 
separate the individual or household survey from the community and facility survey. 
For the IFLS individual or household survey, the first sample design for IFLS1 is the 
most important design since it would be the basis for the next IFLS sample (IFLS2, 
IFLS3 and IFLS4). IFLS2 drew its sample from IFLS1, IFLS3 drew its sample from 
IFLS2 and IFLS1, and IFLS4 drew its sample from IFLS3, IFLS2, and IFLS1.
2.2.1. IFLS1 Household Survey
The IFLS1 sampling scheme was stratified on provinces and urban/rural location, then 
randomly sampled within the provinces (Strauss et.al, 2009). The provinces were 
selected according to the populous regions in order to capture the number and 
diversity o f the population, culture and socio-economic trends o f Indonesia. The 
sample is representative o f about 83% o f the Indonesian population and contains over
30,000 individuals living in 13 o f the 27 provinces in 1993 (today Indonesia has 33
26
provinces). The 13 provinces are four provinces on Sumatra (North Sumatra, W est 
Sumatra, South Sumatra and Lampung), all five o f the Javanese provinces (DKI 
Jakarta, W est Java, Central Java, DI Yogyakarta and East Java), and four provinces 
covering Bali, W est Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi. Figure 
2.1 shows the IFLS provinces.









I 1 IFUS Provinces
Source: RAND 2010, family life survey h ttp : / /w w w .ran d .org / lab or /F L S /IF L S/
In each province, enumeration areas (EA) were random ly chosen from the Indonesian 
National Socio-economic Survey (SUSENAS = Survei Sosial Ekonomi N asional) 
data, a national socio-econom ic survey that was designed by Central Bureau Statistics 
(BPS), based on the 1990 census, with approxim ately 60,000 households. In 
SU SENA S, each EA contains around 200 to 300 households. W ithin selected EAs in 
IFLS surveys, households were randomly selected by adopting the same sample frame 
that was used from SUSENAS. According to BPS, a household is defined as a group 
o f  people whose members reside in the same dwelling and share food from the same 
cooking pot.
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T a b l e  2 .1 :  I F L S  1 H o u s e h o l d  E n u m e r a t i o n  A r e a s
1990 IFLS Sample EAs
Population
Province_____________ (000)________ Urban Rural Total
North Sumatra 10391 16 10 26
W est Sumatra 4041 6 8 14
South Sumatra 6403 8 7 15
Lampung 6108 3 8 11
DKI Jakarta 8352 40 0 40
W est Java 35973 31 21 52
Central Java 28733 19 18 37
DI Yogyakarta 2923 16 6 22
East Java 32713 23 22 45
Bali 2798 7 7 14
W est Nusa Tenggara 3416 6 10 16
South Kalimantan 2636 6 7 13
South Sulawesi 7045 8 8 16
Total 151532 189 132 321
Source: Frankenberg et al. (1995)
Table 2.1 presents household Enumeration Areas (EAs); this table provides 
information about the size o f the population from the 1990 population survey across 
provinces and the distribution o f EAs across provinces in total and separately by urban 
and rural areas. There are 321 enumeration areas in the 13 provinces, o f which 189 
EAs are urban and 132 EAs are rural. IFLS randomly selected 20 households in urban 
EAs and 30 households in rural EAs, with an over-sampling o f urban EAs and EAs in 
smaller provinces to facilitate urban-rural and Javanese-non-Javanese comparisons. 
The different number o f households between urban and rural is to minimize the 
transportation costs in rural EA.
Table 2.2 provides information o f the household response rate in IFLS1 by province. 
This table is based on an overview and field report o f the 1993 Indonesian Family Life 
Survey by Frankenberg et Al. (1995). A total o f 7,730 households were sampled and
28
complete interviews were conducted with 7,039 households in late 1993 and early 
1994. The response rate of complete interviews is about 91%, while the complete 
interviewed rate across provinces is ranged from 87% to 97%.




nUHmHber ( l) /(4 )
Number o f  Households Survey
Partial None 
(2) (3) 
number . . . . . .  number





North Sumatra 543 87.6 20 3.2 57 9.2 620
West Sumatra 335 93.1 15 4.2 10 2.8 360
South Sumatra 340 91.9 8 2.2 22 5.9 370
Lampung 269 89.7 5 1.7 26 8.7 300
DKI Jakarta 724 90.5 7 0.9 69 8.6 800
West Java 1084 86.7 27 2.2 139 11.1 1250
Central Java 858 93.3 21 2.3 41 4.5 920
DI Yogyakarta 438 87.6 40 8 22 4.4 500
East Java 1032 92.1 13 1.2 75 6.7 1120
Bali 340 97.1 0 0 10 2.9 350
West Nusa Tenggara 402 95.7 5 1.2 13 3.1 420
South Kalimantan 312 94.5 11 3.3 7 2.1 330
South Sulawesi 362 92.8 13 3.3 15 3.8 390
Total 7039 91.1 185 2.4 506 6.5 7730
Source: Frankenberg et al. (1995)
In addition, a partial interview3 was obtained from 185 households (2.4%), so in total 
IFLS1 successfully interviewed 93.5% from the total households sampled or 7,224 
households (7,039 HHs with complete interviews, and 185 HHs with partial 
interviews). The remaining 6.5% of households was not interviewed. There were 
several reasons, such as the building was vacated, the household refused, no-one was 
at home, or illness.
3 Roster level information w as already obtained, but only a subset o f  selected  household members was 
interviewed.
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To reduce the cost o f survey, not all household members were interviewed, so a 
sampling scheme was used to select several members within a household to provide 
detailed individual information. IFLS1 conducted detailed interviews with the 
following household members: the household head and his/her spouse; two randomly 
selected children o f the head and spouse, aged 0 to 14; an individual aged 50 or older 
and his/her spouse, randomly selected from remaining members; a randomly selected 
25% of the households for an individual aged 15 to 49 and his/her spouse, randomly 
selected from the remaining members. The last rule was especially for a household 
with a large family; for instance, a family with 10 household members including 8 
adults, in addition to a head o f a household and his/her spouse, and also any other 
individual aged 50 or older and his or her spouse as the main respondents; if there 
were still any adults left, the surveyor would select about 25% o f the adults aged 15 to 
49 who had not been interviewed by then.
2.2.2. IFLS2 Household Survey
IFLS2 re-interviewed the 7,224 households that were interviewed in 1993. Table 2.3 
shows the number o f households that were interviewed in IFLS1 and IFLS2 by 
provinces. This table also provides the household response rate for IFLS2. The total 
number o f households interviewed in IFLS2 was 7,698, o f which 6,820 were original 
IFLS1 households and 878 were split-off households. Split-off households were from 
1FLS1 household members who had left their IFLS1 household and IFLS had tracked 
and interviewed them in their new locations. The response rate o f the IFLS1 
households was 94.4%. One reason for this high rate o f retention was the effort to 
follow households that moved from their original housing structure. If an entire 
household or respondent moved then they were tracked, as long as they still resided in
30
any one o f the 13 IFLS provinces, regardless o f whether they moved across those 
provinces. The complete interviewed rate o f the IFLS1 households across the 
provinces ranged from 87% to 97%.
In the case o f household members, IFLS also tried to keep a high response rate for 
individual members o f IFLS1 households. All individual household members who 
provided detailed individual level data in 1993 (panel respondents) were to be tracked 
and interviewed in IFLS2. IFLS2 had priority and targeted two groups o f IFLS1 
household members for tracking and interview in 1997 if they moved out from IFLS1 
households. First came all individuals with completed and detailed individual level 
information in IFLS1, and second were all IFLS1 household members who were 26 
years old or older in 1993.
IFLS2+ was conducted in m id-1998 in order to examine the immediate impact o f the 
Asian economic crisis that had hit Indonesia from January 1998. A 25% sub-sample of 
the IFLS households was taken from 7 o f the 13 provinces (West Nusa Tenggara, 
Central Java, Jakarta, West Java, South Kalimantan, South Sumatra and North 
Sumatra) that IFLS covers. Within those, 80 EAs were purposively selected in order 
to match the full IFLS sample. As in IFLS2, all households that had moved since the 
previous interview to any IFLS province were tracked. In addition, new households 
(split-offs) were added to the sample, using the same criteria as in IFLS2 for tracking 
individuals who had moved out o f the IFLS household. For interviewing individuals 



































s *  i


















07 cno oo CN inSO SOin oTf inOs
76
98
in en en CN r - ' in cn en en
’■et o in OO in m4«
13
5 Os cn SO oofs.
■^t m m en SO N ■'fr m m en 00
m o n ; in 00 Os O ; 00 SO t> n-_
Os r-~: n - in 00 SO 00 : in n -







^  53 73
tu
n - Os 00 Os (N soso/—«s
oo , CN CN SO OS
o CN m n - so in I—?f--. CN o Os in




—  D l|




oo CN _ en N ; Os in SO en Os Os CN in
o n -' 00 in in en SO l> SO cn







•"d"e- en Ost-- OOr -
in




m en en CN r - — oo en en en
o o o o
CN SO r - o
























cd(med _w £W) .2£ c "v><u a a)
S I  I
^ 0  rr< "Z-S2 cd
I  *
—  w  t i o 3





















2.2.3. IFLS3 Household Survey
The sampling approach in IFLS3 was to re-interview all original IFLS1 interviewees, 
plus split-off households from both IFLS2 and IFLS2+. Table 2.4 presents the IFLS3 
household response rate. A total o f 8,347 households were targeted to be interviewed 
in IFLS3, which consisted o f 7,138 IFLS1 HH, 865 IFLS2 split-off HH, and 344 
IFLS2+ split-off HH. From 7,138 IFLS1 households, 6,800 IFLS1 households could 
be contacted. It was about a 95% response rate o f IFLS 1 households. For IFLS3 target 
households, in total there were 8,347 IFLS3 target households; 7,928 households 
could be contacted, or around a 95% response rate. In addition to the IFLS3 target 
HH, IFLS3 also interviewed 2,646 new split-off households in IFLS3. Hence, in total, 
10,574 households were contacted in IFLS3; 3,774 were split-off households since 
IFLS1 and 6,800 were IFLS1 households.












IFLS1 HH 7,138 32 6,800 95.3
IFLS2 sp lit-off HH 865 2 819 94.7
IFLS2+ sp lit-off HH 344 309 89.8
IFLS3 sp lit-off HH 2,646
IFLS3 target HH 8,347 7,928 95.0
Total HH 10,574
Source: Strauss et al. (2004)
Table 2.5 shows the provincial distribution o f interviewed households. There were a 
number o f IFLS 1 HH interviewed in 1993 and 2000 across various provinces. In total, 
6,800 IFLS1 households were re-contacted in 2000, or about a 94.1% response rate. In 
addition, 10,574 households were contacted, and 10,435 households were interviewed. 
This was because there were households whose members had died since the last 
survey, or who had joined other IFLS households. In general, the complete
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interviewed rate o f the IFLS1 households across provinces in 2000 ranged from 83% 
to 98%.








interviewed in 2000a 
Number 












North Sumatra 563 507 90.1 241 748 738
West Sumatra 351 325 92.6 192 517 507
South Sumatra 349 331 94.8 228 559 550
Lampung 274 257 93.8 164 421 414
DKI Jakarta 731 610 83.4 355 965 958
West Java 1111 1065 95.9 603 1668 1658
Central Java 878 859 97.8 523 1382 1362
DI Yogyakarta 478 438 91.6 203 641 636
East Java 1044 1025 98.2 462 1487 1465
Bali 340 325 95.6 160 485 482
W est N usa Tenggara 407 399 98.0 278 677 668
South Kalimantan 323 307 95.0 202 509 488
South Sulawesi 375 352 93.9 163 515 509
Total 7224 6800 94.1 3774 10574 10435
Note: a= Includes IFLS1 households whose members died, or joined other IFLS households: 
Source: Strauss et al. (2004)
As in IFLS2, households that moved were followed as long as they still resided in 
IFLS provinces. In IFLS3, the rule was expanded; in the case o f households moving to 
a location that was assessed to be near the border o f IFLS provinces, and thus within 
cost-effective reach o f the enumerator, these households were to be followed, since 
there were also a small number o f households who moved to non-IFLS provinces, 
such as Southeast Sulawesi, Central Kalimantan, and East Kalimantan.
2.2.4. IFLS4 Household Survey
The target households for IFLS4 were the original IFLS1 households, minus those o f 
whom all their members had died by 2000, plus all o f the split-off households from
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1997, 1998 and 2000. Table 2.6 presents the IFLS 4 household response rate. In total, 
IFLS contacted 13,995 households, including those that died between waves, those 
that relocated into other IFLS households and new split-off households. A total of 
10,994 households were targeted in 2007; IFLS re-contacted 9,962 households, or 
90.6%. From the 10,994 households, 7,135 were original IFLS1 households, 3,859 
were old split-off households. From the 13,995 contacted households, 13,535 
households were actually interviewed. The difference between the 13,535 households 
interviewed and the 13,995 households contacted was those whose members had died 
since the last survey was completed, or other joint IFLS households. In addition, 4,033 
new split-off households IFLS4 were added as contacted households in 2007.











IFLS1 households 7,135 144 6,596 92.4
IFLS2 sp lit-off households 876 7 769 87.8
IFLS2+ sp lit-off households 335 2 295 88.1
IFLS3 sp lit-off households 2,648 15 2,302 86.9
IFLS4 main household/target 10,994 9,962 90.6
IFLS4 sp lit-off households 4,033
Total 13,995
Source: Strauss et al. (2009)
Table 2.7 shows the household response rate across the target provinces. In general, 
the complete interviewed rate o f the IFLS1 households across the target provinces in 
2007 was ranged from 75% to 98%, with DKI Jakarta with the lowest percentage and 
West Nusa Tenggara with the highest percentage. In total, 6,596 IFLS1 households 
were re-contacted in 2007, or about 91.3% o f the response rate.
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North Sumatra 563 493 87.6 532 1025 998
West Sumatra 351 314 89.5 421 735 714
South Sumatra 349 301 86.2 435 736 712
Lampung 274 256 93.4 329 585 569
DKI Jakarta 731 551 75.4 637 1188 1147
West Java 1111 1038 93.4 1227 2265 2207
Central Java 878 840 95.7 973 1813 1733
DI Yogyakarta 478 435 91.0 382 817 786
East Java 1044 1009 96.6 932 1941 1869
Bali 340 316 92.9 330 646 625
W est Nusa
407 399 98.0 484 883 858
Tenggara 
South Kalimantan 323 303 93.8 376 679 653
South Sulawesi 375 341 90.9 341 682 664
Total 7224 6596 91.3 7399 13995 13535
Note: a= Includes IFLS1 households whose members had died, or who had joined other IFLS 
households; Source: Strauss et al. (2009)
Table 2.8 summarizes re-contact rates for each survey wave. For IFLS1, 33,081 
individuals were eligible and alive at the time of the survey. For cost reasons IFLS1 
implemented a within-household sampling scheme, which involved individual 
interviews with the household head and his/her spouse, up to two of their children 
aged 0-14 who were randomly selected, and a randomly selected member aged 50 or 
older and his/her spouse. For a randomly selected 25% of the households, an 
individual aged 15 to 49 and his/her spouse were also randomly selected from the 
remaining members on the household roster. With this scheme, from 33,081 
individuals, 22,588 individuals were tracked and contacted for individual interviews, 
and 22,019 household members could be interviewed, or around 97% o f the 22,588 
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In IFLS2, o f the 33,081 household members in IFLS1 that were eligible for the 
survey, 854 died between the waves or before IFLS2 was done. 32,227 were eligible 
for survey and alive, and 26,948 o f these were interviewed in IFLS2. Over 91% o f the 
“target respondents” were interviewed (row 06), about 1% refused and the rest were 
lost to follow-up. In IFLS3, 790 respondents died between the waves, 38,811 
respondents were eligible for interview, o f which 32,189 were eligible to be tracked 
and interviewed. 91.5% were interviewed and just below 1% refused. The rest were 
lost to follow-up. In IFLS3 there were slightly over 6,000 new entrants, and over
38,000 people were individually assessed in the survey. Almost 45,000 people were 
eligible for the next wave (Strauss et al., 2004). In IFLS4, 2,610 died between the 
waves, and there were 42,305 potential respondents, o f whom 32,757 were target 
respondents. O f these people, 86.5% were tracked and interviewed with 1% refusing 
and the remaining 12% lost to follow-up (Thomas et al., 2010).
In short, Thomas et al. (2010) concluded that fourteen years after the baseline, attrition 
in IFLS remains low. In IFLS surveys, there are relatively few respondents who refuse 
to participate, and so the attrition is mainly because respondents who move are lost to 
follow-up. Predicting movers correctly is very important. Yet, there are so many 
factors that cannot be observed, such as ambition, willingness to take risks and 
patience that may affect migration decisions. Strauss et al. said that the first follow-up 
o f IFLS in 1997 and an interview outcome ten years later, in 2007, depended not only 
on observed characteristics o f the respondents but also the interview in 1997 and the 
characteristics o f the interviewers, including unobserved characteristics. Flere, IFLS 
was successfully interviewing the same respondents in subsequent survey waves 
because o f at least two reasons. The first was having good enumerator skills, such as
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carrying a sense o f empathy towards the respondents and building trust with 
respondents. The second is about the quality o f information that enumerators collect.
In order to ensure the low attrition o f IFLS, Table 2.9 presents information about 
household movement since 1FLS1. According to this table, the number o f households 
who moved to non-IFLS provinces is tiny, at approximately 1%. It means that almost 
99% o f households are still reachable to be interviewed, as the rule o f tracking is that 
as long as households move to an IFLS province, then IFLS is able to track and 
interview them.
Table 2.9: Households’ Movement
IFLS2 IFLS3 IFLS4
Relocation HH % HH % HH %
Did not m ove 6125 89.8 6098 58.4 5771 42.6
M oved within village 212 3.1 1278 12.2 964 7.1
M oved within district 99 1.5 601 5.8 1120 8.3
M oved within municipality 120 1.8 693 6.6 1138 8.4
M oved within province 122 1.8 1001 9.6 2828 20.9
M oved to another IFLS
province 73 1.1 690 6.6 1540 11.4
M oved to non-IFLS province 69 1 74 0.7 175 1.3
Total 6820 10435 13536
Source: Strauss et al. (2009)
2.3. Characteristics of Respondents on 2000 Data (IFLS3)
This section explores the characteristics o f respondents in 2000 for those who were 
interviewed in 2007 and those who were not, as we used two o f the latest waves on 
IFLS data, IFLS3(2000) and IFLS4(2007). Table 2.10 reports the comparison between 
respondents who were interviewed in 2007 and those who were not. Column 1 is 
respondents who were interviewed in 2007 and 2000, and Column 2 is for respondents
39
who were interviewed in 2000 but not interviewed in 2007. The difference between 
Columns 2 and 1 is presented in Column 3.
For individual characteristics, the average number o f years schooling for those who 
were interviewed in 2007 was 7.3 years on average, and 8.1 years for those who were 
not interviewed in 2007. The difference between those groups was 0.8 years. Here, 
respondents who were not interviewed had a slightly better education than those who 
were interviewed. In addition, those who were not interviewed in 2007 had less 
educated fathers and mothers. In terms o f height, they were approximately 2 cm 
shorter than those who were interviewed. Moreover, relative to those who were 
interviewed in 2007, respondents who were not interviewed were 11% less likely to be 
married and earn 2.6 times less.
For household characteristics, Table 2.10 reports that 28% o f those who were 
interviewed owned a farm business in 2000, and only 15% o f those who were not 
interviewed lived in a household that owned a farm business. The level o f household 
expenditure per capita was higher for those who were interviewed by around 49%. In 
sum, Table 2.10 shows that there are large and significant differences in the 
respondent characteristics between those who were interviewed in 2007 and those 
who were not re-interviewed. O f the characteristics o f respondents as they were 
measured in 2000, the target respondents who were most likely to suffer from attrition 
from the 2007 survey were those who were better educated, had a less educated father 
and mother, were shorter, single, were less likely to have their own farm business and 
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Thus the IFLS suffers from considerable attrition. Although there is considerable 
attrition, estimates may still be robust to this problem. To explore the potential for 
attrition inducing biased estimates, we estimated an uncomplicated eamings-equation 
model using the individual data in 2000 (IFLS3) only who do not attrit in 2007 
(IFLS4) compared to a sample that excludes those that eventually attrit. We estimated 
eamings-equation using data from 2000 (IFLS3), and we re-estimated the same model 
using 2000 data after dropping data for those who attrit by 2007. As we can see in 
Table 2.11, Column 1 is the estimation result by using all observation in the 2000 
data, and Column 2 is the estimation results by using the 2000 data after dropping data 
for those who attrit by 2007.
Table 2.11: The eamings-equation estimates





A ge 0.104*** 0.102***
(0.00327) (0.00402)




Secondary education 0.516*** 0.539***
(0.0223) (0.0256)










Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical 
significance: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Table 2.11 shows the estimation results o f eaming-equation for testing the attrition. 
The results suggest that although those who drop out o f the sample are different from
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those who remain in the sample, there is no significant effect on the regression results. 
As we can see, the coefficient o f each variable has a similar value both with attrition 
and without attrition. For instance, the age coefficient with attrition is 0.104, and 
without attrition is 0.102. The male coefficient is 0.425 for estimation with attrition 
and 0.460 is for estimation without attrition. Hence, we should not worry about 
attrition bias in the estimation results by using IFLS data 2000 and 2007.
We also conducted a F-test to examine whether parameters o f equation 1 o f the data 
are equal to those o f equation 2 on table 2.11. The null hypothesis is parameters in 
equation 1 are equal to parameters in equation 2. If the null hypothesis is rejected, two 
equations have different slopes and intercepts. With a F-statistic is equal to 0.92 and 
P-value equal to 0.56, we fail to reject the null hypothesis at 0.05 significance level. 
This means that there are no difference estimators between those two equations.
2.4. Sample Design and Response Rate of the IFLS Community and Facility 
Survey
For the community and facility survey, all information is about the characteristics of 
communities, including the facilities that are around the household. In past waves, 
these data had been collected only in the original 312 IFLS1 EAs or communities (9 
o f them are the same as other EAs that had already been interviewed and resided in 
the same larger community, thus making up 321 communities in total). Data was 
collected from the official village/township leader and a group o f his/her staff were 
interviewed about aspects o f community life; in visits to local health facilities and 
schools, staff representatives were interviewed about the staffing, operation and usage 
o f their facilities, prices and the availability o f appropriate equipment and supplies.
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For health facilities, measures o f process quality were taken; data on prices o f goods 
were collected from three complementary sources: from a large local market, two 
stores or street stalls and an interview with a group o f up to three knowledgeable local 
informants.
IFLS sampled schools and health care providers from information provided by 
household respondents. There were several strata o f public facilities including health 
care and school types with the quota for each enumeration area: government health 
centres (3 units); private clinics and practitioners, including doctors, midwives, nurses 
and paramedics (5 units); community health posts (2 units), community health post for 
the elderly (1 unit), traditional health practitioners (2 units), community informants (2 
units), primary schools (3 units), junior high schools (3 units) and senior high schools 
(2 units). Most o f the information was gathered from the official village or township 
leaders and their staff and also staff representatives for health centres or health 
facilities and schools. Information about prices was collected from around 4 persons 
per village and the market was also visited to get market price information directly.
For each enumeration area lists o f facilities in each strata o f public facilities were 
constructed by gathering information provided by the household regarding the names 
and locations o f facilities that they used or knew. For the health facility in each EA, 
IFLS compiled a list o f facilities from household responses about the names and 
locations o f facilities that the respondent knew about. The names and locations 
provided were added to the sampling frame. Household respondents did not need to 
have actually used a health facility for it to be relevant to the facility sample. Though 
someone in the household may well have used a facility that was mentioned, any
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facility known to the respondent was relevant. On the other hand, for the lists o f 
schools, the sample was based on the names o f candidate schools that were obtained 
from household responses, in which (typically) the household head verified the name 
and location o f all schools currently attended by household members under the age of 
25. Each school in the candidate list had at least one member o f an IFLS household 
attending. Not all identified health facilities and schools were eligible for interview. A 
facility was excluded if it had already been interviewed in another EA, and if it was 
more than 45 minutes away by motorcycle. The facilities that were located in another 
area were eligible for interview so long it was in a reachable area (about 45 minutes 
away by motorcycle).
The facilities on each list were ranked by frequency o f mention. These ranked lists 
provided frames for each stratum from which a sample o f two to four facilities was 
drawn. In all strata, the most frequently mentioned facility was always visited. 
Additional facilities were randomly selected to fill the quota for that stratum. Because 
IFLS sampled randomly from sample frames constructed by householder knowledge 
o f facilities in 2007, IFLS may not necessarily have re-sampled facilities that were 
sampled in IFLS1, 2 or 3; however, many facilities would have been the same.
Table 2.12: The Number o f Community Facilities in IFLS1
Facility type
Total number 
o f  facilities
Average number 
o f  facility per EA 
Urban Rural
Government health centres 993 3.1 3.1
Private clinics and 1439 2.25 2.25
practitioners
Elementary schools 944 1.9 1.7
Junior high schools 900 2.8 2.8
Senior high schools 584 2.9 3
Source: Frankenberg et al. (1995)
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Table 2.12 presents the distribution o f community facilities by facility type and the 
average number o f facilities per enumeration area in IFLS1. For health facilities, in 
addition to 993 government health centres, there were also 1,439 private clinics and 
practitioners provided. For school facilities, IFLS1 compiled information about 944 
elementary schools, 900 junior high schools and 584 senior high schools. For IFLS2, 
the number o f community facilities is presented in Table 2.13. In total, there were an 
increasing number o f community facilities, except government health centres. In 
addition, there were also new community facilities in IFLS2 and the IFLS1 
community facilities that were re-interviewed in IFLS2.











Government health centres 993 66.5 662 259 921
Private clinics and 
practitioners
1439 40.4 582 1249 1831
Elementary schools 944 64.9 612 351 963
Junior high schools 900 55.3 498 447 945
Senior high schools 584 44.2 258 360 618
Source: Frankenberg and Thomas (2000)
For the IFLS1 CF re-interviewed rate, government health centres have the highest 
percentage with 66.5%, and private clinics and practitioners have the lowest, with 
around 40%. This is not surprising since there are numerous private facilities, so the 
sampling rates are smaller, plus the yearly turnover is larger. Hence, we can also see 
that for new CF IFLS2, private clinics and practitioners have a larger number.
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% Number %  number
Government 
health centres
993 63.1 627 732 211 943 53.3 529
Private clinics 
and practitioners
1439 32.8 472 859 1045 1904 22.6 325
Elementary
schools
944 53.4 504 641 319 960 44.3 418
Junior high 
schools
900 50.3 453 647 304 951 38.1 343
Senior high 
schools
584 33 193 284 334 618 21.6 126
Source: Strauss et al. (2004)
The number o f community facilities in IFLS3 is presented in Table 2.14. There is a 
similar pattern for the IFLS1 re-interviewed rate, with the highest rate around 63% for 
government health centres, and the lowest rate at 32% for private clinics and 
practitioners. In addition, there is also a percentage rate for CFs that could be 
interviewed in IFLS 1, IFLS2, and IFLS3. In comparison with the re-interviewed rate 
for IFLS1 CFs, the re-interviewed rates are smaller but still have a similar pattern. In 
total, the numbers o f community facilities that were interviewed are not that different 
from IFLS2.
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% Number viewed %  Number
Government 
health centres
993 52.4 520 662 290 952 40.0 397
Private clinics 
and practitioners 1439 16.1
232 582 1013 1595 8.5 123
Elementary
schools
944 40 378 518 448 966 28.4 268
Junior high 
schools
900 40.8 367 602 357 959 26.1 235
Senior high 
schools
584 27.4 160 274 359 633 12.8 75
Source: Strauss et al. (2009)
From the latest survey, Table 2.15 presents the number o f facilities interviewed in 
IFLS4. There are community facilities from IFLS1 only that could be re-interviewed 
in IFLS4, community facilities from IFLS1, 2 or 3 that were re-interviewed 
individually in IFLS4, and panel community facilities that were interviewed in IFLS4, 
3, 2 and 1. In addition, there are also new facilities that were interviewed only in 
IFLS4. In total, the interviewed facilities in IFLS4 number around 950 public health 
clinics, approximately 1,600 private health clinics and over 2,500 schools. It was the 
same case with the previous wave: the highest re-interviewed rate for IFLS1 CF was 
around 50% for government health centres, and the lowest re-interview rate was in 
private health facilities, at 16%.
4 8
2.5. Questionnaires
Data was collected by using questionnaires. There were separate questionnaires for 
individual or household questionnaires and community facility questionnaires. 
Individual and household questions were classified into four books, based upon the 
category o f respondent (head of HH, spouse, child, adult). For instance, the head o f 
HH was interviewed about the general information o f the household, such as health, 
education, income and basic information about household members. The adult 
respondent questions included enquiries about marriage and fertility. Children were 
asked about general childhood conditions, such as health and education. In general, all 
instruments were to cover all information on the household level, such as 
consumption, income, welfare, education, migration, employment, marital status, 
fertility, contraception, health status, elderly health condition, utilizing health services, 
health insurance, transfer from and to HH, HH decision making and community 
participation.
In addition, community and facility questionnaires were separated in to several books, 
according to the type o f facilities. For example, school questionnaires for school 
facilities, health centre questionnaires for health centres, and market price 
questionnaires. Overall, information on community level was about the physical 
condition o f the area, the social condition, infrastructure, job opportunities, prices of 
needs, access to health facilities, access to education facilities, quality and health 
facility services, quality and education facility services, social activities, social 
security programs (2000), poverty alleviation programs (2007), decentralization and 
good governance (2007).
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RAND collected all IFLS questionnaires together from each wave and they can be 
downloaded all the questionnaires from the IFLS RAND official website in the data 
and documentation section4. In addition, there is also an overview and field report o f 
each wave, which explains all o f the questions asked5.
2.6. IFLS Data for Chapters
Based on the sample o f datasets above, this study used two waves o f micro data for 
IFLS3(2000) and IFLS4(2007), and will examine the education, health, expenditure 
and disasters sections. The main reason why we only use the last two waves is because 
those two waves provide complete information on data that are needed, especially data 
about disasters. Using the two latest waves o f IFLS data, we constructed three 
different datasets in this study. The first data set is a cross-section data at the 
individual level, from IFLS4 only. We used IFLS4 since all data about the school 
operational assistance program (BOS) as a new scheme of school subsidy and its 
information is only provided in IFLS4. Using this data set we examined the impact o f 
BOS on child test scores. In addition, we also used this data for analysing the impact 
o f disasters on child test scores. The main variable used in this data set is the child test 
score at primary school, information about the year o f test, and school subsidy. 
Furthermore, for disasters, we used information about people who were being affected 
by disasters, including the type of disasters. Table 2.16 presents descriptive statistics 
of all variables that are used in those studies. From table 2.16, the main variables for 
chapter 3 are BOS, test score and poverty index. BOS as the school subsidy program 
is represented by the BOS dummy variable, equal to 1 if individuals received BOS 
and 0 otherwise. From IFLS survey data, we determined BOS students based on self-
4 http://www.rand.org/labor/FLS/IFLS/download.htm l
5 Frankenberg et Al. (1995); Frankenberg and Thomas (2000); Strauss et al. (2004); Strauss et al.
(2009).
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reported information from the survey. They reported whether they received BOS. For 
test score, it was obtained from the national test score that was conducted at Grade 6 
(last grade at primary school). The IFLS surveyor asked whether they could show the 
certificate o f national test score, and recorded. If they could not show the certificate, 
the surveyor asked and recorded the test scores if they remembered. The scale o f test 
scores is 0 to 10.
For the poverty index, it was constructed by adding 8 poor criteria. There are 8 
dummies for poor criteria, which are equal to 1 for each criterion, and 0 otherwise. 
The 8 criteria are: no electricity at home, less water source, no toilet, inappropriate 
stove, health cards, low income, landless and no house. The poverty index, therefore, 
ranges from 0 to 8. The 0 value means not poor, and the 8 is the poorest. In addition to 
poverty index, we also observed information o f households who receive poor letter, 
since we used this information for Instrumental Variable regression as instrument for 
BOS. Children from poor family are eligible to get BOS by showing poor letter as 
evidence. Poor letter was given to the family who meet at least 1 criteria. The family 
is identified by using poverty indexes. Using those poverty indexes, head o f village or 
staffs o f village issued the letter, and when head o f village or staffs o f village are 
absent, the community figures usually can issue the poor letter. Head o f village and 
staffs o f village are more accountable in issuing poor letter because they should use 14 
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In addition to the main variables, we also used other explanatory variables, such as a 
dummy head o f village equal to 1 if a head o f village determined which households 
are categorised as poor households and 0 otherwise. On the other hand, the dummy 
staff o f a village is equal to 1 if the poor category for households was determined by 
the staff o f a village. As the excluded category for village officer dummy, we defined 
other o f village as the value equal to 1 if the poor category for households was not 
determined by the head o f village or the staff o f village, such as community figures, 
head o f RT (Rukun Tetangga=a group of several households in a small 
neighbourhood), village midwife, NGO and other. There is also a rank o f Head Count 
Index (HCI) for the provincial level. It measures the percentage o f the population that 
is considered as poor or living below the poverty line. The rank is ordered from the 
highest percentages to the lowest one. The smaller the rank o f HCI, the poorer the 
province is. Java dummy variable is equal to 1 if individuals reside in java and 0 
otherwise.
In Chapter 4, for analysis o f the impact o f disasters on child test scores, there are 
several important variables that are presented in Table 2.16. One key variable is the 
disaster variable. A disaster region is defined as a region which has a bigger disaster 
than other regions. Neumayer and Plumper (2007) measure the strength o f a disaster 
using the number o f people killed during the disaster divided by the total population as 
a proxy o f the strength o f the disaster, but this study uses two proxies as a measure of 
the strength o f a disaster. Besides using the percentage o f number o f people killed to 
the total population, this study also uses the percentage o f the number o f people 
evacuated from the population instead. The region which experiences disasters almost 
every year that affect the economy can be captured using this proxy.
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For our empirical analysis, we have determined disaster regions as DI Yogyakarta, 
DKI Jakarta and West Sumatra. We picked those three provinces since only those 
three provinces are completely covered by IFLS survey data. Yogyakarta, with a big 
earthquake, had the highest percentage o f both dead and evacuated people. In terms of 
the percentage o f evacuated people, West Sumatra, with a small earthquake, had an 
above average percentage, and in terms o f the percentage o f dead people, although 
West Sumatra had a below average percentage, the value was just below DI 
Yogyakarta, which was quite high compared to other provinces. DKI Jakarta 
experienced several floods, and although the percentage o f dead people was quite low, 
the percentage o f evacuated people was above average; another strong argument was 
that DKI Jakarta experienced floods almost every year and always presented severe 
problems.
Based on disaster data information above, we define a dummy D (Disaster region) and 
a dummy A (being affected by disaster). D is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an 
individual is from a disaster region and 0 otherwise. A is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if an individual is in a disaster region and is affected directly by the disaster and 0 
otherwise. We created the same dummy variables for D and A for each type of 
disasters (big earthquake, small earthquake and floods). In addition, we also have 
D2006, D2007, A2006 and A2007. These are also related, with dummy variables o f D 
and A. D2006 is equal to 1 if children in a disaster region took the test in 2006 and 0 
otherwise. D2007 is for children taking the test in 2007. Furthermore, A2006 is equal 
to 1 if children in disaster regions and affected by a disaster took the test in 2006, and 
there is a similar meaning for A2007.
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The second data set is panel data, which consists o f IFLS3 and IFLS4 at the individual 
level. We used this dataset to examine the impact o f disasters on child health. The 
main reason why we used panel data for this study is because we need data on child 
health before and after disasters to observe whether there is any impact from disasters. 
IFLS3 provides information before disaster, and IFLS4 provides information after 
disaster. The main variables that we use in this research are the height o f a child aged 
2 to 5 years old in cm, and self-reported-data on health, which reported general health 
condition, the previous year’s health condition, the number o f days in bed, and the 
number o f days absent because of poor health. Table 2.16 shows the descriptive 
statistics from panel data provided by IFLS3 and IFLS4 at the individual level
Some o f the important variables in Chapter 4, for the analysis o f the impact o f 
disasters on child health that are presented in Table 2.17, have been explained in the 
previous table. Those variables, such as A, D, and also A and D for each type of 
disaster have the same meaning as the previous variables in Table 2.16. Moreover, 
there are several important health variables which are not presented in Table 2.16, like 
general health, days missed, days in bed, last year’s health, the water system, the 
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For general health condition, the respondents were asked about their general health 
condition at the time of the survey, and the answer was designed in closed questions, 
which consisted o f rank data: (1) very healthy, (2) somewhat healthy, (3) somewhat 
unhealthy and (4) unhealthy. For last’s year health condition, respondents were asked 
about the health condition 12 months ago in comparison with the condition at the time 
o f the survey, and the data consisted of: (l)m uch better now, (2) somewhat better 
now, (3) about the same, (4) somewhat worse, and (5) much worse. In comparison 
with general health condition, last’s year health condition represented the child health 
condition that was closer to the time o f disasters. As the big earthquake was occurred 
in May 2006, floods in January 2007, and small earthquake in March 2007, while 
IFLS4 survey was conducted in November 2007 to May 2008. For count values, days 
missed and days in bed are the total number o f days missing from regular activities 
and lying in bed for each child due to a poor health condition in the previous 4 weeks 
from the time of the survey.
Moreover, at the community level, we provide information about the water supply and 
the garbage system in the community. Dummy water system is equal to 1 if there is a 
good system or supply for drinking water and dummy garbage system is equal to 1 if 
there is a good system for garbage disposal in the community. There is also 
information about the wet season. Dummy wet season is equal to 1 if the child was 
born in the wet season and 0 otherwise.
The third data set is the IFLS panel data formed from IFLS3 and IFLS4 at the 
household level. Here we obtain all variables at the household level only. We use this 
data set to study the impact o f disasters on household expenditure and food demand.
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The main data that we use are information on various household expenditure, shares 
o f expenditure, several prices o f foods for food demand estimation and also 
information about disasters. Table 2.18 presents the descriptive statistics o f all 
variables.
As presented in Table 2.18, there are some important variables that are not seen in 
previous tables. Those variables are the main variables used in Chapter 5 for analysis 
o f the impact o f disasters on household expenditure and food demand. All price 
variables are both at market level and household level, and some relate to expenditure 
on foods. For price, there are two different types o f prices according to the source of 
information: price at market level and price at household level. Prices at market level 
are obtained from community level, which is from market informants, while prices at 
household level are obtained from households. For food expenditures, there are three 
different types o f food expenditure: market purchased expenditures, own produced 
expenditures, and total food expenditures. Market purchased expenditure is the 
expenditure o f food from market purchases and own produced expenditure is food 
expenditure that is estimated from a household’s own production from their farm. The 
sum o f those two expenditures is the total food expenditure.
For all prices and expenditures, we only observed 5 types o f important foods: rice, 
vegetable, meat, fish and oil. Furthermore, we also considered the number o f 
household members across age categories. We classified age into 6 groups: under 6 
years, 6 to 12 years old, 13 to 18 years old, 19 to 23 years old, 24 to 60 years old and 
over 60.
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2.7. Relevant IFLS Papers
This section briefly discusses selected literatures which use IFLS data that are relevant 
to this study but all these studies are different in methodology and focus. A 
considerable amount o f literature that has used IFLS data in their work has been 
published in recent years. With regard to the disasters study, Brown and Wong (2011) 
investigated the link between poverty and vulnerability with respect to disasters from 
forest fires. Using panel data of IFLS, they used a utility model to estimate both the 
households’ vulnerability in total and their food consumption. In addition, they used 
OLS to estimate the effect o f forest fires on vulnerability. The results confirmed that 
households with a high degree o f exposure to smoke from the fires were more 
vulnerable in total consumption than households with lower exposure, but they were 
no more vulnerable in food consumption. In comparison with our study, this study 
only considered forest fires, while our study used several types o f disasters.
Pangaribowo and Tsegal (2011) is similar to our study on food demand. They studied 
demand for food in Indonesian households by using 3 waves o f IFLS data (IFLS2, 
IFLS3 and IFLS4). Using Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System, they observed the 
food expenditure patterns across income groups and regional differences. The results 
showed that the poorest households’ expenditure was dominated by staple food 
expenditure, while the richest households’ expenditure was on vegetables, fish and 
meat. Most o f the food price elasticities were found to be elastic, except staple food 
and oil. In comparison with our study, the methodology that we employed was 
different. We used Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System (LA-AIDS), 
but the results are similar with the results in our study.
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Gill and Satriawan (2010) examined the impact o f a supplemental feeding program 
(.Program Makanan Tambahan-PMT) on child nutritional status in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis from 1998 to 2000. Using two round panel data o f Indonesia 
Family Life Surveys (IFLS2 and IFLS3) which covered the condition pre- and post­
crisis, they observed the nutritional status o f young children at age 12 to 24 months at 
the time of the survey in 2000. By employing difference in differences methods, they 
measured the impact o f the program on the treatment group (children with the PMT 
program). The results confirmed that the program had a significant impact on children 
in a group aged 12 to 24 months at the time of the survey but no effect on children 
younger or older than this group.
Another interesting study on the impact of disasters on consumption and expenditure 
was conducted by Cameron and Worswick (2001). They studied the impact o f crop 
loss due to weather shocks and drought on household education expenditure in 
Indonesia. This research is interesting since they analyse whether households could 
cope with their consumption during hard times by defining permanent income and 
transitory income. They only focus on educational expenditure to avoid the 
measurement error o f total expenditure because the non-food expenditure is not well 
recorded. Cameron and Worswick (2001) designed a model o f educational 
expenditure in response to crop loss to investigate whether households are able to 
smooth consumption or not in the time o f crop loss. The finding from this study shows 
that households were not able to smooth consumption during the time of crop loss so 
they were most likely to reduce educational expenditure, especially for girls.
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Newhouse and Beegle (2005) studied the effect o f school type on the academic 
achievement o f junior high school students in Indonesia. Using 3 waves o f IFLS data 
(IFLS1, IFLS2 and IFLS3), they estimated using OLS, fixed-effects and instrumental 
variable estimation and found that students who graduate from public junior 
secondary schools, controlling for a variety o f other characteristics, score 0.15 to 0.3 
standard deviations higher on the national exit exam than comparable privately- 
schooled peers. In addition, the results also provide indirect evidence that higher 
quality inputs at public junior secondary schools promote higher test scores.
Borghans, Dupuy, and Wu (2008 examine the educational expenditure in response to 
an aggregate shock (Asian financial crisis) to human capital investment behaviour. 
They defined human capital investment as parents’ decisions over the financing of 
their children’s education and the types o f school that the children attend, such as 
formal or informal, religious or non-religious school. The results show that when the 
cost o f education rose disproportionately, then consumption levels changed and 
caused education expenditure to fall. In such circumstance, some children were still 
able to receive some education, which could be formal or informal, but there are still 
questions about whether parents from different income levels were still able to 
maintain the educational quality attained by their children. Using a national evaluation 
test score - EBTANAS (Evaluasi Belajar Tahap Akhir Nasional) - national 
achievement test scores for a measure for educational outcome, they found that the 
Asian financial crisis caused some children to self-select themselves out o f transition 
to drop out o f education, despite passing their tests.
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Another interesting study on education was conducted by Thomas et al. (2004), which 
discussed the effect of the financial crisis in 1998 on education and also looked at the 
relation between education and household expenditure at the time after the crisis. 
Using two waves o f IFLS data (IFLS 1, IFLS2 and IFLS2+), they assessed the impact 
o f the crisis by estimating Engle curve for educational expenditure in measuring the 
change in real education expenditure and linear regression. The results showed that on 
average household spending on education declined, most dramatically among the 
poorest households. Spending reductions were particularly marked in poor households 
with more young children, while there was a tendency to protect education spending 
in poor households with older children. In addition, they found that the school 
enrolments decreased most for young children and those from the poorest households. 
In urban areas, young children from low-resource households in 1997 were less likely 
to be enrolled in school in 1998 if they had older siblings living in the household, and 
on the other hand, older children in these households were more likely to be in school 
if they had younger siblings.
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Chapter 3 
The Impact of the School Operational Assistance Program (BOS) 
on Child Test Scores in Indonesia: An Evaluation Using Matching Method
3.1. Introduction
Investment in human capital, especially in child education, is considered to be among 
the most effective ways for countries to improve their national welfare and reduce 
poverty in the long term. Becker (1964) pointed out that investment in human capital 
raises earnings in later life. Undoubtedly, promoting educational attainment can raise 
living standards on average and contribute to the reduction in absolute poverty by 
enabling individuals to generate income and access better-paid jobs. Many 
governments in developing countries have made this issue one o f this top national 
priority by ensuring that the national budget allocation to education is increased. Many 
governments have promoted human capital investment, especially on children, by 
designing subsidy programs such as PROGRESA (Programa de Educacion, Salud y 
Alimentacion) in Mexico, PRAF (Programa de Asignacion Familiar) in Honduras, 
PETI (Programa de Erradica9ao do Trabalho Infantil) in Brazil, FA (Familias en 
Accion) in Colombia, and BOS (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah) in Indonesia. School 
Operational Assistance, or BOS in Indonesia, started in 2005 and has been the biggest 
school subsidy program in Indonesia during the last two decades. An important issue 
addressed in this chapter is to evaluate the impact o f BOS on student performance at 
primary school, especially in improving the quality o f education as measured the child 
test scores.
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This chapter contributes to the international literature in several aspects. First, 
compared to other literature, this study uses survey data with self-reported information 
on whether children get a school subsidy from the government. This allows us to 
estimate the impact o f the treatment rather than the intention to treat (people 
eligibility). Second, this study examines the impact o f school subsidies on a measure 
o f school quality, test scores, while most of the earlier studies looked at the impact of 
school subsidies on a quantity measure o f schooling, such as school enrolment or 
dropping out. Third, the BOS program is an example o f a specific school subsidy 
program to support basic education in Indonesia. The subsidy for each student who is 
eligible is distributed to the school directly and is managed by the school for 
operational expenses so that the students will be free from all kinds o f fees during their 
schooling. The students only receive a small amount o f money for their transportation 
allowance. An evaluation o f this school subsidy policy is important to inform whether 
this kind o f policy is appropriate to adopt in other countries.
According to the World Bank, Indonesia has a relatively low percentage, at 3%, of 
GDP allocated to education, or about 13% of public expenditure6. It is relatively low if 
we compare it with developed countries such as Denmark, which has the highest 
percentage o f public spending on education at 8% of GDP, or around 30% o f public 
expenditure. Moreover, based on the poverty line definition o f the Central Bureau of 
Statistics o f RP 182,636.00, or US$20 per person per month, Indonesia - with a 
population o f 235 million - still had approximately 30 million people, or around 13 per 
cent , living in poverty in 2010. However, according to the World Bank poverty 
definition o f US$2 per person per day, Indonesia has 116 million people (49%) who
6 Source o f  data: The World Bank (2010), http://data.worldbank.org
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live in poverty. The Government o f Indonesia realizes that such extreme poverty 
implies that income is usually only just sufficient for subsistence and not sufficient to 
finance schooling; therefore the government has to consider its policies regarding 
financing education.
As a part o f financing education, the Government o f Indonesia has designed several 
school subsidy programs especially to support basic education in the last two decades, 
such as the JPS (Jaring Pengaman Sosial) scholarship program, the BKM (Bantuan 
Khusus Murid) program, and the BOS (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah) program7. The 
BOS program is the most recent school subsidy program with the biggest allocation of 
national budget. The main purpose of the BOS program is to support 9 years o f basic 
education in Indonesia so that all poor children can get access to basic education free of 
charge. In 2005, when BOS was launched, it was only allocated to poor students who 
met certain criteria, so those children were entitled to get free education. In 2009, BOS 
was allocated to each school based on the total number o f students, so all students at 
primary and junior high school were free from school fees, although well-off students 
still paid some school operational costs, such as extracurricular, enrichment or other 
student activities.
This study uses three different methods: Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Instrumental 
Variable (IV) and Propensity Score Matching (PSM) estimation. OLS is used as a 
conventional method and estimates the effect o f school subsidy on average by 
assuming that BOS is exogenous, while IV estimation is used to deal with endogeneity 
o f BOS and also correct for selection bias based on unobservable characteristics. In
7 Further discussion about school subsidy policies reform in Indonesia is in Section 3 o f  this chapter.
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addition, IV estimates the effect o f the treatment on those individuals whose behaviour 
is affected by treatment. That is, IV estimation provides an estimate o f the causal effect 
for those individuals who change the treatment status because o f the instrument. 
Moreover, PSM is used to estimate the average treatment effect in the absence of 
selection on unobserved characteristics.
Our main finding is that the BOS program has a positive and significant effect on child 
test scores. Students who receive subsidies on average raise their test score. OLS 
estimation suggested that test scores can be raised by 0.358 points, and IV estimation 
resulted in a bigger value by 3.3 points. Furthermore, PSM also suggested that the BOS 
program in Indonesia increased test scores by 0.26 points. In comparison with other 
estimation, IV estimation resulted in a bigger value. It is because o f the local average 
treatment effect when the instruments generated the treatment effects exceeded those 
generated from OLS and PSM estimations. Overall, in the early program, BOS 
successfully improved average student performance. Yet, when the analysis was broken 
down by student type we found evidence that, BOS does not help very poor students, 
but does help less poor students. All o f our work is conditional on being at school to 
take the test. We envisage that the mechanism by which BOS affect test scores is 
through encouraging attendance up to age 11 at least.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses a review of the 
literature on the effects o f school subsidies on schooling. The third section outlines the 
school subsidy reforms in Indonesia and is followed by students’ and BOS description. 
The fifth section presents data sources and is followed by methodology. The seventh
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section discusses the finding on child test scores and evaluates the estimation results. 
The last section concludes with policy recommendations.
3.2. Literature Review
This section reviews the previous school subsidy studies using micro data. Many 
countries use conditional cash transfers (CCT) as the type o f subsidy. CCT is a type of 
subsidy by giving money to the poor in return for fulfilling specific behavioural 
conditions. The conditions are made to minimize the failures from the aim of subsidy 
while transferring money to the poor. Janvry and Sadaulet (2006) underlined that CCT 
can assist the use o f subsidy more efficient if we implement three rules. The first is a 
rule to select the poor. The second is eligibility among the poor and the last one is 
calibration o f transfers, particularly if budgets are insufficient to offer large universal 
transfers to all the poor. Conditionality is used to try to ensure that the subsidy has the 
desired effect such as in increasing school enrolment, decreasing school dropout rate, 
or increasing student performance. In addition to the type o f subsidy, the methods that 
the previous studies used are also varies. Some studies use randomized experiments, 
and other studies implement different methods, such as instrumental variable 
regression, propensity score matching, or linear parametric regression. The literatures 
are reviewed separately for developed and developing countries.
3.2.1. Developed Country Studies
A considerable number o f studies have focused their attention on school subsidies in 
developed countries. The US study for New York City (NYC), was conducted by 
Riccio et al. (2010). The program, known as Opportunity NYC, is a conditional cash 
transfer program for poor families. The recipients should use the subsidy for
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developing children’s education or other activities related with developing human 
capital. The finding showed that there was no effect on some educational outcomes, 
such as educational achievement, for primary and secondary school students.
In the United Kingdom, Dearden et al. (2005) examined the effect o f conditional cash 
transfer paid to children aged 16-18 in full-time education on school dropouts in the 
UK in 1999. The Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA) program was targeted at 
students who completed the last year o f compulsory education in Year 11 in summer 
1999. This program was introduced to subsidize children to remain in school for up to 
two years beyond the statutory age in the UK (Dearden et al., 2005). By using Kernel- 
based propensity score matching, a multinomial probit and a linear regression model, 
they estimated the impact o f the program on school dropouts. Dearden et al. (2005) 
confirmed that EMA had a positive and significant impact on school participation.
In 1986, the government o f Australia introduced the school subsidy program, 
AUSTUDY, to increase school participation in higher education and reduce youth 
unemployment. Dearden and Heath (1999) estimated the impact o f AUSTUDY on the 
probability o f completing the final two years o f secondary school. They used 
instrumental variables, where the eligibility for AUSTUDY was used as an instrument 
for AUSTUDY receipt. They found that the AUSTUDY program had been successful 
in increasing school participation by approximately 3%, especially for those who were 
from poor family backgrounds.
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3.2.2. Developing Country Studies
The most influential study o f school subsidy program in developing countries was the 
study on the Mexican PROGRESA poverty program by Behrman and Todd (1999). 
PROGRESA was created in 1997 to provide a conditional cash grant and to support 
education, health and nutrition for rural poor families in Mexico, especially for children 
and their mothers. In the case of educational grants, the recipients had to meet some 
requirements that were designed by the Federal government, such as maintaining 
school attendance for children at 85% and above. Behrman and Todd (1999) tried to 
evaluate the impact o f PROGRESA on education for poor families in the initial stages 
by using a randomized social experiment. This approach was used to ensure the 
similarity o f characteristics in both observables and unobservables between the 
treatment and control areas. Treatment was randomly assigned at the local level, not at 
the household level to ensure that the control was not contaminated. In general they 
found that there was no difference between treatment and control area means.
Using the same data that was used by Behrman and Todd (1999), Schultz (2004) re­
examined the effect o f the PROGRESA school subsidy on school enrolment in Mexico. 
He also used a randomized design to analyse the data and this was followed by two 
steps analysis. Firstly, he used difference in differences between the treatment and 
control groups to see the impact o f subsidy on school enrolment. Secondly, probit 
model was adopted to estimate the effect on the probability o f being enrolled in school. 
The determinants o f school enrolment include the household characteristics, such as the 
years o f schooling completed by father and mother, the eligibility o f children (from the 
poor family), the area o f living where the PROGRESA was implemented, the distance 
to the nearest school and the school and community characteristics. Schultz found that
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there was a significant difference in school enrolment between the areas where 
PROGRESA was implemented and where it was not.
Nicaragua created a similar conditional cash transfer program in 2000, Red de 
Proteccion Social (RPS), modelled on the PROGRESA conditional cash transfer 
program. This program was targeted at poor households and conditioned the cash 
transfer on school attendance and health service. Maluccio and Flores (2005) conducted 
an evaluation o f that area level using the evaluation design based on a randomized, 
community-based intervention with measurements before and after the intervention in 
both treatment and control communities. They selected 42 randomly administrative 
areas into the program. Each administrative area had around 100 households. 21 areas 
were for treatment areas and 21 areas were for control areas. They found that RPS 
successfully increased the net school enrolment by 12.8% on average and decreased the 
number o f working children by 5.6%.
Honduras is another country with a similar cash transfer program, along with Mexico, 
Ecuador and Nicaragua. Glewwe and Olinto (2004) evaluated the impact o f the 
conditional cash transfer program (Program de Asignacion Familiar, PRAF) on 
schooling. They used demand and supply side methods to examine the program. The 
demand side was the approach when the household received the cash transfer 
conditional on school attendance o f the children while the supply side was the approach 
when the assistance goes to the school directly. Glewwe and Olinto (2004) confirmed 
that the demand side approach is more effective than the supply side, increasing the 
school enrolment by 1-2% and reducing the drop-out rate by 2-3%.
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In a more recent study in Ecuador, another developing country in Latin America, 
Schady and Araujo (2008) examined the impact o f conditional cash transfers on school 
enrolment. The cash transfer program, the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH), was a 
huge program from 2004 with a total budget o f approximately 0.7 percent o f the Gross 
Domestic Product o f Ecuador and was targeted at poor families with children aged 6- 
17. It was evaluated using a reduced form regression, where the dependent variable was 
a dummy variable of school enrolment as a function o f child and household 
characteristics and dummy variable o f BDH that takes value 1 if the household received 
the cash transfer. They found that the probability that the child was enrolled in school 
increased by 3.2% to 4% when the household received the cash transfer.
Attanasio, Fitzsimons and Gomez (2005), in a study o f the impact o f the conditional 
cash programme in Colombia, Familias en Action (FA), on school enrolment, found 
that a monthly subsidy for education paid to eligible mothers whose children attended 
school was an effective programme to increase school enrolment, both in urban and 
rural areas. They used average information o f the school enrolment in the treatment 
group either with or without program and the control group then estimated the 
counterfactual for the treatment group without the programme. Estimation was by 
linear regression because o f its greater efficiency. They confirmed that the program 
increased school enrolment both in urban and rural areas.
Pakistan has a further example o f a school subsidy programme in developing countries. 
In this case, the transfer is made to the school. Kim, Alderman and Orazem (1999) 
studied the impact o f this school subsidy, the Urban Fellowship Program, on school 
enrolment, particularly for poor girls. This study observed that in Pakistan there is a
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culture which prevents girls from going to school. To overcome this problem, the 
government o f Pakistan introduced private schools for girls to increase girls’ 
enrolment, especially in poor regions. These private schools are supported by the 
government and receive school subsidies which are allocated to the poor girls’ tuition 
fees. They define the treatment group as the households which reside in the region 
where a girls’ private school is created, while the control group is the households which 
reside outside the program’s region. They found that the girls’ school subsidy can 
increase the enrolment rate, not only for girls but also for boys. This result suggests that 
girls’ education is complementary with boys’ education.
India provides subsidies for school meals. Afridi (2010) evaluated the impact o f school 
meals on school participation in rural India. This study used school panel data and 
household data which was estimated by difference-in-differences. Afridi (2010) 
estimated two different models. The first model was for both public and private schools 
while the second was only for public schools. All models confirmed that there was a 
negative and insignificant effect of school meals subsidy on school enrolment. 
Furthermore, the school meals subsidy program had a significant impact on the daily 
attendance decision. There was a larger and significant increase in girls’ attendance in 
the lower grades, but an insignificant effect for boys o f lower grades. This was because 
the cash value o f the school meals subsidy was relatively larger for lower grade 
students, and encouraged the parents to send their children to school more regularly, 
especially girls in lower grades. As a result, this program was found to reduce gender 
disparity in education.
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There have been some empirical studies on Indonesian earlier school subsidies. The 
most famous study was conducted by Duflo (2001), which examined a school subsidy 
by Indonesia’s government for the school construction programme. Between 
1973/1974 and 1978/1979, 61,807 new schools were constructed and it spent over 500 
million USD, calculated using the 1990 exchange rate. The World Bank (1990) 
observed that it was the fastest primary school construction program ever undertaken in 
the world. The research suggested that an investment in infrastructure causes a rise in 
school enrolment and educational attainment. An increase in educational attainment 
caused an increase in earnings. Another school subsidy study was conducted by 
Sparrow (2007). He evaluated the impact o f the social safety net in education (Jaring 
Pengaman Sosial, JPS) on school enrolment after Indonesia was hit by the financial 
crisis in 1997/1998. Using instrumental variable regression, he confirmed that the JPS 
program was an effective policy for protecting the education o f the poor, especially for 
those who were most vulnerable to the effects o f the crisis. This program was found to 
increase school attendance by 1.2% for children aged 10-12 and 1.8% for children aged 
13-15.
Table 3.1 shows the impact o f school subsidy in various countries as a percentage o f a 
standard deviation in the dependent variable. It shows the estimated effect o f school 
subsidies on enrolment rate, dropout rate or test score in various selected countries. The 
highest impact o f the program was found in Pakistan, where the school subsidy 
program was estimated increase the outcome by 68 % of SD while the US gave the 
lowest impact o f only 1.87% of SD. Compared to other studies, the effect o f school 
subsidy on student performance in this chapter is quite large at 21.3%.
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T a b le  3 .1 :  T h e  e f f e c t  o f  s c h o o l  s u b s id ie s  in  v a r io u s  c o u n t r i e s
Study Country Marginal effect Prop of SD Dependent variable
Dearden and Heath Australia 0.038 7.70% enrolment rate
(1999)
Dearden et al. (2005) UK 0.045 7.20% dropout rate
McPherson and US 0.0086 1.87% enrolment rate
Schapiro (1991) 
Schultz (2004) Mexico
Female 0.0092 4% enrolment rate
Male 0.008 3% enrolment rate
Schady and Araujo Ecuador 0.032 7.60% enrolment rate
(2004)
Afridi (2010) India 
Girls 1 st grade 1.768 5.50% enrolment rate
Kim, Alderman and Pakistan 0.33 68% enrolment rate
Orazem (1999) 
Glewwe and Olinto Honduras 0.02 2.20% enrolment rate
(2004)
Maluccio and Flores Nicaragua 0.128 19.39% enrolment rate
(2005)
Sparrow (2007) Indonesia 0.008 2.60% enrolment rate
Duflo (2001) Indonesia 0.03 17.60% dropout rate
This study (2012) Indonesia 0.26 21.3% test score
Note: SD=Standard Deviation
3.3. School Subsidy Policies Reform in Indonesia
This section outlines the school subsidy programs in Indonesia since 1970. The 
Government o f Indonesia has paid more attention to education since Independence Day 
in 1945 by making education one o f the national constitution objectives. For a country 
whose population structure has a huge proportion o f young people, the most important 
national concern in education is how to provide basic education. In 1994, the basic 
education policy changed from a focus on children aged 6-12 in the old policy to a new 
focus on children aged 6-15, especially from poor families. Based on the population 
survey in 2005, the number o f children o f school age is approximately 20%, out o f 235 
million people.
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In the President Soeharto era, a huge amount o f money was allocated to the primary 
school construction project, the program that was named the SD Inpres Project. More 
than 61,000 primary schools were constructed between 1973/1974 and 1978/1979 
throughout the country and according to Duflo (2001), the budget was over 500 million 
USD at 1990 exchange rates. The whole budget was funded by the oil boom revenue 
from 1973 to 1980. Based on the Presidential instruction, each school was given a 
target to enrol approximately 120 students with 3 teachers, and the local governments 
and society had a responsibility to provide additional school subsidies if there was 
insufficient funding for implementation.
In 1998, after Indonesia was hit by the Asian economic crisis, the school subsidy began 
to be used as an important policy. At this time, the school subsidy was a part o f the 
social safety net program, which was known as the JPS (Jaring Pengaman Sosial) 
program. JPS was very useful in assisting the families who suffered from the crisis, 
especially in supporting education expenditure. JPS in education was allocated to two 
types o f school subsidies: scholarships for students and block grants for schools. 
Scholarships were distributed to the students directly while block grant was distributed 
to the school. Sparrow (2006) pointed out that the JPS program appeared to fully 
support poor families in supporting household expenditure while the block grant, Dana 
Bantuan Operasional (DBO), was intended to keep the school operating during the 
crisis. Both subsidies were distributed as cash transfers to the students and schools.
The JPS subsidy covered 6% of students in primary school, 17% of students in junior 
high school and 10% in senior high school, and the amount o f money per student per 
annum was RP 120,000 or equivalent to $12 for primary school, RP 240,000 ($24) for
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junior high school and RP 300,000 ($30) for senior high school. The students who were 
eligible to get the scholarships were: (1) students from poor families; (2) students at 
grades 4, 5 and 6 for primary school and all levels for junior and senior high schools; 
(3) dropped-out students or students vulnerable to dropping out for economic reasons. 
The government used data from the National Family Planning Coordinating Agency 
(Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional, BKKBN) for selecting the students 
who were eligible to get subsidies. According to BKKBN standards, there are five 
categories o f family prosperity level: Pre-prosperous Families, Prosperous I, 
Prosperous II, Prosperous III and Prosperous III Plus. The school subsidies were 
distributed to the two lowest BKKBN household levels (Pre-Prosperous and Prosperous 
I). All the funds for the 5-year program (1998-2003) were from the Government o f 
Indonesia, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.
In 2001, the Government o f Indonesia decided to reduce the fuel subsidy and allocated 
the funds to education, health and infrastructure instead. The purpose o f distributing the 
funds to these three sectors was: to accelerate the 9-year compulsory basic education 
program; to secure health services for the poor; and to develop village infrastructures, 
particularly for remote and poor villages. With respect to the education goal, the 
Government o f Indonesia used the funds to add more scholarships for poor students and 
block grants for the schools. This school subsidy, which was known as Special 
Assistance for Students (Bantuan Khusus Murid, BKM), was distributed to the students 
as a cash transfer and covered 20% of all students in primary school, junior high school 
and senior high school. Expenditure was the same as the JPS scholarship program 
while the block grants for the school, which were known as Special Assistance to
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School (Bantuan Khusus Sekolah, BKS), were bigger than DBO in the JPS program. 
The BKM and BKS programs lasted 4 years, from 2001 to 2004.
In July 2005, The BKM and BKS were superceded by the School Operational 
Assistance Program (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah, BOS). This program was still part 
o f the Fuel Subsidy Compensation Program but the concept o f BOS was slightly 
different from the previous subsidy programs. BOS was designed to support poor 
students with free access to basic education and to reduce the financial burdens on the 
rest o f the students. In 2005, all poor students had priority to receive BOS so that they 
could go to school without paying any fees, while wealthier students still had to pay 
some fees but not as much as if there were no BOS program. The idea o f the BOS 
program was, as its acronym School Operational Assistance, suggest to support each 
school in financing their operational costs, such as textbook procurement, school 
exams, general and daily tests, consumables procurement (notebooks, chalks, pencils, 
lab materials, etc.), stationery, maintenance costs, electricity and telephone costs, 
student activities costs (remedial, extracurricular). Thus, for financing the operational 
costs, each school received funds from the government and same wealthier students, 
who still had to pay some fees. The amounts o f the subsidies were RP 235,000 per 
student per annum for primary school and RP 325,000 for junior high school. The 
subsidies were distributed every 3 months (January-March, April-June, July-September 
and October-December).
In 2009, the BOS policy was changed. BOS was now allocated for all students (poor 
and rich students) who were registered at primary and secondary schools. To simplify 
the distribution, BOS was sent to schools directly and distributed to each school based
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on the total number of students. Thus, the main purpose o f the BOS program 2009 was 
to ensure that all school-age children could go to school without paying any school 
operational costs and this was the difference between the BOS program 2009 and the 
BOS program 2005. In addition, for the BOS program 2009, poor students got an 
additional assistance for transportation and a uniform allowance. Moreover, in 2009, 
the government changed the objective o f the BOS program. The previous goal was only 
to accelerate the 9-year basic education programme and a new goal was added - to 
increase the quality o f basic education. The amount o f money was also increased to RP
400,000 per student per annum for primary schools and RP 575,000 for junior high 
schools per annum.
The poor students got free access to basic education and were also eligible to receive 
the transport and uniform allowances. This was determined by the school committee 
and their poor status had to be proved by a letter from the village head. The school 
committee consisted o f the teachers, school principal and same parents or guardians o f 
the students. To guarantee that the poor students could go to school without paying any 
cost, both in public and private schools, the central government set up monitoring 
teams which consisted o f representatives of central, provincial and local government to 
control the implementation o f the BOS program.
Table 3.2 shows a summary of the amount o f assistance for each school subsidy 
program in Indonesia for basic education after the primary school construction project 
in the 1970s (SD Inpres program), from 1998 until now. There are three big programs 
which support basic education system in Indonesia. All o f them have the goal o f 
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Even though the nominal value of BKM scholarship per student per annum is the same 
as the JPS scholarship, the real value is lower than the previous program. For instance, 
the real value o f the JPS scholarship program for primary school students per student 
per annum in 2007 rupiah was RP 240,712 while the BKM scholarship program per 
student per annum was RP 191,748. On the other hand, for the first BOS program in 
2005-2009 the real value o f the scholarship is a little higher than the previous ones, but 
it increased significantly after 2009. Besides all the assistance for the students, there are 
block grants for schools in the JPS and BKM programs, but not for the BOS program, 
since the BOS funds were given to the schools based on the number o f students in each 
school for all operational expenses.
3.4. Profile of Students and BOS at Basic Education in Indonesia
The 9 year basic education goes from primary school to junior high school and these 
levels o f schooling are a compulsory part o f the structure o f education in Indonesia. 
There are 6 main levels of schooling in Indonesia, from play group to university. First, 
play group, is normally for children aged between 3-4 years. Second, kindergarten, is 
usually for children aged between 5-6 years. Neither o f these first two levels of 
schooling is compulsory. Third, primary school, is a 6-year basic education. Fourth, 
junior high school, is a 3-year basic education. Both primary school and junior high 
school are compulsory and are known as 9-year basic education for children aged 7 to 
15 years. Fifth, senior high school, is three years o f schooling after 9-year basic 
education and is not compulsory. Lastly, higher education is from undergraduate to 
post graduate programs.
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The main goal o f the 9-year basic education program and the BOS program is, 
therefore, to ensure that all Indonesian citizens attain the junior high school level free 
o f charge. Currently, the net enrolment rate o f junior high school in Indonesia is 
approximately 70%. By implementing the BOS program, the Goverment o f Indonesia 
has set a target to achieve approximately 100% of junior high school gross enrolment 
rate or approximately 80% for the net enrolment rate8. Figure 3.1 represents the net 
enrolment rate in each level of education from 2000 to 2009.
Figure 3.1: Net Enrolment Rate on Each Level o f Schooling from 2000 to 2009
m Primary School  
Net Enrolment 
Rate
a  Junior High 
School Net  
Enrolment 
Rate








Source o f data: Central Bureau of Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistics, BPS)
8 Gross enrolm ent rate is calculated from the total number o f  students at primary school and also students 
at non-formal education equal to primary school level (could be elderly who enrol in non-formal 
education equal to primary school level) divided by the total number o f  people in that age o f  schooling  
and multiplied by 100%.
N et enrolm ent rate is calculated from the total number o f  students at primary school age (only those who  
enrol in formal education at primary school) divided by the total number o f  people in that age o f  
schooling and multiplied by 100%.
Gross enrolment rate could be more than 100% because there are students w ho are outside the official 
school age, for instance 25-year-olds who went to primary school. The sam e w ay is used to calculate the 
junior high school gross and net enrolment rates.
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The figure shows that the highest net enrolment rate in Indonesia in 2009 is primary 
school at around 95%, followed by junior high school at approximately 70%. The net 
enrolment rate o f senior high school is around 45% and the lowest one is university 
enrolment rate, which is approximately 10%. The figure shows a significant increase in 
the net enrolment rate at junior high school and senior high school level in Indonesia 
from 2000 to 2009 but only a slight increase for primary school and higher education 
net enrolment rate.
To achieve the net enrolment target, the Government o f Indonesia has increased the 
number o f junior high schools significantly. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the number of 
schools at primary school and junior high school levels from 2001 to 2010. There has 
been a significant rise in the number o f junior high schools, both public and private, 
and a slight decrease in the number o f primary schools in Indonesia from 2000 to 2010.
The number o f primary public schools is approximately 140,000 schools, which is large 
compared to private schools, which number only around 10,000 schools. The number 
o f schools decreased slightly for both public and private during this period. On the 
other hand, the number o f junior high schools increased gradually, especially the public 
schools. In 2001 the number o f public and private schools were similar with around
10,000 schools, but by the end of 2010 the numbers o f public schools had risen 
significantly to approximately 18.000 schools, while the numbers o f private schools 
increased slowly to 12,000 schools (see figure 3.2).
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F ig u re  3 .2 :  T h e  N u m b e r  o f  S c h o o ls  f o r  P r im a r y  a n d  J u n io r  H ig h  S c h o o l  L e v e ls
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Source o f data: Central Bureau Statistics o f Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistics, BPS)
In addition, the trend in the number of students at primary schools shows a slight 
increase while the trend in the number at primary schools shows a small decrease 
during the last 10 years, both in public and private schools. According to the education 
data base from the directorate general for basic education in Indonesia, all students 
could be enrolled in primary schools by increasing the number o f classrooms and
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classes in existing primary schools. For example, nationally in 2007 the number of 
classes was 974,412 and the number o f classrooms was 891,594, then in 2009 the 
number o f classes was increased to 1,009,232 and the number o f classrooms was 
899,016. However, the trend in the number o f junior high school students has shown a 
significant increase since 2005, especially for public schools (figure 3.3). This reflects 
the government’s commitment to provide a 9-year basic education.
Figure 3.3: The Number o f Primary and Junior High School Students
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Based on the previous evidence, the government o f Indonesia has made a significant 
effort to improve resources and to increase the net enrolment rate at every level of 
education. By implementing the BOS program, the government signalled its intention 
to increase the net enrolment rate, particularly for basic education. As we can see in 
Figure 3.4, according to the latest population census in 2010, the BOS program still 
does not cover all children at the primary school level. We can see that the ratio of the 
total number o f BOS students to the total number o f children at the primary school 
level for all regions in Indonesia is below 90%, except in West Papua. It is because 
West Papua has children o f school age less than other provinces. In addition, as regions 
with higher numbers o f children o f school age seem to have a lower enrolment, such as 
East Java, West Java and Central Java. In fact, there are still many children at the 
primary school level who do not receive BOS as their financial support to provide free 
access to basic education. These children are not registered at primary school level. It 
could be because they are categorised as street children, helping their parents to earn 
money, or their parents are not keen to encourage their children to go to school because 
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The main source of the micro data used in this research is the Indonesia Family Life 
Survey (IFLS) data which has been discussed in Chapter 2. In particular, this chapter 
uses data from IFLS4 (2007). We cannot use panel data (IFLS3 and IFLS4), since the 
old BOS was started in 2005 and IFLS3 was in 2000. Moreover, we also use school 
subsidies data from the Ministry o f Education and Culture o f the Republic o f 
Indonesia (MEC) and other data from the Central Bureau o f Statistics o f Indonesia 
(BPS). IFLS provides educational information at individual, household and 
community levels. MEC provides information about school subsidies at the aggregate 
level, and some demographic information comes from BPS.
3.5.1. BOS Data
We only estimate the early version of BOS since we only have data 2007 (IFLS4). As 
explained in section 3, BOS was launched in 2005 to enable poor students to have free 
access to basic education. Using the IFLS survey data, we determined BOS students 
based on self-reported information. We generated BOS as a dummy variable equal to 
1 if students reported that they received BOS and 0 otherwise. Table 3 shows BOS 
participation rate at primary school and junior high school based on IFLS survey data 
2007. The percentage o f students who receive BOS in each grade is below 20% at 
primary school and below 15% at junior high school.
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T a b le  3 .3 :  B O S  P a r t ic ip a t io n  R a te
Primary School 
Grade




1 85.51 14.49 856
2 81.89 18.11 795
3 84.07 15.93 703
4 83.46 16.54 665





1 87.35 12.65 490
2 85.25 14.75 400
3 85.02 14.98 227
Source: calculated from IFLS 4
The number o f students who receive BOS is lower than the government’s expectation 
and the data suggest that BOS is failing to support all students for all nine years of 
basic education. In comparison, a study by SMERU in selected regions in 2006 found 
that there were only a few poor students who received BOS from the total number of 
poor students in the study regions. Table 3.4 shows the number o f poor students who 
received BOS from the school samples.
Table 3.4: The percentage o f poor BOS students in selected samples
Poor students Poor students with BOS
% of total
Total number % of total % of total poor
Province of Students Number students Number students students
East Java 2957 1002 33.9 242 8.2 24.2
North Sulawesi 3173 - - 296 9.3 -
North Sumatra 2841 940 33.1 256 9 33.1
West Nusa 
Tenggara 1740 568 32.6 111 6.4 32.6
S o u r c e :  S M E R U  2 0 0 6
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The proportion o f BOS students in IFLS survey data is larger than in the SMERU 
study. That has occurred because IFLS data was collected in 2007 while SMERU was 
base in 2005 when BOS was new. In more recent years, the allocation o f the national 
budget for BOS has been larger, so BOS is expected to cover more children or even 
all children o f school age.
3.5.2. Poor Criteria
Even though the purpose o f BOS is to provide nine years o f basic education free of 
charge for all children, in the first phase o f implementation o f BOS in 2005, there 
were not enough funds to cover all children at that level o f education, so the 
government decided to prioritize the allocation o f funding for children from poor 
families using ‘poor criteria’ prepared by the Central Bureau o f Statistics (Badan 
Pusat Statistik, BPS). The government then developed school committees to 
implement and monitor BOS funding allocation across the regions in Indonesia. 
School committees consist o f students’ parents, teachers and the head o f the school. 
Poor students do not pay any cost for their school fees and they receive money for 
transportation cost and uniform allowance. From 2009, the BOS program covered all 
students, including pocket money for the poor. Based on the Central Bureau of 
Statistics Indonesia, there are 14 criteria to define a poor family (see Table 3.5).
This research uses only eight criteria, because of the lack o f information in the data 
set. The variable poverty index is calculated from the household poor criteria 
information by adding up all dummy variable criteria that we are generated from 
household level. Households having values o f 0 means that no poor criteria are met; in 
other words, the family is not poor. Households having values o f 8 mean that 8 criteria
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have been met, which means that the family is very poor. The eight criteria used are: 
(1) A family with no electricity at home; (2) a bad quality o f water resource; (3) no 
toilet at home; (4) not a standard stove; (5) having a health allowance card; (6) low 
income level; (7) no house or an improper house; (8) landless.
Table 3.5: Poor Criteria
No. 14 Criteria
1 No house or improper house with size less than 8m2 per person
2 The floor is made from land or bamboo
3 The wall is not permanent, such as bamboo or wood with low quality
4 A family with no electricity at home
5 The quality of water resource
6 No toilet at home
7 Low quality of stove availability
8 Having a health allowance card
9 Low income level -under RP 600,000 or approximately US$60 per month
10 No education for head of household or with the maximum level at primary school
11 Landless
12 Milk, meat, chicken consumption is only once in a week
13 Only buy one set of clothes in a year
14 No assets or savings
Note: All bold sentences are 8 ‘p°or criteria’ that are used in this research
In addition to these poor criteria, we also use information about the decision maker at 
the village level who determines whether households are a poor family as an exclusion 
criterion in our Instrumental Variable regressions. We created two dummy variables: a 
dummy for whether the head of the village determines whether the family is poor or 
not, and a dummy variable for whether the staff o f the village make this decision. The 
excluded category captures everyone except the head o f the village and the staff o f the 
village who make decisions whether the family is poor, such as community figures, 
head o f RT (Rukun Tetangga=a group o f several households in a small 
neighbourhood), village midwife, NGO and other. Village officers (head and staff o f 
village) have an obligation to determine whether the families are poor or not based on
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the poor criteria from village data. Formally, poor students should present a poor 
letter, which is issued by the village officers to prove that they are poor and eligible to 
receive BOS. Hence, we identify assumption that local administrative mechanism 
affects who receive the BOS, but we assume that local administrative does not affect 
the test scores.
Table 3.6 shows the proportion o f BOS and non-BOS students by poor criteria. In 
total, the numbers o f BOS students are around 10% from the total number o f children 
o f school age (6 to 15 years old). Furthermore, Table 3.6 also presents the number o f 
BOS students for each poor criterion by the person who determines households to be 
in the poor family category. From 1,013 BOS students, around 40% of students have 0 
criteria, or are not poor students. It is very significant numbers BOS which was 
allocated to non-deserving students, or it could be that students who meet certain poor 
criteria but the criteria were not included in the 8 criteria which is used in this 
research. In fact, if we see the number o f children without BOS, there are still a lot of 
poor students who did not receive BOS in 2007. It could be true since 2007 was the 
early stage o f the implementation o f the BOS program, so BOS was not distributed 
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Furthermore, from 5,116 children o f school age who meet various poor criteria, only 
38% of those children, or about 1,950 children, receive poor letters; 51% are 
administered by heads o f the villages, 31% by staff o f the village, and 18% by other 
village officers. Table 3.7 presents the proportion o f students with poor letters that 
were distinguished between BOS and non-BOS by village decision maker. From 1000 
poor students who got poor letters from heads o f the villages, 51% of students are with 
BOS and 49% are not. From 596 poor students with poor letters from staff o f the 
villages, 61% students are with BOS, and 39 students are not. For 348 students with 
poor letters from other village officers, 41% students received BOS, and 59% students 
did not receive BOS. Hence, the probability o f getting BOS is higher for those who 
are administered by village officers.
Table 3.7: Proportion of students by village decision maker
Proportion of students with:
poor letter BOS no BOS
# % # %
head of village 1,000 506 51 494 49
staff of village 596 365 61 231 39
other 348 142 41 206 59
Total 1,944 1,013 52 931 48
Source: calculated from IFLS data
Figure 3.5 presents the proportion o f students granted BOS by the village decision 
maker. Among those children o f school age within the village, only 5.5% of students 
with BOS received a poor letter from the head o f the village, around 4% o f students 
received a poor letter from staff o f the village, and 1.5% students received a poor 
letter from other village officers.
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F ig u r e  3 .5 :  P r o p o r t io n  o f  s tu d e n t s  w i th  B O S  b y  v i l l a g e  d e c is io n  m a k e r
other
The differences are because there is a possibility o f different decision maker in issuing 
poor letter in a village. For instance, when the head o f village is absent, so staff of 
village will be responsible in issuing the poor letter, and if head o f village and staffs o f 
village are absent, there will be another person such as midwife, or other community 
figures in issuing the letter. There is clearly variation o f differences in judgements by 
different types of decision makers. It can be explained by using individual 
characteristics such as the proportion o f father’s education background from BOS 
student, the proportion o f gender from BOS student, and the proportion o f urban/rural 
areas from BOS student that are shown from figure 3.6 to 3.8.
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F ig u r e  3 .6 :  P r o p o r t io n  o f  f a t h e r ’s e d u c a t io n  b a c k g r o u n d  f r o m  B O S  s tu d e n t s
b y  v i l l a g e  d e c is io n  m a k e r
Head of village Staffs of village Other
Father's education background
■  Not in school
■  primary school
m secondary school  
•  undergraduate
■  Masters











Head of village Staffs of  village Other
Proportion of BOS students by gender











Head of village Staffs of village Other
The proportion of BOS students by rural/urban areas
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3.5.3. Student test score
Test scores are obtained from the test score in primary school at age 11 or in 
children’s final year o f primary school. All questions in the test are multiple choices 
and are marked using computer. The test is conducted nationally by Ministry of 
Education and Culture o f The Republic o f Indonesia at the same time and standard for 
all regions in Indonesia. The test is conducted in each primary school and monitored 
by other teachers from different school, and the results o f the test are announced in a 
month later.
The test score is continuous variable and ranges from 0 to 10. It is calculated from the 
average scores o f 3 subjects (Maths, Science and Indonesian Language). Test score 
data from the IFLS surveys are taken only from the respondents who could show test 
certificates and excludes the respondents who could not show certificates, since 
sometimes the information is not complete. For instance, they only mentioned 2 
subjects out o f 3 or they only mentioned the total score without mentioning each o f 
the subjects individually, because they did not remember their scores in detail. Figure 
3.9 presents the child test score distributions for BOS and non-BOS students.
102




2 6 8 104
childtestscore 
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Table 3.8 shows the descriptive statistics o f test scores from BOS students and non- 
BOS students. BOS students have higher average test scores than non BOS students.





Source: calculated from IFLS data
In addition, we also performed t-test to test whether there were significantly different 
test scores between BOS and Non-BOS students. A t-statistic o f -3.76 and a p-value 
0.0002, implies that the mean scores are statistically different from each other at the 
1% significant level.
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Table 3.9 describes the distribution o f students’ test score by level o f education o f the 
father and mother. In general, the higher the level o f education o f the father and 
mother the higher the test scores o f the student. More than half o f students’ test scores 
below 6.5 out o f 10 are from students whose parental backgrounds are not higher than 
junior high school. The highest test scores are found for students whose father’s 
education is at doctoral level.
Table 3.9: Distribution o f students’ test score by parental education background (%)
Father education Mother education 
The highest level o f  parental Average Average
education test % test %
score score
N o schooling 6.26 4.76 6.24 7.97
Primary school 6.40 48.93 6.40 54.78
Junior high school 6.46 15.47 6.53 16.24
Senior high school 6.66 22.12 6.85 16.05
College D l ,  D2, D3 6.96 2.90 7.02 2.63
Bachelor’s 7.03 5.45 7.06 2.22
Master’s 7.26 0.33 7.70 0.11
Doctorate 8.35 0.03
Observation 6405 6528
Source: calculated from IFLS data
3.5.4. Education Expenditure
Apart from school fees (such as registration fees, tuition fees and exam fees), there are 
also other education costs incurred during schooling, for instance: textbooks cost, 
uniform cost, transportation cost, housing and food cost, and any additional courses 
which students take outside school. Table 3.10 describes the various costs o f students 
in primary school and junior high school per year.
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Table 3.10: The average costs to individuals o f school spending (rupiah)
per annum in 2007
Variable Rural Urban
Registration fees 58,250 234,369
Tuition fees 83,800 317,748
Exam fees 16,833 40,262
Book costs 66,687 134,050
Uniform costs 62,942 112,433
Transportation costs (A) 134,215 282,019
Housing costs and food (B) 299,338 560,758
Additional course costs (C) 20,803 96,588
Total 742,868 1,778,227
Total -  (A+B+C) 288,512 838,862
Source: calculated from IFLS4; Note: 1 USD= 10,000 RP
The data is taken from IFLS survey data 2007. The average o f registration fees in 
rural area is RP 58,250 per year while in urban areas it is RP 234,369, which is almost 
four times the registration fees from rural areas. These registration fees are only paid 
once during their schooling in primary school and are set by the school committee 
(school teachers, school principal and student’s parent representative), and under 
control from local government. The average o f the tuition fees in rural areas is RP 
83,800 per year and for exam fees it is RP 16,833, while in urban areas the tuition fees 
are over three times the tuition fees in rural areas and for exam fees it is RP 40,262. 
Other costs which are excluded from the school fees and are very significant expenses 
for each student are transportation costs, housing costs and food for students who live 
far away from their schools. These students need to rent a boarding house and spend 
some money for their own food. The housing costs and food costs are usually incurred 
for students at junior high school. If we compare the total school expenses to the 
amount o f school subsidy which was shown in Table 3.2, the school subsidy is only 
sufficient for school fees or even only enough for tuition fees if the students live in 
urban areas. The remainder o f the education expenditures must be covered by the
household. That is why there are still some children o f school age who cannot afford 
even basic schooling.
3.5.5. Parental Education Background
Table 3.11 presents parental education background o f both fathers and mothers of 
BOS students and non-BOS students in 2007. Most parents only have a primary 
school education. However, the proportion o f parents with only primary education is 
higher for BOS students than non-BOS students. The higher the education level, the 
smaller the proportion o f fathers and mothers. In general, however, the parents o f non- 
BOS students are slightly more educated than BOS students.
Table 3.11: Parental Education











N o schooling 3.26 4.15 5.28 6.98
Primary school 46.59 40.12 51.10 43.54
Junior high school 15.77 17.14 19.42 19.11
Senior high school 23.60 26.90 18.13 22.12
C ollege D l,  D2, D3 2.75 3.46 2.19 3.31
Bachelor’s 7.93 7.44 3.88 4.65
Master’s 0.10 0.72 0.00 0.28
Doctorate 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00
Source: calculated from IFLS data
3.5.6. Financial Background
Table 3.12 depicts parental income and household expenditure. Students who receive 
BOS in urban areas have less parental income and household expenditure than non- 
BOS students. On the other hand, in rural areas, students receiving BOS have slightly 
higher parents’ income than non-BOS students but lower household expenditure. It
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seems that BOS is well targeted in the urban areas in terms o f parental income, but not 
in the rural areas. This may be because in rural areas, the income from their own 
production is not calculated as parental income. Besides that, the definition o f poor 
criteria is not only based on income but also on other criterion.
Table 3.12: Parental Income and Expenditure
Monthly father’s Monthly mother’s Monthly household
income (Rupiah) income (Rupiah) expenditure (Rupiah)
Non- Non-
Area BOS Non-BO S BOS BOS BOS BOS
Urban 1,018,030 1,396,295 564,096 891,020 2,430,776 2,876,353
Rural 851,462 781,559 524,495 462,151 1,744,994 1,894,586
Source: calculated from IFLS data
In addition, the monthly household expenditure is a little higher than the aggregate of 
both father’s income and mother’s income but the families could afford all the 
monthly household expenditure. This is likely to be because there is income from 
other household members that is not calculated.
3.6. Research Methodology
This section outlines the research methodology used in this chapter to evaluate the 
effects o f BOS program on child test score. We used three different methodologies to 
address the relevant issues: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation, Instrumental 
Variable (IV) regression, and Propensity Score Matching (PSM) estimation. OLS is 
used as the conventional method and estimates the effect of school subsidy on average 
and assuming BOS is exogenous, while IV estimation is used to deal with endogeneity 
o f BOS and also correct for selection bias based on unobservable characteristics. In 
addition, IV estimates the effect of the treatment on those individuals whose
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behaviour is affected by treatment. That is, IV estimation provides an estimate o f the 
causal effect for those individuals who change the treatment status because o f the 
instrument. Moreover, PSM is used to estimate the average treatment effect in the 
absence o f selection on unobserved characteristics.
3.6.1. Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Ordinary Least Squares estimation is used to estimate the basic econometrics model o f 
the impact of the BOS program on child test scores. The econometric models used in 
this chapter can be written as:
T e s t  Scorei = a 0 + a ^ O S i  +  a 2X t +  £t (3.1)
The dependent variable in this equation (Test scorei) is child test score at age 11 for
individual i. The average child test scores across subjects are used rather than total 
child test scores in order to make them comparable across different age groups of 
children, since there was a change in the total number o f subjects tested from 2002. 
Before 2002, the number of subjects tested was 5 subjects: (1) Moral and civil 
education, (2) Bahasa Indonesia, (3) Maths, (4) Science and (5) Social studies. 
Starting in 2002, the number of subjects tested was only 3 subjects: (1) Bahasa
Indonesia, (2) Maths, and (3) Science. For test scores before 2002, we used test
scores from the same subjects with the subjects that were tested after 2002. The main 
explanatory variable is BOS, a dummy variable for the school subsidy, with a value 
equal to 1 if the children receive BOS and 0 otherwise. In addition, the vector Xj 
contains the other explanatory variables to capture individual and household 
characteristics, such as the poverty index, gender, area where they live, rank of 
provincial HCI, household size, household expenditure, type o f schooling (public or
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private), parental education background and whether they reside in Java or outside 
Java. The use o f ordinary least squares estimation is problematic since BOS may be 
endogenous, and OLS fails to address some very important potential sources o f 
endogeneity, so we also provide estimation by using instrumental variable regression 
in section 3.6.2.
3.6.2. Instrumental Variables Estimation
BOS may be an endogenous variable -  an observable explanatory variable that is 
correlated with the unobservable error term. The endogeneity o f BOS could arise at 
least from three sources: reverse causality or simultaneity, spurious correlation, or 
self-selection. The simultaneity problem is one source that we should worry about the 
endogeneity problem of BOS since students may increase their test scores because 
they received BOS, or they received BOS because their test scores were high. In the 
case o f a spurious correlation problem, BOS and test scores may both be correlated 
with an omitted variable but not directly with each other. Self-selection is another 
cause o f endogeneity o f BOS. It may be that students who perform better at school 
become more interested in doing well and choose to receive BOS, whereas students 
who perform less well at school choose not to receive BOS.
Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi (2005) said that IV can overcome the OLS bias that 
results from endogeneity of the explanatory variables. IV corrects for the endogeneity 
problem by using good instruments. This instrument is correlated with the causal 
variable o f interest, BOS, but uncorrelated with any other determinants o f the 
dependent variable. This variable has a clear effect on BOS in the first stage 
regression, and the only reason o f relationship between test scores and BOS is from
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the first stage. According to Angrist and Pischke (2009), good instruments come from 
a combination o f institutional knowledge and ideas about processes determining the 
variable o f interest.
Hence, IV estimates the average treatment effect o f BOS among those individuals 
whose treatment status is influenced by changing an exogenous regressor that satisfies 
the exclusion restriction. The treatment effect that we estimate is the average 
treatment effect for those who adjust their treatment status because theay react to the 
instrument. That is, IV estimates the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) o f the 
impact o f BOS=l on subset o f individuals. Card (2001) and Lang (1993) suggest that 
LATE estimates from IV could exceed OLS estimates, because they estimate average 
effects for a specific group, whereas OLS estimates, in the absence o f omitted 
variables and measurement error biases, estimate the average effect across everyone. 
Imbens and Angrist (1994) said that instrumental variables estimated a LATE under 
very weak conditions. There are two potential weaknesses: IV estimates the effect o f a 
treatment on a generally unidentifiable sub-population; and the LATE estimate will 
vary depending on the particular instrumental variables that are used. In the case of 
our study, the IV estimate is a LATE for those whose BOS status affected by the 
identity o f the decision maker in the village.
We used two dummy variables as instrument for BOS: a dummy for whether the head 
o f the village determines whether the family is poor or not, and a dummy variable for 
whether the staff o f the village make this decision. The excluded category captures 
everyone except the head o f the village and the staff o f the village who make 
decisions o f whether the family is poor, such as community figures, head o f RT
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(Rukun Tetangga=a group of several households in small neighbourhood), village 
midwife, NGO and other. Village officers have an obligation to determine whether the 
families are poor or not, based on village data. Formally, poor students should present 
a poor letter which is issued by village officers to prove that they are poor and eligible 
to receive BOS. Thus, these two variables are good exclusion restrictions, since these 
variables are highly correlated with a probability of receiving BOS, but there is no 
reason to believe these would be a correlation with test scores. As the head o f the 
village is the person who is elected from local elections in the village level by all 
people who meet the criteria to be electors, and staff o f the village are the people who 
are appointed by the head o f the village. The head o f the village and the staff o f the 
village are also accountable and more objective in issuing poor letters. The outcome 
should be based on whether the family is poor or not, instead o f the student’s ability. 
Hence, the instruments should be uncorrelated with test scores beyond their impact on 
the likelihood of getting BOS.
Thus, the model that is used for instrumental variable regression can be written as:
First stage equation:
BOSi =  /?o +  & Head_villagei  +  (32S ta f f_ v i l la g e i  +  p 3Xt +  (3.2)
Second stage equation:
T e s t  Scorei =  a 0 +  +  a 2Xt +  £t (3.3)
In the first stage equation, the BOS dummy is the dependent variable. We used a 
dummy o f head o f village and staff o f village as the instrument variable for BOS with 
other o f village officers as the excluded category. Moreover, the vector X t contains the 
other explanatory variables to capture individual and household characteristics, such
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as poverty index, gender, area where they live, rank o f provincial HCI, household size, 
household expenditure, type o f schooling (public or private), parental education 
background and whether they reside in Java or outside Java. For the second stage 
equation, we have the same variables as in the OLS estimation.
3.6.3. Propensity Score Matching Estimation
We used matching method to get the estimation result from the average treatment 
effect in the absence o f selection based on unobserved characteristics. Here, we can 
compare the matching estimation to the IV estimation that IV can avoid the bias 
because o f the correlation of observable and unobservable characteristics in the 
equation. According to Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi (2005), matching method is 
defined as a non-parametric approach that attempts to find a comparison group from 
all the non-treated so that the selected group is similar to the treatment group in term 
o f their observable characteristics. The only remaining difference between two groups 
is participation in BOS program, therefore, the outcomes from the comparison group 
is the right sample for the missing information on the outcomes o f the treatment 
group. In addition, as IV estimation has important issue in choosing instrumental 
variable, matching method also has important issue in choosing matching variable. 
The only different is IV variables should satisfy exclusion restriction in outcome 
equation conditional on the treatment, while matching variables should satisfy the 
impact on outcome and treatment equations (Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi, 2005).
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) estimation method is adopted when there is a wide 
range o f matching variables. According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), propensity 
score is a feasible method to match the variables by using balancing score. Blundell,
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Dearden and Sianesi (2005) said that by definition propensity score matching is when 
treatment and non-treatment observations with the same value o f propensity score 
have the same distribution o f density scores. Hence, PSM match treated and untreated 
observations on the estimated probability of being treated (propensity score).
This chapter uses PSM to estimate the average treatment effect in the absence of 
selection on unobserved characteristics. PSM requires selection on observables 
assumption when conditioned on an appropriate set o f observable attributes. 
Obviously, there is variability in selections that influences the selection process for the 
treatment group and the control group. The treatment group is recipients o f school 
subsidies who meet poor criteria. Only poor students and those who meet poor criteria 
that are prepared by the Central Bureau o f Statistics will be categorized into the 
treatment group as recipients o f BOS (BOS-students). To prove whether the students 
are poor enough, students should show a letter from the village head to the school 
committee. For those who can prove themselves as poor, they will receive a treatment.
In non-experimental studies, the essential problem is the missing counterfactual. It is 
impossible to have outcomes o f the same unit in both treatment conditions at the same 
time (Holand, 1986). PSM uses information from other students that do not get BOS 
(Non-BOS students) as a control group to identify what would have happened to 
students in the absence o f the intervention (BOS). By comparing the outcomes from 
BOS students relative to observationally similar groups (non-BOS students), it is 
possible to estimate the effects o f the intervention.
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3.6.3.1. The PSM Model
Following Caliendo and Kopeining (2005) and Sianesi (2006), the core model will 
consist o f treatment outcome and control outcome of individuals. An observed 
outcome o f individual / can be expressed as:
In the above equation, Z), E {0,1} is treatment indicator. is equal to one if the 
individual i receives BOS as a treatment and zero otherwise. Yt is the potential 
outcome of individual is the potential outcome o f individual i when the 
individual receives BOS as the treatment outcome or when Dt is equal to one. YQi is 
the potential outcome o f individual i when the individual does not receive BOS as 
control outcome, or when Dt is equal to zero. Thus, the treatment effect for an 
individual can be written as the following equation:
The fundamental problem of causal inference/counterfactual problem makes it 
impossible to observe the potential outcome o f individuals for both treatment ( Y u ) 
and control (Yoi) conditions at the same time, so only one potential outcome for each 
individual can be observed, thus estimating the treatment effect o f an individual is 
impossible.
In this chapter we estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). ATET 
estimates the average among those who got the treatment or received BOS. ATET can 
be formulated as:
Yt = DtYu + (1 -  Di)Yoi (3.4)
(3.5)
tATET  = E[YU -  roi|Di = 1] (3.6)
xATET  = E (t \Dt = 1) = E[Yu \Dt = 1] -  E[Yoi\Dt = 1] (3.7)
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E[Y\i\Di =  1] is the potential outcome of students who receive BOS (BOS students) 
and is potentially observable. =  1] is the potential outcome of BOS students
when they did not receive BOS and cannot be observed because it is the missing 
counterfactual.
To calculate ATET, it is essential to find a substitute for E(Yoi\Di =  1). One possible 
way is by using the potential outcome of non-BOS students who do not receive 
treatment or BOS E(Yoi\Di =  0) because the potential outcome from BOS students 
who did not receive treatment E(Yoi\Di =  1) is not observed at the same time when 
those individuals received treatment. So, we can estimate ATET by using:
E lY ^ D t  =  1] -  E[Yoi\Di =  0] =  r ATET  (3.8)
Hence, ATET is estimated from the potential outcome o f BOS students who receive 
treatment, E[Yn\Di =  1], minus the potential outcome o f non-BOS students who did 
not receive treatment, E[Yoi\Di =  0].
3.6.3.2. Assumptions and Five Steps of PSM
In matching methods, there are assumptions to be applied in order to get a comparison 
group similar to the treatment group in observable characteristics (Sianesi, 2006):
1. Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA)
The potential outcomes are independent o f the treatment assignment based on the 
observable attributes o f covariates X which are not influenced by treatment (Caliendo 
and Kopeinig, 2005). Here, we should control for observable differences in
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characteristics between the treated group or BOS students and non-treated group or 
non-BOS students; the outcome that would result in the absence o f treatment is the 
same in both cases. This identifying assumption for matching, which is also the 
identifying assumption for the simple regression estimator, is known as the 
Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA).
2. Common Support
Common support is the condition when there is a region o f the support o f matching 
variable that is overlap in the distribution o f density scores from treated and untreated 
groups. The treated and untreated individual must have similar probabilities or 
treatment. As illustrated on figure 3.10, the region o f common support is the range of 
the score which overlaps between density o f scores for untreated individuals and 
density o f scores for treated individuals.
Figure 3.10: Common Support Region
Density ,
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The data can be estimated by using the five steps o f Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
Estimation. The five steps are as follows:
1. Estimate the Propensity Score
According to Caliendo and Kopeinig(2005), there are two steps to be conducted when 
estimating the propensity score: choice o f model and choice o f variables that should 
be included in the model. For the model choice, any discrete choice model can be 
used, such as Binary Logit, Binary Probit, Multinomial Logit, Conditional Logit and 
Multinomial Probit. The choice of model is not critical when the treatment is only 
binary, but when the model uses multiple treatment, some assumptions must be 
satisfied. Moreover, for the choice o f variables, the choice must be based principally 
on economic theory and previous empirical research findings.
2. Choosing a Matching Algorithm
There are a few different matching algorithms. According to Caliendo and Kopeining 
(2006), the matching algorithms are divided into five different groups: Nearest 
Neighbour(NN), Caliper and Radius, Stratification and Interval, Kernel and Local 
Linear and Weighting (see figure 3.11).
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F ig u r e  3 .1 1 :  D i f f e r e n t  M a tc h in g  M e th o d s
Weighting
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Source: Caliendo and Kopeining (2006)
This chapter used Near Neighbour matching (NN). We estimate the average treatment 
effect on the treated using NN matching with replacement and without replacement. 
NN with replacement is a matching method where one treated unit is matched to more 
than one non-treated unit. It brings a trade-off between bias and variance. NN with 
replacement can yield better matches because controls that look similar to many 
treated units can be used multiple times, and the order in which the treated units are 
matched does not matter. In the case o f NN without replacement, the ordering has to 
be done before estimating.
3. Having Common Support
Common support is a critical step in matching estimation. This depends on whether or 
not overlap occurs between treated and non-treated groups. The common support 
condition ensures that matches for treated and untreated groups can be found.
118
4. Assessing the Match Quality
Tests must be conducted to assess the matching quality, such as test for standardised 
bias, test for equality o f means before and after matching (t-test) and test o f joint 
equality o f means in the matched sample (F-test). If there is bad matching quality or 
there are still any differences, it is better to take a step back and redo the same steps 
until the matching quality is satisfactory. If after re-specification and re-assessment 
the matching quality and the results are not satisfactory, it indicates that the 
Conditional Independence Assumption fails to be met and alternative evaluation 
approaches should be used.
5. Estimating the Standard Errors and Sensitivity Analysis.
To deal with the problem of understated standard errors because o f variation beyond 
the normal sampling variation when estimating, Lechner (2002) suggests using 
bootstrapped standard errors. Bootstrapped standard errors are used when the 
sampling distribution o f parameter may not be o f any standard distribution. 
Bootstrapped standard errors rely upon the assumption that the current sample is 
representative o f the population. Besides that, sensitivity analysis should be applied to 
estimate the level o f bias in observational studies (Guo and Fraser, 2010). Based on 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Rosenbaum (2005), sensitivity analysis should be 
conducted routinely to see sensitivity o f findings to hidden bias when the treated and 
untreated groups may differ in ways that have not been measured. W ilcoxon’s signed- 




3.7.1. Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Table 3.12 shows estimation results o f Ordinary Least Squares. All variables are 
statistically significant. The BOS dummy as the variable of interest has a positive 
effect on child test score. BOS students have a higher test score by 0.358 points on 
average compared to non-BOS students or 29.3% of standard deviation. This is a 
small effect o f BOS on test scores, as the mean of test scores is 6.53. The poor 
variables have a negative effect on child test score. It indicates that the poorer the 
students, the lower the test score will be. Females have a higher test score compared to 
males, by 0.076 points on average or 6.2% of standard deviation. Children from a 
large household size are also negatively correlated with child test scores. Looking at 
Column 2 in Table 3.13, column 2 allows for literation effects between BOS and its 
poor criteria. We can spot the response of each type o f child on the test score, based 
on their poor criteria for both with and without BOS. There is information about the 
magnitude o f child test scores for each type of child in each poor criterion for both 
children with and without BOS. The interaction between BOS variable and poverty 
index represents children with BOS in each poor criteria, while poverty index only 
captures information o f children in each poor criterion without receiving BOS.
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T a b le  3 .1 3 :  T h e  im p a c t  o f  B O S  o n  c h i ld  t e s t  s c o re






BOS 0.358*** 0.076 1 913*** 0.129
Poor
Poor (satisfied 1 criteria) -0.248** 0.117 -0.231** 0.118
Poor (satisfied 2criteria) -0.284** 0.116 -0.271** 0.116
Poor (satisfied 3 criteria) -0 319*** 0.119 -0.304** 0.120
Poor (satisfied 4 criteria) -0.313** 0.124 -0.299** 0.125
Poor (satisfied 5 criteria) -0.349** 0.139 -0.292** 0.138
Poor (satisfied 6+ criteria) -0.869*** 0.190 -0.825*** 0.194
BOS*Poor
BOS*Poor (satisfied 1 criteria) -1 593*** 0.256
BOS*Poor (satisfied 2criteria) -1.512*** 0.168
BOS*Poor (satisfied 3 criteria) -1.531*** 0.183
BOS*Poor (satisfied 4 criteria) -1.511*** 0.253
BOS*Poor (satisfied 5 criteria) -2.400*** 0.605
BO S*Poor (satisfied 6+ criteria) -2.218*** 0.220
Male -0.076** 0.036 -0.077** 0.036
Urban 0.322*** 0.038 0.325*** 0.038
Rank o f  provincial HCI -0.012*** 0.003 -0.012*** 0.003
HH size -0.027*** 0.010 -0.028*** 0.010
Log o f  HH expend on food 0.117*** 0.034 Q JJ7*** 0.034
Father secondary 0.266*** 0.054 0.271*** 0.054
Father higher education 0.444*** 0.099 0.455*** 0.099
Mother secondary 0.284*** 0.065 0.276*** 0.065
Mother higher education 0.514*** 0.145 0.508*** 0.145
Public school -0. 120*** 0.036 -0. 122*** 0.036
Java 0.193*** 0.037 0.193*** 0.037
R2 0.13
Observation 3284
Note: dependent variable is child test score with scale 0-10, SE is robust standard 
error; *Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
OLS estimation suggests that poor students are basically insignificantly different from 
non-poor student. For instance, looking at Column 2 in Table 3.13 with interactions 
between BOS and poor criteria, we see that the average impact o f BOS on child test 
score is 1.9. Table 3.14 presents the impact of BOS for each BOS student in each poor 
criterion from column 2, the impact o f BOS on test score for poorer students with 
BOS is none or even worse. For instance, students with 5 poor criteria are worse by
0.779 (1.913-0.292-2.4), and students with 6 poor criteria are worse by 1.13 (1.913- 
0.825-2.218), which is calculated from the difference between the coefficients o f BOS 
without interaction 1.913 plus the coefficient o f poverty index, plus coefficient o f 
BOS interaction with poverty index.
Table 3.14: The impact o f BOS on child test scores by poor criteria 
from OLS regression
Poor criteria Non-BOS BOS gap (BOS - Non-BO S)
0 criteria 0 1.913 1.913
1 criteria -0.231 0.089 0.32
2 criteria -0.271 0.13 0.401
3 criteria -0.304 0.078 0.382
4 criteria -0.299 0.103 0.402
5 criteria -0.292 -0.779 -0.487
6+ criteria -0.825 -1.13 -0.305
Furthermore, Figure 3.12 also presents the different results o f child test scores 
between BOS students and non-BOS students by poor criteria from OLS estimation. 
For non-BOS students, the higher number the poor criteria satisfied, the lower the test 
scores will be. For BOS students, students who meet 1 to 4 criteria seem to have a 
better effect with higher test score, but students with 5 or 6 poor criteria tend to have 
lower test scores. According to Table 3.14 and Figure 3.12, it seems that BOS did not 
help very poor students; even their test scores were worse. Yet, for less poor students, 
BOS seems to work well; this shows from the positive values of gap between BOS 
students and non-BOS students with 1 to 4 criteria. In short, BOS does not help the 
very poor students but it helps the less-poor students more. For the very poor student, 
the impact o f BOS on test score is very low. This could be true because BOS only 
covers school fees, while other educational costs such as textbooks, uniforms, 
transportation, food, housing/boarding house costs are not covered by BOS. For very
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poor students, the cost o f going to school is very expensive. So, although the poor get 
the BOS, their test scores are still lower. Due to a potential endogeneity problem of 
BOS, hence, this chapter applies instrumental variable regression to estimate the 
impact o f BOS on child test score.
Figure 3.12: The impact o f BOS on child test scores by poor criteria 
from OLS regression
■ NonBOS HBOS : gap (BOS-NonBOS)
As note, estimation in table 3.13 is obtained from individuals who could prove their 
test scores using certificate issued by government in the time of IFLS survey. For 
those who cannot show certificate are dropped from this estimation, since the test 
scores data are not complete. This selection issue may cause bias. Yet, we also 
provide estimation by using imputation missing value for those who have incomplete 
test score. As there are three subjects that were tested (bahasa Indonesia, math, and 
science), so if there is a missing value in one subject for test scores, then this missing 
value will be substituted by the average score from the scores that are not missing. For 
instance, if math score is missing, we imputed the score o f math from the average
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score o f bahasa Indonesia and science o f the child score. In the case, there are 2 scores 
missing (math and bahasa Indonesia), we imputed the missing values using score from 
science, so all three scores will be the same. Although there may be an issue o f a 
measurement error, imputation for missing values is appropriate since the 
measurement error is on dependent variable, and test score is variable on the left hand 
side, so it will not cause a bias but will increase imposition, as missing values are 
random. The results is similar to table 3.13 especially on the coefficient o f variable 
interest, BOS (see Appendix table A3.1).
3.7.2. Instrumental Variable Estimation
To correct for the endogeneity, we conducted IV regression for analysing the impact 
o f school subsidy on child test scores and the results are reported in Table 3.16. 
Moreover, the first stage regression o f IV regression is presented in Table 3.15. Both 
o f the excluded instruments (village officer variables) are significant. Only a few of 
the included instruments are statistically significant which is what we would expect 
because these variables are not part o f the BOS criteria. In order to ensure that we 
used the right instruments for BOS, we conducted a test for the instrumental variables. 
The first test is an F test of the excluded instrument. With F statistics value equal to 
10.53 and P value o f F test equal to 0.0000 which is smaller than the significant level 
at 0.05, the results show that all excluded instruments (dummy of head o f village and 
staff o f village) highly correlated with BOS. In addition, we also conducted a Sargan 
test, a test conditional on at least one being valid. It is a test for over-identifying 
restrictions. The hypothesis being tested with the Sargan test is that the instrumental 
variables are uncorrelated with the residuals, and therefore they are acceptable 
instruments. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, it means that the instruments are
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valid. The results confirmed that the null hypothesis is not rejected at Sargan statistics 
equal to 0.022 and P value equal to 0.8818.
Table 3.15: First Stage Least Square Estimation
Dependent variable: BOS Coefficient SE
Male -0.007 0.010
Urban -0.006 0.010
Rank of provincial HCI 0.000 0.001
HH size 0.002 0.003
LHH food expenditure -0.005 0.009
Father secondary -0.015 0.014
Father higher education 0.049 0.035
Mother secondary 0.018 0.019
Mother higher education -0.018 0.040
Public school -0.010 0.010
Java -0.014 0.010
Poverty Index:
Poor (satisfied 1 criteria) 0.036*** 0.012
Poor (satisfied 2criteria) 0.058*** 0.011
Poor (satisfied 3 criteria) 0.044*** 0.013
Poor (satisfied 4 criteria) 0.050*** 0.018
Poor (satisfied 5 criteria) 0.008 0.029
Poor (satisfied 6+ criteria) 0.003 0.074
Head_of village 0.076*** 0.027
Staff_of village 0.081** 0.038
Observation 3284
Note: SE is Standard Error; *Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
Table 3.16 column 1 reports the IV regression without interacting the BOS variable 
with the poverty index. Column 2 reports the results with BOS and poverty index 
interaction. Looking at Column 1, the 2SLS estimates suggest that the BOS program 
seems to be relevant and has a significant positive effect on child test scores. The 
direction o f the results is consistent with the findings from the OLS analysis but the 
size o f the BOS program effect on child test scores from IV estimates is bigger than 
OLS and looks over value. It indicates that students with BOS who are influenced by 
the head o f the village and also the staff o f the village will have a bigger effect on test
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scores than those who are influenced by other village officers, as head o f village and 
staff o f village are the instrument variables for BOS. In addition, we predict that 
village staffs are more accountable and objective in categorizing people as poor than 
other village officers who are more likely to have a personal relationship.
In addition, the higher effect o f BOS on child test scores in IV regression than in OLS 
regression may be because it is a local average treatment effect (LATE). According to 
the previous studies that measure LATE (Angrist and Kruger, 1991; Acemonglu and 
Angrist, 2001), the instruments often generate treatment effects that exceed those 
generated from OLS. In addition, Card (2001) suggests that the higher IV results 
could occur because they approximate average effects among compliers, whereas the 
OLS estimates approximate average effects among everyone. In this study, the IV 
estimates correspond to students who receive BOS because o f the way it is 
administrated by village officers. Furthermore, students who are at the margin of 
qualifying for BOS, would experience a large increase in test score if they did receive 
BOS. Hence, the BOS effect is quite large. On the other hand, as regards students with 
very poor criteria, the effect o f BOS is very small. Thus, giving BOS to somebody 
who is not very poor according to poor criteria can result in a very large effect.
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T a b le  3 .1 6 :  I n s t r u m e n ta l  V a r ia b le  R e g r e s s io n






BOS 3.304*** 1.261 0.284*** 0.092
Poor
Poor (satisfied 1 criteria) -0.532*** 0.147 -0.431*** 0.137
Poor (satisfied 2criteria) -0.619*** 0.156 -0.433*** 0.133
Poor (satisfied 3 criteria) -0.626*** 0.157 -0.499*** 0.137
Poor (satisfied 4 criteria) -0.655*** 0.174 -0.506*** 0.147
Poor (satisfied 5 criteria) -0.550*** 0.192 -0.514** 0.204
Poor (satisfied 6+ criteria) -1.329*** 0.356 -1.190** 0.520
BOS*Poor
BOS*Poor (satisfied 1 criteria) 0.140 0.251
BOS*Poor (satisfied 2criteria) -0.098 0.165
BOS*Poor (satisfied 3 criteria) 0.273** 0.110
BOS*Poor (satisfied 4 criteria) 0.248** 0.127
BOS*Poor (satisfied 5 criteria) 0.211 0.224
BOS*Poor (satisfied 6+ criteria) 0.101 0.596
Male -0.099* 0.052 -0.121** 0.042
Urban 0.347*** 0.053 0.329*** 0.044
Rank of provincial HCI -0.012*** 0.004 -0.013*** 0.004
HH size -0.043*** 0.014 -0.036*** 0.012
Log of HH expend on food 0 177*** 0.049 0.165*** 0.040
Father secondary 0.309*** 0.078 0.274*** 0.064
Father higher education 0.218 0.187 0.353** 0.139
Mother secondary 0.197** 0.097 0.245*** 0.078
Mother higher education 0.574** 0.245 0.517*** 0.183
Public school -0.098* 0.055 -0.129*** 0.043
Java 0.147*** 0.056 0.103** 0.044







Note: dependent variable is child test score with scale 0-10; *Significant at 10%, 
**significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%; SE is standard error9.
9 There is another sensib le estim ation to do by generating dummy variables as instrument for 
BO S*Poor using head o f  v illage and staff o f  village which are interacted with Poverty index.
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Furthermore, looking at Column 2, there is an interaction between BOS and the 
poverty index. Detailed calculation about the effect o f BOS on child test scores by 
poor criteria is presented in Table 3.17 and Figure 3.13.
Table 3.17: The impact o f BOS on child test scores by poverty criteria
from IV regression
Poor criteria Non-BOS BOS gap (BOS - Non-BOS)
0 criteria 0 0.284 0.284
1 criteria -0.431 -0.007 0.424
2 criteria -0.433 -0.247 0.186
3 criteria -0.499 0.058 0.557
4 criteria -0.506 0.026 0.532
5 criteria -0.514 -0.019 0.495
6+ criteria -1.19 -0.805 0.385
Note: Only using 2 instruments with multiple endogenous regressors.
The results suggest that BOS students who satisfied each poor criterion have higher 
test scores than those who are without BOS (non-BOS). For instance, BOS students 
who satisfied 3 criteria increase their test score by 0.058 (0.284-0.499+0.273), and 
0.026 (0.284-0.506+0.248) for students with 4 criteria. The difference between BOS 
students and non-BOS students is presented in Table 3.17 and Figure 3.13. It show 
that the gap is positive and significantly higher for BOS students, and it seems that 
BOS has a larger effect on poor students than non-poor students. Poor students who 
satisfied 3 criteria with BOS have a test score 0.557 point higher than those without 
BOS, and also have higher test scores than those who are not poor students (0.284). 
This suggests that OLS results may be biased because those who get BOS may be 
better students and not poorer students.
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3.7.3. Propensity Score Maching Estimation
Following the Caliendo and Kopeninig study (2005), the variables used in PSM 
should satisfy the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) where the outcome 
variables must be independent of the treatment conditional on the propensity score. 
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) suggest only including the variables which 
simultaneously influence the decision for receiving the school subsidy and the test 
score outcome. Matching on a large number of variables or on criterion variables 
gives to a dimensionality problem. Propensity score matching is a solution to the 
dimensionality problem and can be estimated using any probability model, such as 
probit or logit model. Since most o f the statistics literature prefer using the logit, this 
study also uses the logit model to get the prediction o f propensity score, although any 
probability model can be applied (Dehejia and Wahba, 1998), and the results in the 
literature are typically robust to the method used. The probability o f getting a school
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subsidy is determined by various individual characteristics, e.g., gender, poor 
dummies, rank o f province based on head count index, household expenditure on 
food, area, school administration and parental education background. Table 3.18 
shows the results o f the logit model.
Table 3.18: BOS Logit Model
Dependent Variable: BOS Parameter estimates Average Marginal Effect
Coefficient SE Marginal effect SE
________________________________(1)________ (2)__________Q}__________ (4I _
Poor
Poor (satisfied 1 criteria) 0.730** 0.288 0.013*** 0.004
Poor (satisfied 2criteria) 0.917*** 0.283 0.018*** 0.004
Poor (satisfied 3 criteria) 0.926** 0.287 0.018*** 0.004
Poor (satisfied 4 criteria) 1.026*** 0.294 0.021*** 0.005
Poor (satisfied 5 criteria) 1.039*** 0.314 0.022*** 0.006
Poor (satisfied 6+ criteria) ] 172*** 0.414 0.026** 0.011
Male 0.098 0.066 0.003 0.002
Urban 0.119* 0.070 0.003* 0.002
Rank of provincial HCI -0.046*** 0.006 -0.001*** 0.000
HH size 0.049*** 0.018 0.001*** 0.001
Log of HH expend on food -0.162** 0.062 -0.005** 0.002
Father secondary 0.262*** 0.090 0.007*** 0.003
Father higher education 0.582*** 0.158 0.016*** 0.004
Mother secondary 0.120 0.101 0.003 0.003
Mother higher education 0.321 0.206 0.009 0.006
Public school 2.300*** 0.077 0.065*** 0.003
Head of Village 0.301*** 0.071 0.009*** 0.002










Note: dependent variable is BOS where 1 is for recipient and 0 otherwise 
*Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
Looking at Column 1 o f Table 3.18, most variables are significant at typical 
significance levels and only a few variables are not. The variables poor, urban, public 
school, rank o f provincial HCI, the number o f household members (hhsize) and
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household expenditures on food are significant. Those variables have the most 
influence on the probability of getting a school subsidy. Column 3 shows the marginal 
effect o f the variables. For instance, students who satisfy 5 poor criteria have a higher 
probability o f getting a school subsidy by 2.2 per cent than those who do not satisfy 
any criteria.
3.7.3.1. Choosing Matching Algorithms
This study uses Near Neighbour Matching, since the distribution o f data is a little 
different in treated and untreated groups. As shown in Figure 3.14, the distribution o f 
the treated group seems to have a higher propensity score than the untreated group 
which is what is supposed to happen.
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3.7.3.2. Checking the common support
Following Sianesi (2006), we check for common support. The common support 
condition requires that there exists treated and non-treated units with similar values of 
the propensity score after matching. Figure 3.15 confirms that the common support 
holds. There is an overlap propensity score between treated and control groups.
Figure 3.15: Propensity score distribution and common support 











kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0077
3.7.3.3. Assessing the match quality
In order to check the success o f the matching for all independent variables, there are 
some tests to be done after matching. Caliendo and Copeinig (2005) suggest assessing 
the quality o f matching by using a standardised bias test, t-test for testing the equality 
of means before and after matching and an F-test for the joint equality o f means in the 
matched sample.
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3.7.3.3.1. Test of standardised bias
The standardised bias test is used to check the reduction o f bias after matching. 
According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), the standardised bias approach is 
calculated from the difference in means o f the treated and untreated variables as a 
percentage o f the square root of the average variance in both groups. Table 3.19 shows 
the standardised bias o f variables before and after NN matching.









Rank of provincial HCI -4.5 5.6
HH size 8.3 5.1
Log of HH expend on food -5.0 0.7
Father secondary -14.3 2.9
Father higher education 16.7 4.5
Mother secondary -0.2 -1.6
Mother higher education 0.5 -7.7
Public school -7.8 -1.1
Staff of Village 1.2 -8.5
Java -18.1 -20.3
8 out o f 14 o f the variables have less bias after matching than before matching, 
although 6 variables have a higher bias after matching. Caliendo and Copeinig (2005) 
stated that there is no clear standard o f success for bias reduction in matching 
methods.
3.7.3.3.2. Test for equality of the mean before and after matching (t-test)
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) also suggested a t-test o f the difference o f covariate 
means for treated and control groups. Table 3.20 displays the p-value of the t-test for
equality o f the means before and after matching. Before matching, some of the 
covariate means are different between treated and control groups, but after matching 
only one (child test score) is significantly different between groups.
Table 3.20: Test for equality o f the mean before and after matching (t test)
P value of t test 
Before matching NN with replacement




Rank of provincial HCI 0.540 0.598
HH size 0.320 0.615
Log of HH expend on food 0.522 0.947
Father secondary 0.076 0.772
Father higher education 0.012 0.695
Mother secondary 0.978 0.884
Mother higher education 0.948 0.476
Public school 0.309 0.915
Staff of Village 0.880 0.439
Java 0.019 0.056
3.7.3.3.3. Test of Joint Equality of Means in the Matched Sample (Hotelling 
Test)
After testing the difference o f covariate means individually, a joint test for equality o f 
means in all covariates can be conducted. Using the Hotelling test in Stata, the result 
shows that the P value o f the F test is greater than 5%, which is 0.36. It indicates that 
the null o f joint equality o f means is not rejected, so the conditioning variables are 
well balanced jointly.
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T a b le  3 .2 1 :  H o te l l in g  T e s t  A f t e r  M a tc h in g
Mean for BOS=l Mean for BOSK)




Rank of provincial HCI 10.22 9.89
HH size 5.30 5.25
Log of HH expend on food 13.84 13.82
Father secondary 0.16 0.15
Father higher education 0.08 0.07
Mother secondary 0.15 0.15
Mother higher education 0.02 0.02
Public school 0.42 0.43
Staff of Village 0.20 0.24
Java 0.43 0.53
Hotelling p-value, that means 
are different for two groups 0.36
Observation 178 3105
3.7.3.4. Results
Having checked the quality of matching is satisfactory, it is then possible to estimate 
the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) because the control group now 
has similar characteristics to the treated group. Table 3.22 shows the effect o f school 
subsidy on student performance. The results indicate that there is a statistically 
significant impact of school subsidy on test score at 5% significant level for NN 
matching with replacement and without replacement. For individuals in the treatment 
group, the treatment has raised the test score by 0.26 points on average for NN 
matching with replacement, and by 0.28 points on average for NN without 
replacement. To check that our results are robust, we carried out a number o f 
additional estimation experiments with different matching estimators. Especially, we 
have tested calliper matching and also kernel matching. Table 3.22 shows the various
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results from several types of matching methods and the estimated treatment effects are 
very similar to those obtained from NN with replacement and without replacement.
Table 3.22: The Effect of School Subsidy on Student Performance
Matching method Effect SE BS SE P-value
NN with replacement 0.265 0.118 0.129 0.040
NN without replacement 0.281 0.116 0.126 0.036
Kernel 0.313 0.081 0.084 0.000
Radius Caliper 0.312 0.082 0.076 0.000
Note: SE(Standard Error o f estimator); BS SE(Bootstraped clustered standard error)
Recall that the OLS coefficient estimate was 0.358 bigger than the matching estimate 
0.265. On the other hand, using IV estimation it was found to be bigger than PSM at 
about 3.20 points. Hence, there is a higher estimated effect o f BOS on child test scores 
using IV regression than using OLS or PSM estimations. This may consistent with a 
local average treatment effect (LATE) interpretation. This suggest that higher IV 
results could occur because they estimate the average effects for the group whose 
BOS status is affected by the instruments, whereas the OLS estimates approximate 
average effects among everyone, and PSM estimates the average effects of treatment 
on the treated, which affects people generally.
Furthermore, IV does not tell us whose behaviour is affected by its instruments. These 
‘compliers’ receive BOS because o f the identity o f the local administrator, rather than 
because o f the official criteria. For example, BOS may be received because o f family 
connections. The estimates imply that the effect o f BOS from the students whose test 
score in the margin is quite large.
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3.7.3.5. Evaluation: Sensitivity Analysis
According to Rosenbaum (2002), selection bias occurs when two individuals with the 
same observed covariates have a different probability o f receiving treatment. To deal 
with selection or hidden bias, Rosenbaum suggested that sensitivity analysis be 
conducted using W ilcoxon’s signed rank test to get Rosenbaum bounds. Table 3.23 
shows the results o f this sensitivity analysis for the study of the effect o f the school 
subsidy on students’ tests scores using W ilcoxon’s signed rank test. The point 
estimation o f Rosenbaum’s bounds of this study for the p-values with T=1 is very 
close to the estimation in the propensity score matching analysis. The estimation 
effect o f NN matching is 0.26 and the Hodges-Lehman point estimate is 0.269 and 
both results are significant at 5%.
Table 3.23: The Rosenbaum sensitivity analysis
T
p-value o f  W ilcoxon’s signed- 
rank test





1 0.010 0.010 0.269 0.269
1.1 0.037 0.002 0.206 0.332
1.2 0.099 0.000 0.153 0.391
1.3 0.203 0.000 0.102 0.439
1.4 0.341 0.000 0.050 0.492
1.5 0.493 0.000 0.002 0.540
Table 3.23 also shows that for a small increase o f T=0.2, p value increases to 0.099 in 
the upper bound, which is above the threshold o f p value 0.05. In this case, a hidden 
bias or selection bias o f size T=1.2 is sufficient to explain the observed difference in 
test scores between the treatment group and the control group. Hence two units that 
appear similar and have the same covariates could differ in their odds o f receiving the
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treatment by as much as a factor o f 1.2. Because 1.2 is a small value, it shows that this 
study is sensitive to hidden bias. For Hodges-Lehman point estimate interpretation, for 
example when r=l.l, matched students might differ in their test scores by a factor of
1.1 due to hidden bias. The range is between 0.206 and 0.332.
3.8. Conclusions
Our research indicated that poorer students had lower average test scores. This 
finding suggests that the Government of Indonesia needed to develop a subsidy 
program to provide a basic level o f education for all students. Another important 
finding is that parental education background is positively related to test scores. 
Moreover, Estimation using OLS, IV and PSM all suggested that the BOS program 
has a positive and significant effect on child test scores. Students who receive 
subsidies attain higher test scores. OLS estimation suggested that test scores can be 
raised by 0.358 points or 29.3% of standard deviation, and IV estimation resulted in a 
much larger value o f 3.3 points or about 270% of standard deviation. Furthermore, 
PSM also suggested that the BOS program in Indonesia increased test scores by 0.26 
points or 21.3% of standard deviation. We interpret our IV estimates as a local 
average treatment effect Overall, the early version o f the program, BOS successfully 
improved student test scores performance.
We further attempt to estimate the impact o f BOS by the depth o f poverty that the 
child experienced. OLS estimation concludes that BOS does not help very poor 
students, and helps less poor students more. On the other hand, IV estimation 
concludes that for those students who got BOS, but they are in the margin for being 
entitled or not quite poor, they do well with BOS. Hence, the BOS effect is quite
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large. In addition, for those students with very poor criteria, the effect o f BOS is very 
small. Thus, giving BOS to somebody not very poor according to poor criteria results 
in a very big effect. In conclusion, the BOS program is successful at raising child test 
scores. As a school subsidy policy, BOS is a good at helping poor students to get an 
access to education, especially basic education, since the government can ensure the 
use o f subsidy for schooling, as the funding goes to the school directly and is managed 
by the teachers and monitored by the school committee.
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Chapter 4 
The Impact of Natural Disasters on Human Capital Outcomes for Children
4.1. Introduction
Natural disaster always affects different aspects o f individual life. It affects in almost 
every part o f our life such as emotional, economic, physical, social, and 
environmental. Children are believed to be very vulnerable to disasters. The 
increasing frequency o f disasters and the intensity o f their destruction motivate an 
analysis o f the impacts o f disasters, especially in terms o f human capital outcomes for 
children. This chapter uses a micro level survey data set from IFLS which covers 
approximately 83% o f the Indonesian population within the survey area. There are 
two main objectives. The first objective is to examine the effects o f natural disasters 
on child test scores and examine whether different types o f disasters have different 
impacts. Moreover, we also investigate the children who took the test immediately 
after a disaster compared to those whose tests a year after a disaster. The second 
objective is to investigate the effects o f natural disasters on child health. Similar to the 
impact on child test scores, we also examine whether different types of disasters have 
different impacts on child health. Three types o f disasters are defined in this chapter: 
big earthquakes, small earthquakes and floods. These types o f disasters were chosen 
because o f their intensity, as measured by the percentage o f people killed, and the 
percentage o f people evacuated.
This chapter contributes to the international literature in several respects. First, 
compared to other literature, this study uses self-reported data, on whether households 
are affected by disasters or not. In our data, individuals are categorized as affected by
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the disasters if they reported that their households experienced death or major injuries 
to household members, direct financial loss to the household, or relocation of 
household members. That definition seems more accurate rather than only using 
general information before and after the shock, and there has been no sense o f which 
individual is affected or unaffected. Second, this study investigates the impact o f 
disasters on child test scores. Previous studies investigate the impact of disasters on a 
quantity measure o f educational outcome - such as school enrolment or attendance - 
rather than the quality o f outcome. Third, this study examines the impact o f disasters 
across the distribution o f test scores using Quantile Regression, so we can see in detail 
the effects o f disasters by groups o f outcomes. Fourth, this study presents the impact 
o f disasters on child health using two different measures o f child health: height of 
child as an objective measure and self-reported health condition as a subjective 
measure. The purpose o f using these two measures that height is a permanent effect 
whereas self-reported health is likely to be a short effect.
A considerable amount o f literature has been published, especially those which have 
focused on the effect o f disasters on child human capital outcomes. In child education, 
some researchers found that there is a negative impact o f disasters on children’s 
schooling. This impact becomes our concern because there is a wide literature that 
indicates that schooling has important effects in lifecycle earnings. Harmon and 
Walker (1995); Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994); Ashenfelter and Zimmerman (1993) 
point out that there are positive and significant effects o f schooling on wages. Other 
studies (Currie and Thomas, 1999; Neale and Johnson, 1996; Murnane, Willett and 
Levy, 1995; Zax and Rees, 1998) confirm that test scores taken during schooling have 
a significant impact on the future labour market or outcomes.
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In addition, almost all studies on the impact o f natural disasters on child education use 
school enrolment or school participation as a measure o f schooling such as Ureta 
(2005), Jacoby and Skoufias (1997), Baez and Santos (2007), Guarcello, Kovrava and 
Rosati,(2008). Only limited studies use other measures such as number o f year grades 
completed such as Maccini and Yang (2008). In child health, earlier studies generally 
found that there is a negative impact o f disasters on children with only a few studies 
finding no impact. The most famous studies were conducted by Hoddinott and Kinsey 
(2000 and 2001), which pointed out that the impact o f disaster differs by gender. In 
brief, most studies on educational outcomes emphasise a quantity measure by using 
school enrolment or participation rate and very few use quality a measure such as test 
scores. Studies o f the impact of disasters on child health have covered various aspects 
but there are no studies that discuss the impact on different age categories.
A major innovation o f this research, that differs from the previous literature is to 
separate the effects of disasters into two parts. The first effect is calculated for 
individuals in disaster regions, both those who report that they are affected and those 
who are unaffected but lived in a disaster area, while the second effect is an additional 
effect for those who report that they have been directly affected by disaster. In 
addition, we calculated these effects for the impact o f specific natural disasters (big 
earthquakes, small earthquakes and floods). We also estimate the impacts on children 
who took the test immediately after the disaster compared to those who took the tests 
a year after disaster.
142
Our first major finding is related to the effects o f disasters on child test scores. Natural 
disasters affect all o f the children in disaster regions, both those who declare they are 
affected and those who are unaffected by the disaster. Those who are affected by 
disasters had a lower test score than those who were unaffected but lived in disaster 
region. Moreover, children who took the test just after the disaster have lower test 
scores than children who took the test more than a year after the disaster. There are 
also different impacts from different types of natural disasters and we find that only 
large earthquakes are associated with lower test scores for all children in the disaster 
region. Being in a region that is hit by a natural disaster has the biggest impact on 
child test score in the lowest quantile o f conditional test scores. The largest additional 
impact o f natural disasters to those who have been affected by disasters is on children 
at the median of the test score distribution.
The second major finding is on the impact o f disasters on child health. We found that, 
conditional on survival, disasters have no serious impact on child health. This finding 
is confirmed by all our estimation results using the height o f the child or self-reported 
health measures. For the height o f the child, none o f the children who have been 
affected by disasters have a lower height compared to those who are unaffected by 
disasters. The same result is obtained for the impact o f specific natural disasters on 
child health. The result from self-reported health data is similar to results from the 
height data. Only the dependent variable which uses last year’s health condition has a 
significant impact from disasters. It indicates that children in disaster regions who 
have actually been affected by disasters have a bigger probability o f being unhealthy.
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In short, disasters result in serious impacts on child test scores but do not affect child 
health significantly. Since a disaster is a temporary event, our results are consistent 
with the government and state agencies compensating well for any impact. It seems 
natural that child health would be top priority, rather than child education, at a time of 
a disaster. This is not surprising, since all agencies deal with the immediate impact at 
the time of disasters, such as child health, rather than long-term impacts such as 
education. Our results suggest that the Government also needs to consider supporting 
the victims o f disasters to compensate for any child education effects o f disaster. This 
may require more resources devoted to longer term disaster relief.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents a review o f the 
literature on the effects of natural disasters on human capital outcomes for children. 
The third section profiles Indonesia’s natural disasters and is followed by data 
sources. The fifth section discusses methodology used in the impact o f disasters on 
child test scores, and is followed by discussion o f its empirical findings. The seventh 
sections are the methodology used in the impact o f disasters on child health and is 
followed by the discussion of its empirical findings. The ninth section is robustness 
checks, and the last section concludes with the policy recommendations.
4.2. Literature review
This section reviews the previous research on the impact o f natural disasters on human 
capital outcomes for children. A growing body of literature has investigated the 
effects o f disasters in developing rather than in developed countries. In this chapter, 
the discussion o f literature can be classified into three strands. The first strand o f the 
literature focuses on the impact o f disasters on health. The second focuses on the
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impact o f disasters on education and the last strand studies the impact o f disasters on 
nutrition.
4.2.1. The Effects of Disasters on Health
A considerable number o f studies have focused their attention on the impact o f natural 
disasters on health, using various measures o f a health. The most famous study was by 
Hoddinott and Kinsey in 2000 and 2001. In 2000, they examined the impact of 
drought on adult health in Zimbabwe, using body mass index as a measure. There 
were three reasons why body mass was used for adult health measurement (Hoddinott 
and Kinsey, 2000). First, body mass was one of the alternatives for adult health 
measurement. Second, previous studies indicated that there was a relationship between 
body mass index and agricultural productivity. Third, a huge number o f health 
indicators were related to body mass index. Using individual-level fixed-effect 
estimation to deal with unobservable characteristics, they estimated health using the 
log o f body mass index and controlled for individual, household and community 
covariates. There was a reduction in the body mass of women but not men. These 
important findings confirmed that only women in poor households were affected by 
the drought. Thus, this study pointed out that there were different impacts o f disasters 
by gender.
Hoddinott and Kinsey (2001) estimated the effects o f disaster on other health 
measures. They investigated the reactions o f the height o f young children to drought 
in rural Zimbabwe. They identified five reasons why they used the height o f young 
children aged 12-24 months. First, the individuals who were more vulnerable to 
weather shocks were believed to be very young children. Second, the growth rate and
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height of young children was a good indicator for health status. Third, by using the 
measurement of height, the authors could examine the impact o f natural disasters at 
the individual level. Fourth, according to previous studies, children with slow height 
growth would perform less well in school than children who had normal height 
growth. Fifth, height was possibly a useful indicator to examine whether the impact of 
natural disasters on children was permanent or transitory. Hoddinott and Kinsey 
(2001) measured child growth as the difference between child height in period t+1 and 
t. They estimated child growth as a function o f child height in period t, child care, 
child characteristics, and health and sanitation environment. The findings confirmed 
that children aged 12-24 months have lower than normal growth, in terms o f height, of 
approximately 1.5 to 2cm after the shock.
A further prominent study on the effects o f disasters on health was by Baez and 
Santos (2007). Using panel data from the Living Standards Measurement Study 
(LSMS) in 1998, 1999 and 2001 in Nicaragua, they examined the impact of Hurricane 
Mitch on children’s education, health and labour force participation. They observed 
two health measurements: the prevalence of illness and conditioning on sickness. The 
research design to calculate the effects o f the shock was a difference in difference 
analysis (DID). The effects of the shock were obtained from the difference o f child 
outcomes after shock (2001) and pre-shock (1998) in disaster areas minus the 
difference o f child outcomes after shock (2001) and pre-shock (1998) in non- disaster 
areas. Baez and Santos (2007) found that the hurricane had a negative impact on 
health for children in rural area. However, in general, they found no statistically 
significant difference between the proportion o f children who were sick before and 
after the hurricane.
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Ninno and Lundberg (2004) examined the impact o f floods on child health and 
nutrition in Bangladesh. Using a three-round household survey in seven flood-affected 
areas collected between November 1998 and November 1999. Child height at 60 
months old was adopted as a measure o f children’s health. For measurement o f child 
growth, they used the change in height-for-age. In the empirical model, they used 
health inputs, the child’s, household’s and community’s characteristics, and lagged 
health as independent variables. This findings suggested that children who 
experienced by the flood were badly affected. There was also evidence that the 
prevention program from the government was more effective than the post-disaster 
program in protecting child health.
Akresh et al. (2007) studied the impact o f economic shock (civil war and crop failure) 
in Rwanda in the 1980s, on children’s health at birth for several years after the shock. 
The height for age o f children was used as a proxy for health. They found that boys 
and girls bom after civil war were both negatively impacted, with height for age 0.30 
and 0.72 standard deviations lower respectively. In the case o f crop failure, only girls 
were affected, by 0.41 standard deviation lower height for age, and the impact was 
bigger for girls from poor families.
In a recent study, Rhodes et al. (2010) examined the impact o f Hurricane Katrina, 
which hit the USA on 29 August 2005, on the mental health o f low-income parents in 
New Orleans. Using psychological distress and perceived distress as measures o f 
mental health outcome from approximately 1,000 participants, they found that higher 
levels o f hurricane- related loss and stressors were associated with worse health
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conditions. Higher baseline resources predicted fewer hurricane-associated stressors, 
but the consequences o f Hurricane Katrina persisted for a year or more and were most 
severe for those experiencing the most stressors and loss.
Study by Aguero and Deolalikar (2011) on the effect o f civil conflict between April 
and June 1994 on health in Rwanda found that the negative effect o f crises on health 
goes well beyond early childhood. They used height o f adult women in Rwanda, and 
the result confirmed that the adult height o f children was lower than older children and 
those who were from neighbouring countries. They used large household survey data, 
focusing on female respondents aged 15-49 years old, and difference in differences 
method to estimate the effect o f the shock.
4.2.2. The Effects of Disasters on Education
According to previous studies on natural disasters, there were heterogeneous effects o f 
natural disasters on education. Some studies found that disasters caused negative 
effects on schooling, while others found no effects. This was because the degree of 
disaster effects varies among individuals, households and regions. In the case of 
schooling, some school buildings may have suffered heavy damages that caused 
important effects on the schooling process, while some others were unaffected. 
Moreover, the effects on teachers might also disrupt the schooling process.
Ureta (2005) investigated the impact o f natural disasters on school enrolment in 
Nicaragua using a test o f mean difference and duration o f schooling function. He 
analysed urban and rural areas separately. To compare: in 1998, prior to the hurricane, 
overall school enrolment rate for a treatment group was slightly higher than a control
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group by 4% from 77 percentage bases for urban area and 6% from the base 
percentage o f 52 for rural area. In 1999, soon after the hurricane hit Nicaragua, school 
enrolment rates o f individuals in hurricane areas were affected but not by much. In 
urban areas, enrolment rates decreased from 86.6% to 84.4%. Similarly in rural areas, 
it decreased from 63.9% to 63.4%. This worse condition in urban areas might be 
because of migration from rural to urban areas.
Still in the case o f Nicaragua, Baez and Santos (2007) examined the effect o f 
hurricane on school enrolment. Using the same data set as Ureta (2005) but different 
methodology (difference in difference analysis), they found that there was no 
significant effect on school enrolment. They looked at the difference of school 
enrolment rate between 1998 and 2001. The school enrolment rate increased 
significantly, by 5.9% for the treatment group and 8.5% for the control group in rural 
areas. This was because there was an important development o f the education sector in 
Nicaragua at that time. Because o f this reason, Baez and Santos (2007) tried to control 
for the characteristics o f individual and household, and also for fixed regional effects 
and local public programs. After controlling for these characteristics, the model could 
reduce unexplained variance from the characteristics o f individual and households 
when they are nor controlled, and confirmed that there was no significant effect o f the 
hurricane on school enrolment.
Guarcello, Kovrava and Rosati (2008) pointed out that different natural disasters have 
varied impacts on schooling. They studied the impact o f floods and droughts on 
schooling in rural Cambodia. Using data from the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey 
1999 and 2003-2004, and applying propensity score matching and difference in
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difference estimates, they found that children who experience both floods and 
droughts experienced negative and significant effects on schooling. Schooling was 
also reduced if a child experienced only a drought, but not so badly as if they had 
experienced both disasters, while floods seemed to have no effect on schooling in 
rural Cambodia.
The pioneering work o f research in Indonesia on the effect o f natural disasters on 
education outcomes was Maccini and Yang (2008), using the third wave (the 2000 
wave) o f the Indonesia Family Life Survey. They focused especially on the weather 
shocks in early-life on future education outcomes and completed grades o f schooling 
as education outcome measures. In addition, Maccini and Yang (2008) used rainfall 
measurement from the closest rainfall station to the child’s birth place as a measure of 
weather shocks. Using a reduced-form linear regression, the result suggested an 
interesting and different result between females and males. For females, the result 
confirmed that the relationship between education outcome and rainfall was positive 
and significant. It indicated that the higher the rainfall at the time of birth, the higher 
the year grade completed would be. Lower rainfall by 20% leads to 0.22 fewer years 
of schooling for females. On the other hand, the result was not statistically significant 
for males.
In a similar study o f weather shocks in agriculture in Cote d'Ivoire, Jensen (2000) 
pointed out that the weather shock in agriculture reduced the school enrolment rate by 
one-third to one-half and the impact on males and females was almost the same. This 
study applied OLS and fixed-effects regression. Equally important, in India, Jacoby 
and Skoufias (1997) reported the effects to school attendance in rural India in times of
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drought. By using a model o f human capital investment under uncertainty and Village 
Level Studies Survey data set from the International Crops Research Institute for the 
Semi-Arid Tropics (CRISAT), they confirmed that the weather shocks in rural India 
reduced school enrolment.
Another study in rural Honduras, by Gitter and Barham (2006), examined the effects 
o f a hurricane which occurred in October 1998 on school attainment. In comparison to 
other studies which used school enrolment or the number o f years completed as 
measures o f educational outcome, they used a different measure, the so-called SAGE 
(the School for AGE) measurement, that has been developed by Patrinos and 
Psacharopoulos (1997). This measurement considers two important elements: the 
current status o f school-age children and the number of years o f schooling. SAGE 
score was obtained from the percentage o f the total number of years o f school 
completed (S) divided by the difference between the age of children (A) and their age 
when they started their schooling (E). A 100 score implies that children kept up with 
their schooling at their age and a score of less than 100 implies that children who 
missed some schooling or did not participate at school. Using a two stage least square 
model, they found that children who were affected by the hurricane had a lower 
SAGE score.
A recent study conducted by Bustelo, Arends-Kuenning and Lucchetti (2012) 
investigated the impact of earthquakes on schooling in Colombia. They identified the 
short and medium term impact o f earthquakes on schooling by combining two cross- 
sectional household surveys before an earthquake and one six years after an 
earthquake. Using school enrolment as a measure o f schooling for two different
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groups o f children at primary school and secondary school, they confirmed that both 
short and medium term effects o f disasters were negative on school enrolment. Short­
term effects were stronger than the medium effects. This was not surprising, since a 
year after an earthquake all the infrastructures o f schooling were still being 
refurbished, so this affected the process o f schooling.
4.2.3. The Effects o f Disasters on Nutrition
The most influential study on the effect o f natural disasters on nutrition was the study 
conducted by Baez and Santos (2007). Their study o f natural disasters, especially the 
effect of natural disasters on health, nutrition, child labour and school enrolment, has 
inspired other researchers to study other natural disasters particularly in relation to 
children’s well-being. Baez and Santos (2007) estimated the effects o f a hurricane on 
nutrition in Nicaragua in 1998. Considering the hurricane as a natural experiment, 
they exploited the medium- term effect o f disasters on children’s well-being by using 
difference in difference analysis and a panel data household-level survey from Living 
Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) 1998, 1999 and 2001 respectively. The results 
indicated that the hurricane badly affected the nutrition o f children in the medium 
term.
There are some studies that discussed the influence o f weather on investments in 
children, especially on nutrition. As pointed out by Jensen (2000), in Cote d'Ivoire, the 
weather shock had affected households in reducing their investment in children. Using 
child weight for height (WFH) in the age range 0-10 as a measure o f nutritional status, 
the results confirmed that there was a negative effect o f weather shocks on child
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nutrition. Malnutrition was suffered by both boys and girls and was nearly double 
compared with the condition before the weather shocks.
In Ethiopia, Woldehanna (2009) examined the effect o f economic shocks on 
nutritional achievement on children aged 5. The economic shocks were recorded 
before and after child birth, such as crops failure, death of livestock, severe illness or 
injury, job loss/source of income, natural disaster and others. Using longitudinal data 
o f children in 2002 and 2006 and household’s utility maximisation function subject to 
income and health constraint, Woldehanna (2009) estimated the impact o f shocks on 
children’s height. The model had child height for age as the dependent variable and 
economic shocks before and after child birth, and household characteristics as control 
variables. To reduce the endogeneity problem, lagged values of explanatory variables 
are used. The finding confirms that there is a significant effect o f economic shocks 
both after birth and before birth on the nutrition and height o f children. Children in 
rural areas were more at risk than in urban areas.
The most recent study conducted by Bustelo, Arends-Kuenning and Lucchetti (2012) 
examined the impact o f the 1999 Colombian Earthquake on child nutrition in the short 
and medium term. They confirmed that the earthquake influenced all households by 
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4.3. Indonesia Natural Disaster Profile
This section outlines the occurrences o f natural disasters used in our empirical analysis 
and provides a description of the disaster data used.
4.3.1. Indonesia Natural Disaster by Region
The data which we use for our empirical study are from the last decade o f disasters, 
2000-2011. More than 4000 disasters occurred and were recorded by the National 
Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) across various regions and some of them were 
very destructive and killed many people in some regions in Indonesia. The most 
destructive one was the earthquake and tsunami in Aceh on 26th December 2004 with a
9.1 - 9.3 moment magnitude scale, and the longest duration in history, of around 10 
minutes. This disaster killed approximately 230,000 people in fourteen countries, and 
more than half o f the people, 126,915, were from Indonesia. In addition, according to 
BNBP, 37,063 people were missing and 655,000 people were made homeless across 
Aceh province. The second destructive disaster was an earthquake on 26th May 2006 in 
Yogyakarta Province. More than 6,000 people were killed in a 6.3 magnitude 
earthquake and about 130,000 were left homeless. Another serious disaster was the 
floods in Jakarta in February 2007. Around 30 people were killed and approximately 
340,000 left homeless. Another earthquake in West Sumatra that measured 5.8-6.4 on 
the Richter scale killed approximately 50 people on 6 March 2007.
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1 Aceh 204 4,494,410 3.713 23.539
2 Bali 58 3,890,757 0.001 0.039
3 Bangka-Belitung 73 1,223,296 0.004 0.036
4 Banten 63 10,632,166 0.001 0.523
5 Bengkulu 22 1,715,518 0.007 0.038
6 DI Yogyakarta 44 3,457,491 0.146 40.973
i B t i i DKI Jakarta 59 9,607,787 0.001 6.908
8 Gorontalo 43 1,040,164 0.002 5.731
9 Jambi 43 3,092,265 0.001 2.539
10 ' West Java 691 43,053,732 0.003 1.822
11 Central Java 863 32,382,657 0.006 2.965
12 East Java 388 37,476,757 0.001 0.480
13 West Kalimantan 53 4,395,983 0.001 3.601
14 South Kalimantan 108 3,626,616 0.002 6.042
15 CentralKalimantan 16 2,212,089 0.000 0.278
16 East Kalimantan 60 3,553,143 0.002 2.983
17 Riau Kepulauan 6 1,679,163 0.000 0.000
18 Lampung 87 7,608,405 0.001 0.066
19 Maluku 29 1,533,506 0.005 0.591
20 North Maluku 30 1,038,087 0.001 1.526
21 West Nusa 7  Tenggara 83 4,500,212 0.001 2.104
22 East Nusa Tenggara 253 4,683,827 0.008 1.144
23 Papua 35 2,833,381 0.007 1.241
24 West Papua 8 760,422 0.023 4.548
25 Riau 67 5,538,367 0.001 2.156
26 West Sulawesi 24 1.158.651 0.003 0.548
27 4 f;South Sulawesi 176 8,034,776 0.005 0.529
28 Central Sulawesi 77 2,635,009 0.005 2.904
29 South East Sulawesi 205 2,232,586 0.004 0.685
30 North Sulawesi 72 2.270.596 0.006 5.187
31 * § | West Sumatra 183 4,846,909 0,042 4.429










Total 4,327 237,641,326 - -
Average 0.076 2.835
Source: BNPB. Note: rows in grey are for IFLS provinces.
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Table 4.2 shows the total number of disasters during the last decade across various 
provinces. Rows in grey are IFLS regions where all IFLS data samples were taken 
from. We provide the percentage of population killed and the percentage o f population 
evacuated in order to see the region which suffered the most from disasters. Aceh 
province has the highest percentage o f deaths to population and also the total number o f 
evacuated people to population. It is not surprising since the most destructive disaster 
during the last decade was in Aceh. As Aceh is an outlier due to the huge number o f 
victims from the impact o f the earthquake and tsunami in 2004 and is not in the IFLS 
sample, we excluded Aceh from the following discussion.
Neumayer and Plumper (2007) suggest that it is better to use the ratio o f dead people to 
the population rather than the total number of deaths to categorize disaster regions. 
Because o f the extensive impact o f disasters, we also consider the effect o f disasters by 
seeing the total number o f evacuated people for determining disaster regions. The 
reason is to capture the effect of disasters like floods: although they result in only a few 
deaths, almost every year, some regions regularly experience floods and they always
present a problem in terms of big numbers o f evacuated people.
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution o f the percentage o f the number of dead and 
evacuated people to the population across the regions. The dark colour is for the
percentage o f evacuated people to the population, while the light colour is for the
percentage of dead people to the population. After excluding Aceh region, Yogyakarta 
had the highest percentage o f both ratios. West Sumatra and West Papua were in 
second and third places in terms of the percentage o f deaths and evacuated people. In 
terms of the percentage o f evacuated people, some regions with high percentages were
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DKI Jakarta, South Kalimantan, Gorontalo and North Sumatra. This information is 
used in the empirical analysis to define disaster regions for further analysis,
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of disasters across regions in Indonesia weighted by 
mortality, while Figure 4.3 is a simple count o f the number o f disasters. The gradation 
o f colour from white to dark red means the greater the number o f disasters in the 
region. The figures confirm that Java and Sumatra islands are dominated by regions 
that have more disasters than other regions. In addition, Aceh and Southern Java have 
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4.3.2. Indonesia’s Natural Disasters by Year
Compared with the distribution of disasters by region, Figure 4.4 shows the total 
number o f occurrences from various types o f disasters by year in Indonesia. From 2000 
to 2011, Indonesian natural disasters were dominated by windstorms, floods and 
landslides. There were also an increasing number o f occurrences of those three 
disasters than others on average, but there is no information on the intensity of these 
disasters. In comparison with landslides, windstorms and floods, earthquakes with 
tsunamis or earthquakes are only of low occurrence but the effects o f these disasters 
result in a huge human and financial loss.








2000 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
■ ■ ■ T s u n a m i  $8883 E ruption  '////M  E a r t h q u a k e
■ O B  E a rt h q u a k e  W ith  T s u n a m i  ■ W S  F lo o d  a n d  L a n d s l id e s  L a n d s l id e s
W i n d s t o r m  ■ F lood
Source: National Disaster Management Agency
In order to capture the intensity of disasters, Figure 4.5 demonstrates the number of 
deaths for each disaster by year. After excluding the tsunami with earthquake in Aceh
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in 2004, due to a huge number o f victims, the earthquake in Yogyakarta in 2006 
resulted in the highest number o f deaths. Compared with the number of occurrences 
from Figure 4.4 above, although the frequency o f the occurrence is quite high, floods, 
windstorms and landslides inflict a lower number o f deaths.










■  EARTHQUAKE ■  EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI ■  FLOODS
■  FLOODS AND LANDSLIDES ■  LANDSLIDES ■  STRONG W IN D
Source: National Disaster Management Agency
4.4. Data Sources
This study uses the Indonesian Family Life Survey IFLS4 (2007) and some from IFLS3 
(2000), the same data set from the previous chapter as the main source o f data for
estimating the impact o f disasters on child test score and child health. In addition, there
are two other data sets used: an official disaster data base from the National Disaster 
Management Agency (BNPB=Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana) o f Indonesia 
and statistics of Indonesian data from the Central Bureau o f Statistics o f Indonesia 
(BPS=Badan Pusat Statistik). IFLS provides all educational, health and disaster
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year
information at individual, household and community level. We also use additional 
information from BNPB to define disaster regions and the degree o f disasters, and 
some demographic information from BPS.
4.4.1. Disaster Data
The main data in this chapter is related to disasters. IFLS defines households as being 
affected by a disaster if the disaster was severe enough to cause death or major injuries 
to a household member, cause direct financial loss to the household, or cause household 
members to relocate. IFLS reports several types o f natural disasters, such as 
earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides, floods, volcanic eruptions and windstorms. Another 
important definition is disaster region. Since most of the regions in Indonesia 
experienced disasters, it is important to determine which disaster region is a treatment 
group. Disaster region is defined as a region with heavily damaged by disasters and a 
lot o f people are affected by disaster (dead and evacuated) than other regions. 
According to Neumayer and Plumper (2007), in order to measure the strength o f a 
disaster, they use the number of people killed during the disasters divided by the total 
population as a proxy o f the strength of the disaster, but this study uses two proxies as a 
measurement o f the strength o f a disaster. Besides using the percentage o f the number 
o f people killed to the total population, this study also uses the percentage o f the 
number o f people evacuated to the population. For this reason, the region which 
experiences disasters almost every year which affect the economy can be captured by 
using this proxy.
As already discussed in Section 3 o f this chapter, this study excludes Aceh from the list 
o f disaster regions, since Aceh is an outlier and also is not covered in IFLS surveys.
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R eferring to the percentage o f  the total num ber o f  dead and evacuated  p eop le  to the 
total population  in each  region , a d isaster region  can be d efined  as a region  ab ove the 
average o f  both p ercen tages w hich  co n sist  o f  A ceh  and DI Y ogyakarta  (see  T ab le 4 .3 ). 
T able 4 .3  sh o w s all the reg ion s ab ove the average o f  the percentage w h ich  are already  
ranked from  the h igh est p ercentages and h igh lights p rov in ces w ith  IFLS data.
T able 4.3: D isaster R eg ion  D efin ition
No Province % death/pop Province % evacuated/pop





































8 Papua 0.01 8 West Sumatra 4 4°
9 North Sulawesi 0.01 9 West Kalimantan 3.60
33 Kepulauan Riau 
Average o f Percentage
0.00
0.076
33 Kepulauan Riau 0.00
2.835
For our em pirical an a lysis, w e  have determ ined the d isaster reg ion s as DI Y ogyakarta, 
DKI Jakarta and W est Sumatra. W e p icked  those three p rov in ces s in ce on ly  th ose three 
p rov in ces are com p lete ly  covered  by IFLS survey data. South K alim antan is covered  in 
IFLS survey data but the total num ber o f  respondents w h o  exp erien ced  d isasters is not 
adequate, w h ile  W est K alim antan, G orontalo, N orth S u law esi and W est Papua are not 
covered  in IFLS surveys. Furthermore, natural d isasters can be determ ined  based on  
the occurrences o f  disasters in each disaster region . Y ogyakarta, w ith  a b ig  earthquake, 
has the h ighest percentage for both dead and evacuated  p eop le . In term s o f  the 
percentage o f  evacuated  p eop le, W est Sumatra, w ith  a sm all earthquake, is ab ove  
average, and in term s o f  the percentage o f  dead p eop le , although W est Sum atra is
166
below average the value is just below DI Yogyakarta, which is quite high compared to 
other provinces. DKI Jakarta has floods, and although the percentage o f dead people is 
quite low the percentage o f evacuated people is above average. Another big factor is 
that DKI Jakarta experienced floods almost every year and always presents severe 
problems.
Based on the disaster data information above, we define dummies D (Disaster region) 
and dummies A (being affected by disaster). D is equal to 1 if individuals are in a 
disaster region at the time o f the disaster and A is equal to 1 if individuals are in a 
disaster region and were affected by disaster. As explained above, in instances where 
the individuals suffered financial loss or where one or more household member died or 
suffered major injuries, this is defined as affected by disaster.
4.4.2. Educational data
The important data on education is child test score. Child test score is obtained from a 
test score in primary school at age 11 or in their final year o f primary school. All 
questions in the test are standard for all regions in Indonesia and the test is conducted 
nationally at the same time. The test score is continuous value and ranged from 0 to 10. 
It is calculated from the average scores, which consist o f 3 subjects (Maths, Science 
and Indonesian Language). Test score data from IFLS survey is only taken from the 
respondents who could show certificates o f test and excludes the respondents who 
could not show certificates, since sometimes the information is not complete. For 
instance, they only mentioned 2 subjects out o f 3, or they only mentioned the total 



















































Figure 4.6 presents the comparison distribution between child test score in a disaster 
region (big earthquake, small earthquake and flood) and a non-disaster region in the 
time before and after a disaster. It seems that child test scores in big earthquake 
regions were badly affected by disaster, while child test scores in small earthquake 
and flood regions are not badly affected if we compare them before and after a 
disaster.
Figure 4.7 shows the common trend o f child test scores for children in a disaster 
region and a non-disaster region, and also for those who are affected or unaffected by 
disasters. Before three types o f disasters (big earthquake, small earthquake and flood) 
occurred in 2006, the average child test score on both a disaster region and a non­
disaster region were similar, but after disasters there was a big gap between child test 
score in a disaster region and a non-disaster region. The same results are obtained for 
affected and non-affected child test score. The difference o f child test score before a 
disaster between those two groups was not that large, but after disasters a huge gap 
could be seen. It seemed that child test scores in a disaster region were badly affected 
by the disasters, especially for those who were affected by disasters.
Dummies for parental educational background were also included. Dummy primary 
school is equal to 1 if the parent went to primary school, dummy secondary school is 
equal to 1 if the parent went to secondary school and dummy higher education is equal 
to 1 if the parent went to university.
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Figure 4.7: C om m on Trend o f  C hild  T est S cores  
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4.4.3. Health Data
T w o im portant typ es o f  health data are used in this chapter. The first is h eight o f  ch ild  
m easured in cm . W e used height o f  ch ild  at ages 2-5  years o ld , s in ce w e b e lie v e  that 
in this age group children are in the stage o f  im portant grow th, k now n as the go ld en
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age. Furthermore, children at an early age are believed to be more vulnerable to the 
effect o f disasters. Figure 4.8 describes the distribution o f child height at age 2-5 in 
disaster regions and non-disaster regions, which is similar.
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The second health measure is self-reported health. There are two different types: 
ordered value and count value. Ordered value is for general and past health condition 
and count value is for the total number o f days missing regular activities and lying in 
bed. For general health condition, the respondents were asked about the general health 
condition at the time of survey, and the answer was designed in closed questions, 
which consisted o f ranked data: ( l)  very healthy, (2) somewhat healthy, (3) somewhat 
unhealthy and (4) unhealthy. For the previous year’s health condition, respondents 
were asked about the health condition 12 months ago in comparison with the 
condition at the time of the survey and the data consisted of: (l)m uch better now, (2) 
somewhat better now, (3) about the same, (4) somewhat worse, and (5) much worse. 
In comparison with general health condition, last’s year health condition represented
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the child health condition that was closer to the time of disasters. As the big 
earthquake was occurred in May 2006, floods in January 2007, and small earthquake 
in March 2007, while IFLS4 survey was conducted in November 2007 to May 2008. 
Count values were defined as the total number o f days missing regular activities and 
lying in bed for each child due to a poor health condition in the last 4 weeks from the 
time of survey. Moreover, at the community level, we provide information about the 
water supply and garbage system in the community. Dummy water system is equal to 
1 if there is a good system or supply for drinking water and dummy garbage system is 
equal to 1 if there is a good system for garbage disposal in the community.
In summary, the means o f key variables o f this chapter can be seen in Table 4.4. There 
is separate data information for disaster region and non-disaster region data. In 
general, child test score in disaster regions are significantly different before and after 
disasters, but child test scores before and after disasters were similar in non-disaster 
regions. To calculate whether there is any difference between before and after 
disasters, we conducted t tests of difference in means. The results show that for 
disaster regions, where t statistics are equal to 8.24 and p value is equal to 0.000, we 
reject the null hypothesis. There is, therefore, a different test score o f children who 
took the test before disasters or after disasters in disaster regions. On the other hand, 
for non-disaster regions, where t statistics are equal to 0.523 and p value is equal to 
0.601, here we fail to reject the null hypothesis. This result confirms that there is no 
difference of test score from children who took the test before disasters or after 
disasters in non-disaster regions. For child height, t tests o f difference in means shows 
that t statistics are equal to -1.77 and p value is equal to 0.07, we fail reject the null 
hypothesis. The results confirm that child height data is similar in disaster and non-
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disaster regions. In addition for self-reported data, the mean of each level for general 
and last year health condition, and also mean of days missing and lying in bed in 
disaster region and non-disaster region are not very different.
Table 4.4 Means o f key variables
Disaster Region Non-Disaster Region
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
1. Child test scores
Before 6.51 1.28 6.49 1.25
After 5.37 1.72 6.46 1.33
2. Child health
height age 2-5 (cm) 92.87 9.00 92.58 9.11
general health
very healthy 0.107 0.309 0.127 0.333
somewhat healthy 0.763 0.425 0.782 0.413
somewhat unhealthy 0.128 0.334 0.090 0.286
Unhealthy 0.001 0.037 0.001 0.036
previous year’s health
much better now 0.127 0.333 0.097 0.296
somewhat better now 0.293 0.455 0.301 0.459
about the same 0.471 0.499 0.523 0.499
somewhat worse 0.076 0.266 0.049 0.217
much worse 0.003 0.059 0.002 0.043
days missing 0.43 1.94 0.33 1.34
days in bed 2.52 0.73 2.42 0.74
3. Disaster dummy
A 0.34 0.48 0.00 0.00
Source: calculated from IFLS4
4.5. Methodology: The Impact of Disasters on Child Test Scores
This section outlines the research methodology used in this chapter to examine the 
effects o f natural disasters on child test score and child health. For child test scores, 
we used Difference in Differences (DiD) method and Quantile Regression. Difference 
in differences (DiD) estimation is used when a certain group is exposed to the causal 
variable o f interest, such as a change in government policy or a change in environment
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due to a big shock including disasters, and others are not. As natural disasters are 
exogenous conditions that affect the economic environment, we use this exogenous 
variation from natural disasters as a natural experiment to estimate the effects of 
disasters on child test score and child health in the affected area. The key assumption 
is on the potential outcome of the treatment group in the absence o f natural disasters, 
and how to get this group when there is no data on what would have happened to 
individuals affected by natural disasters if the disasters had not occurred. Therefore, 
DiD tries to find the solution to estimate this group by using other individuals that we 
cannot observe at the same time. Moreover, Quantile Regression is used to examine 
the impact o f disasters across the distribution of test scores, so we can see in detail the 
effects o f disasters by groups of outcomes.
On the other hand, Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) demonstrated that DiD 
estimates have a potential problem of serial correlation. They said that DiD has at 
least three factors that potentially cause serial correlation problems. First, DiD usually 
uses a time series data set. Second, dependent variables in DiD usually have a positive 
serial correlation. Third, an intrinsic factor of DiD model, the treatment variable can 
change very little. Those three issues can support each other so true standard error of 
parameter of treatment variable can understate the standard deviation. To deal with a 
serious overestimation of t values and significance levels in DiD estimation, we 
should pay attention to the length of the time series data, the serial correlation o f the 
dependent variables and we should also correct the estimation. Bertrand, Duflo and 
Mullainathan (2004) offered 5 possible solutions to correct the serial correlation 
problem: parametric method, block bootstrap, ignoring time series information, 
empirical variance-covariance matrix, and arbitrary variance-covariance matrix. Here,
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we collapse the data into pre and post period so we only have one period before and 
one period after the treatment (disaster) to lead to spurious inference in DiD model. 
Thus, OLS estimation provides a consistent standard error.
4.5.1. Difference in Differences Method
To illustrate the research design o f DiD method, this study defines Yoi as a particular 
outcome o f individual i in the absence o f natural disasters and Ylt as a particular 
outcome of individual i who experienced disasters in the region affected by disasters. 
Furthermore, a it is equal to 1 if the individuals reported that they were affected 
directly by the disasters and a it is equal to 0 if the individuals were not affected 
directly by disasters. The definition of affected directly by disasters is if the disaster 
was severe enough to cause death or major injuries to a household member, cause 
direct financial loss to the household, or cause household members to relocate. Hence, 
DiD model can be written as:
y i t  =  <*lD it +  « 2  ( P i t  *  CLit) +  u it
Yit = a 1Dit +  a 2A it + u it (4.1)
Note: A it = Dit x  a it and u it =  yr +  v t +  %
Where «/ is the effects o f disasters to all o f the individuals who live in a disaster 
region at the time of a disaster. ot2 is the effects o f disasters for individuals who have 
been affected directly by disaster. yr is region effect, v t is time effect, %  is random 
error, Dit= l is only for people in the disaster region in the time after disaster, A u-1  is 
only for people in the disaster region in the time after disaster who have been affected 
by disaster directly. Furthermore, and 0:2 are parameters o f interest. Overall, «/ + 0:2
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are the effect o f disasters. When Dn=0 and A it=0 then Yit=0, and when Dit-1  and 
Ait=l then Yit= a 1+0.2.
Note that Du and A it in equation (4.1) above are interaction terms. Dit indicates a 
dummy observation in a disaster region after disasters and A it as interaction effect 
represents a dummy indicating individuals in a disaster region who have been affected 
by disaster. A j rt is an intensity effect o f disasters, which is a subset o f D ih so A it would 
be a marginal effect o f being affected by disasters. This model can be expanded by 
including individual covariates Xit and can be written as:
Yit — a i  ^ i t  +  a 2 Ait +  W i t  +  u it (4-2)
Thus, there are two treatment groups: the first group is individuals in a disaster region 
at the time of the disaster and after disaster, and the second group is individuals in a 
disaster region who report that they have been affected by the disaster. Furthermore, 
the control group is comprised o f individuals who are in a non-disaster region and are 
those in a disaster region but not affected the disaster. The equation of child test score 
can be written as:
T e s t scorei = a 0 + a 1Di -F a 2A t + ipXi + yr +  v t +  £t (4.3)
The dependent variable in this equation (Test scorej) is child test score at age 11 for
individual i. The average child test scores are used rather than total child test scores in
order to make it comparable with different age groups o f children, since there was a
change in policy on the total number o f subjects tested in 2002. Before 2002, the
number o f subjects tested was 5 subjects: (1) Moral and civil education, (2) Bahasa
Indonesia, (3) Maths, (4) Science and (5) Social studies. Starting in 2002, the number
of subjects tested was only 3 subjects: (1) Bahasa Indonesia, (2) Maths, and (3)
Science. For test scores before 2002, we used test scores from the same subjects with
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the subjects that were tested after 2002. In addition, IFLS also reported the condition 
o f whether the child could show the test score certificate or not. To avoid 
measurement error on child test score, this study only uses data from children who can 
prove their test score using test score certificates10.
The main explanatory variables are Z), and A it which capture the natural disaster 
variables. In addition, vector X t contains the other explanatory variables to capture 
individual and household characteristics, such as age, gender, area where they live, 
and parental education background. The variables yr and vt are used to control for 
regions and year fixed effects respectively. The inclusion o f the regional dummy 
variables reduces the potential bias from unmeasured regional shocks. Year dummy 
variables are useful to control for year specific characteristics and control for potential 
changes in the yearly test score.
Moreover, in order to see whether different types o f disasters have different impacts 
on child test score and child health, this chapter replaces the main explanatory 
variables, which are dummies A  and A t using specific dummy variables o f A  and A it 
which belong to specific types of disasters. There are 3 dummies for A  ( big 
earthquake, small earthquake and flood), and the same 3 dummies for A,-.
4.5.2. Quantile Regression
Least squares regression can capture the change in the mean of the dependent variable 
if there is a change in independent variables. Yet sometimes, a single mean curve is 
not informative enough, conditional quantile functions provide a more complete view.
10 W e also estimated the impact o f  disasters on child test scores using test scores data with imputation 
for m issing value, but there is an issue o f  measurement error (see Appendix table A 4.1).
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Koenker and Bassett (1978) introduced quantile regression as a simple minimization 
problem yielding the ordinary sample quantiles in the location model11. This method 
generalizes naturally from the linear model a new class o f statistics. Quantile 
regression is very useful for looking at the complete picture information about the 
relationship between the outcome Y j  child test scores and the covariates X j = including 
the variables o f interest ( D j  and A j )  at any different points in the conditional 
distribution of Y j .  Quantile regression is more robust for data with outliers. For 
instance, by looking at the median regression rather than mean regression, the mean 
regression minimizes expected squared error while median regression minimizes the 
expected absolute error. Quantile regression can be written as:
Qr ( Y \ X ) = X Tpr (4.4)
Where t  is choice o f quantile level (0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, ..., 0.9, 0.95), X T is 
covariates, and /?T is parameter o f interest. For this study, we can express the quantile 
regression model as:
Qr (T e s t score{) = a 0 +  +  a 2A t +  ipXi 4- yr + v t +  et (4.5)
4.6. Empirical Results: The Impact of Disasters on Child Test Scores
This section discusses the results of the impact o f natural disasters on child test scores. 
There are several main estimation results: (1) the average impact o f natural disasters, 
(2) the impact o f natural disasters in the first and second year aftermath and (3) the 
impact o f specific natural disasters. DiD model is applied to estimate the outcome of 
interest. In addition, we applied Quantile Regression to find out the impact of 
disasters on a different group o f children’s test scores. By using QR, we can see the
11 The detail explanation about regression quantile is discussed by Koenker and Bassett (1978).
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extent to which the effect o f a disaster differs across the distribution o f conditional test
scores.
Moreover, the estimation results of this study are only the lower bound estimates of 
the impact of natural disasters on child test score and child health. As Baez and Santos 
(2007) note, the reasons why the results are only a lower bound are that the natural 
disasters are an aggregate shock, so it is possible that households who live in a non­
disaster region are indirectly affected by the disasters. Furthermore, households who 
live in disaster regions will normally receive financial assistance after disasters and 
those in a non-disaster region will not. Although physically they were not hit by 
disasters, they probably needed more financial aid due to the macro effects of 
disasters.
4.6.1. Difference in Differences Method
Table 4.5 illustrates the difference in difference (DiD) estimation o f the effect of 
natural disasters on child test scores. The first column reports the average test scores 
before disasters, the second column reports the average test scores after disasters, and 
the third column is the difference between the after-disaster child test scores and the 
before-disaster child test scores. The rows present the average of child test scores in 
disaster regions, non-disaster regions and the difference o f those two regions. The 
after-disaster child test scores in disaster regions decreased by 1.14 points compared 
to before-disaster scores. Child test scores in non-disaster regions decreased by only 
0.03 points, and the difference between those two regions is -1.11 points as a DiD 
estimate o f the impact o f natural disasters on child test scores.
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Table 4.5: Difference in difference estimates o f the effect o f disasters
on child test scores











Note: Standard errors in parentheses
For regression version o f DiD estimators, there are six specifications based on 
different sets o f control variables, which consist o f sets o f individual characteristics, 
interaction variables with the dummy variables o f interest (D and A) and also year 
dummies and regional dummies. The coefficient on D represents the average impact 
o f natural disasters on child test scores for children who took tests after a disaster in a 
disaster region, while the coefficient on A represents the additional impact of natural 
disasters on child test scores for those being affected by disasters in disaster regions. 
Table 4.6 shows the average impact of natural disasters on child test scores. Both 
specifications confirm that natural disasters reduce child test scores. Lower test scores 
are not only suffered by children who are affected by disasters but also children who 
are not affected by disasters in a disaster region. This is not surprising since most of 
the school buildings, transportation, telecommunication and infrastructure are 
destroyed and teachers are also affected by disasters, so it is likely that all the schools 
are closed down at the time of disasters. However, those who are affected by disasters 
have an even lower test score than those who are not affected.
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Year dummies yes Yes
Region dummies yes Yes
Observation 5073 5067
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%
In Model 2, by controlling individual characteristics, year dummies and regional 
dummies, the occurrence o f natural disasters decreases child test score by 0.900 for 
children in a disaster region who took the test after a disaster. For those who are 
affected by natural disasters there is a further reduction, by 1.054, so being affected by 
disaster caused an even lower test score. In addition, children in urban areas have a 
better test score by 0.26 on average than children in rural areas. Moreover, boys seem 
to also suffer a lower test score than girls - at 10% significance levels, by 
approximately 0.07 on average. Similarly we find that higher parental education 
background is associated with higher the child test scores, especially for maternal 
education background.
As already note in chapter 3 about test score data, the results in table 4.6 are also only 
used test score data from children who can show test score certificate in the time of 
IFLS survey. For those who cannot show certificate are dropped from this estimation, 
since the test scores data are not complete. This selection issue may cause bias. Yet, 
we also provide estimation by using imputation missing value for those who have 
incomplete test score. The results is not quite different to table 4.6 especially on the 
coefficient o f variable interest, D and A (see Appendix table A4.1).
Table 4.7 shows the model with interaction of explanatory variables with D and A. 
Column 2 and Column 3 are the continuation o f Column 1. Column 1 shows all the 
magnitude o f coefficient variables when A=0 and D=0. Column 2 shows the 
magnitude of coefficient from the interaction o f all explanatory variables with A or 
with condition A=1 and D =l, while Column 3 is the magnitude coefficient o f all 
explanatory variables from the interaction with D when A=0 and D =l. The idea of 
running this model specification is to investigate whether some people are more badly 
affected by disasters than others.
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%
The results show that the interactions with A in column 2 are positive and significant 
effect for urban and male, but negative and significant for father and mother education 
background. That means that being affected by the disaster students in rural areas and 
females have lower test score than in urban areas or male students relative to not being 
affected directly by the disaster. Furthermore, students who are affected directly by 
the disaster with higher parental education backgrounds also have lower test scores 
relative to not being affected directly by the disaster. Column 3 shows that the 
interaction o f D with age, urban and father’s education background has a negative
coefficient, a positive coefficient for the interaction with maternal education 
background. This means that being in a disaster region (but not being affected by a 
disaster) has a more negative effect o f being in an urban area relative to not being in a 
disaster region.
Table 4.8 Results o f the Impact of Natural Disasters on Child Test Score 
in the First and Second Year Aftermath



































Year dummies yes yes
Region dummies yes yes
Observation 5062 5056
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%
Table 4.8 compares the results of the impact o f natural disasters on child test scores
for children who took the test just after the disasters in 2006 and one year after the
disasters in 2007. The results confirm that children from the year test o f 2006 in a
disaster region suffered a lower test score than those who took a test one year after the
1 8 4
disasters, in 2007. Most possibly, that is because the test in 2006 was taken 
approximately only a month after disaster occurred and the children may have had less 
concentration in taking the test at that time, due to the disaster’s influence.
Children’s test scores in 2006 in disaster regions decreased by 1.6 on average and 
decreased by an additional 1.2 for those who were affected by a disaster. In 2007, 
children’s test scores in disaster regions decreased by 0.6 on average, and for those 
who were affected by disasters suffered a negative marginal effect o f approximately 
0.7. In addition, other significant explanatory variables seem to have the same impact 
and similar coefficients with the model in Table 4.6.
Table 4.9 provides the results o f the impact on child test scores from three specific 
natural disasters. The results are from a big earthquake in Yogyakarta, a small 
earthquake in Sumatra Barat and a flood in Jakarta. The results indicate that only a big 
earthquake had a negative impact on child test score. The result also confirms that 
children in a big earthquake region suffer a significantly lower test score by 
approximately 2.5, while other disasters, for small earthquakes region is positive and 
significant, and for floods region and affected floods dummy are not significant. 
Furthermore, other significant control variables: urban, male and parental education 
background in Model 2 has a similar impact to Table 4.6.
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Year dummies yes yes
Region dummies yes yes
Observation 5062 5056
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%
4.6.2. Quantile Regression
Table 4.10 compares the estimation results across quantiles and OLS. There are two 
different specifications: ( 1) estimation without control variables and (2) estimation 
with control variables. The coefficients on D and A vary across quantiles. In 
Specification 1, most noticeably, the highly statistically significant coefficient o f D 
has a much greater impact at the low quartile (q=0.25) o f child test scores, reducing it 
by approximately 1.75. For the coefficient on A, the biggest impact on child test score 
occurs at the median regression (q=0.50), decreasing it by approximately 2.39.
T a b le  4 .1 0 :  R e s u l t s  o f  I m p a c t  o f  N a tu r a l  D is a s te r  o n  C h i ld  T e s t  S c o r e  A c r o s s
Q u a n t i le s
(1)
Estimation without control 
variables
OLS QR_25 QR_50 QR75
D -0.439** -1.750*** -0.547** -0.439**
(0.213) (0.280) (0.224) (0.213)
A -0.954*** -0.646* -2.397*** -0.954***




D -0.893*** -1.977*** -0.580*** -0.581***
(0.199) (0.296) (0.221) (0.203)
A -1.060*** -0.672* -2.511*** -1.046***
(0.265) (0.394) (0.294) (0.270)
Age 0.00241 0.0174 -0.00416 0.00405
(0.00962) (0.0143) (0.0106) (0.00981)
Urban 0.273*** 0.218*** 0.225*** 0.290***
(0.0386) (0.0573) (0.0428) (0.0394)
Male -0.0753** -0.0228 -0.121*** -0.178***
(0.0353) (0.0523) (0.0390) (0.0360)
Father_secondary school -0.0340 -0.0553 0.00306 0.0236
(0.0505) (0.0750) (0.0559) (0.0515)
Father_higher education 0.291*** 0.219 0.378*** 0.357***
(0.0920) (0.136) (0.102) (0.0937)
Mother_secondary school 0.165*** 0.222*** 0.122** 0.193***
(0.0512) (0.0759) (0.0566) (0.0521)
Mother_higher education 0.444*** 0.402** 0.545*** 0.495***
(0.109) (0.162) (0.121) (0.111)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%
In Specification 2, the quantile regression results are not very different from 
Specification 1. The lower group of children’s test score is badly affected by natural 
disaster while the middle and upper group have similar impact and are less affected 
than the lower group. In addition, for those who are affected by disaster, the middle 
group o f children’s test score are worst affected by disaster but the lower group is not 
significantly affected. The upper group is also affected but not as badly as the middle 
group. It might be that the academic ability o f the middle group is only moderate
while the upper group is dominated by more able children, so the affected children in 
the middle group of test score were badly influenced by this condition, more so than 
the upper group o f test score, while the lower group o f test score were also affected 
but not as much as the middle group or upper group. The quantile regression results 
differ considerably from the OLS coefficients.
4.7. Methodology: The Impact of Disasters on Child Health
This section discusses the methodology that is used to estimate the impact o f disasters 
on child health. We used DiD method to estimate the impact o f disasters on height of 
child. In addition to DiD method, Ordered logit is used to estimate the impact of 
disasters on general and last year’s health condition. As general and last year’s health 
condition are categorical data that are naturally ordered, so ordered logit is an 
appropriate method. Furthermore, Zero Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) which 
estimate model for dependent variables with count data is used to estimate the impact 
o f disasters on days lying in bed and days missing from main activities o f each child 
due to a poor health condition. Days missing and days lying in bed are count data that 
contain very large proportion of zero values, therefore ZINB is the right method for 
these data. All data that is used for ordered logit and ZINB methods is from self- 
reported health condition.
Data set that is used in this section is repeated cross-section data, since the child 
height data that are used in the sample are for different children in the two periods. 
We use IFLS4 from 2007 and IFLS3 from 2000 as the main data. Data in 2000 and 
2007 are different children at age 2-5 years old. Here we compare the condition before
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the disasters in 2000 and after the disasters in 2007, by using children age 2-5 in each 
year, so the data set is not panel data but repeated cross-section.
4.7.1. Difference in Difference Method
For the impact o f disasters on child health, we use DiD model for the equation, with 
child height as the dependent variable. The equation for child height can be written as: 
height it= fio + PiDit + /M u  + y/Xu + yr+ vt + £,t (4.6)
Height o f child is measured in cm for individual i in year t. Height o f child is only 
measured from children aged 2-5 years old. The main explanatory variables are Din 
and A j rt, which capture the natural disaster variables. In addition, vector X it contains 
the other explanatory variables to capture individual, household and community 
characteristics, such as age, gender, household expenditure, household size, area 
where they live, parental height, maternal education background and community 
facilities, such as garbage system and water supply. We also add a wet season dummy 
as an explanatory variable to capture the influence o f the weather at the time of birth 
to child health. The variables yx are used to control for regions. The inclusion o f the 
regional dummy variables reduces the potential bias from unmeasured regional 
shocks.
4.7.2. Ordered Logit
Data in this section is panel data, since we used data IFLS3 and IFLS4) from the same 
individuals in two different periods, 2000 and 2007. Using dependent variables from 
categorical data that are naturally ordered and take a value from 1 to 4 in estimation, 
ordered choice model is the best model to apply. The use o f OLS in this case could
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lead to predicted values lying outside the range o f possible values o f the dependent 
variable. We choose ordered logit model since we can interpret the coefficient directly 
as ordered log-odds coefficients or we can transform it into odds, while in the ordered 
probit model coefficients are z-scores, and we could only transform them into 
predicted probabilities using the standard normal distribution.
According to Greene (2010), the ordered logit model specification that we use can be 
written as:
Y*t = v t  + y r  + otiDit +  a 2A it +  \pXit +  et (4.7)
and the observed dependent variable equation as:
Yt = 0 i f Y t* <Ho,
=  1 i f  n0 < Y? < fiv  
= 2 i f  fLx <Yt* <\i2,
=  3 i f  \i 2 <Y* <(i3,
= J i f l x j . 1 <Y*
Where Y{t is a dependent variable with an ordered value, X it is explanatory variables, 
Dit is a dummy in a disaster region and in the time after disasters, A it is a dummy in a 
disaster region and being affected by disasters, and et is the error term, which has a 
standard logistic distribution. Y*t is an unobserved variable. The p ’s are unknown 
parameters related to various threshold points. In this study, there are two ordered 
logit estimations. In the first model, y is the level o f general health conditions with the 
order: (1) very healthy, (2) somewhat healthy, (3) somewhat unhealthy and (4) 
unhealthy. For the second model, y is last year’s health condition with the order: ( 1)
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much better now, (2) somewhat better now, (3) about the same, (3) somewhat worse, 
and (5) much worse. The explanatory variables are the same as the DiD model for 
child height estimation.
Athey and Imbens (2006) show difference in differences models can be extended to 
discrete outcomes which allow the researcher to non-linear estimations. Puhani (2008) 
shows that “the sign o f the treatment effect in a non-linear DiD model with a strictly 
monotonic transformation function of a linear index (like probit, logit, or tobit) is 
equal to the sign o f the coefficient o f the interaction term” (Puhani, 2008,p.7). Since 
an ordered logit can be interpreted as a combination of binary logits, Puhani’s (2008) 
result should also be applicable to ordered logit models like the one we use here.
4.7.3. Zero Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB)
A zero inflated negative binomial regression is applied for this study since the
dependent variable, days missing regular activities and days lying in bed are count
variables. These variables contain very large proportion o f zero values. It happened
since most of children are healthy or never get sick and a few children may experience
with poor health condition so they missed regular activities in few days. Therefore, we
used ZINB that allow for estimates using data with an excess zero outcome. ZINB
allows combining a binary model for children who never get sick and a count model
for children who experienced poor health condition. Following Hall (2000) The ZINB
model can be written as:
r  (0, with  probabi l i ty  p£
[binomial  (n^TT*), with probabi l i ty  1 — p t
( 0, with probabi l i ty  p t +  (1 -  pOi  1 -  ni)ni 
~  |  k ,w i th  probabi l i ty  (1 — P i)( —n d ni~k>k =   ^ ^
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Where Yj is the count for the ith subject, p t is probability whether a child will always 
healthy, and (1 — p t) is probability whether a child will miss regular activities 
because o f unhealthy, rii is the total number o f days from children at risk o f being 
sick, k  is equal to 1, ..., . 7T; is the success probability for each day. We do not use
Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP), since ZIP must meet the assumption that the variance 
must be equal to the sample’s mean, and in our case, the variance exceeds the mean 
(overdispersed), so the ZIP is inefficient. Therefore, we used ZINB.
4.8. Empirical Results: The Impact of Disasters on Child Health
4.8.1. Results
This section presents the estimation results from the impact o f disasters on child 
health. There are separate model specifications between objective measurements and 
self-reported data. Different methods were also applied. DiD model is for height 
measurement. Ordered logit is for self-reported general health measurement with 
ordinal data for dependent variables, and Zero Inflated Negative Binomial is for 
dependent variables with count data. We present the results in two different 
estimations: the impact of natural disasters on child health, and the impact o f specific 
natural disasters on child health.
For the first two results, each of the estimate has 5 different models and all of them are 
estimated using difference in difference (DiD) method. The first model that uses the 
objective measure height o f child aged 2-5 years old adopts Ordinary Least Square 
DiD estimation. The second to the fifth models use subjective measure, which is self- 
reported data about health conditions from children below 15 years old. This second
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model, with general health condition as a ranked dependent variable (very healthy, 
somewhat healthy, somewhat unhealthy and unhealthy) uses ordered logit in DiD. The 
same method is applied for the third model, which has last year’s health condition as 
the dependent variable (much better now, somewhat better now, about the same, 
somewhat worse, and much worse). In addition, for the fourth and fifth models, ZINB 
are applied. This is because the dependent variables are count data with many zero 
values (days missing regular activities and days in bed).
As a comparison, Table 4.11 provides the simple DiD estimation results o f the effect 
o f disasters on child height. The first column reports the average child height before 
disasters, the second column reports the average child height after disasters, and the 
third column is the difference between after-disaster child height and before-disaster 
child height. The rows present the average o f child height in disaster regions, non­
disaster regions and the difference of those two regions. The difference o f child height 
between after- and before- disaster in disaster regions is increased by 1.19 points. 
Child height in non-disaster regions increased by 1.05 points, and the difference in 
those two regions is 0.14 points, as a DiD estimation o f the impact o f natural disasters 
on child height was not significant statistically.







Non-disaster region (0.22) (0.18) (0.28)
DR-NDR difference 1.37 1.51 0.14
(0.55) (0.48) (0.59)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%
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Table 4.12 shows the impact of natural disasters on child health. There are 5 different 
specification models according to the type o f dependent variables. All those models 
show that disaster region dummies (D) are not significant. It indicates that disasters 
have no serious impact on child health in disaster regions. This may indicate that state 
agencies have provided sufficient compensation for victims, especially children. In 
addition, the dummy for being affected by disasters (A) is only significant for general 
health condition and last year’s health condition variables. However, both o f these 
models have different effects.
There is a negative and significant sign on A for general health condition and positive 
and significant sign for last year’s health condition. Negative sign for A means that 
general health condition o f children in the time of survey is healthier for children who 
were affected by disasters, but a positive sign for A indicated that children who were 
affected by disasters are unhealthier for last year’s general health condition than those 
who were not affected. This is not surprising, since last year’s health condition is 
closer to the time when the disaster occurred. For Model Specifications 4 and 5 with 
count variables, days missing regular activities and days in bed as dependent 
variables, none o f the variables o f interest are significant. The same condition is for 
Model Specification 1, with height of child as the dependent variable.
194
T a b le  4 .1 2 :  th e  Im p a c t  o f  N a tu r a l  D is a s te r s  o n  C h i ld  H e a l th
Dependent variable Difference in Difference
OLS Ordered Logit Ordered Logit ZINB ZINB
1 2 3 4 5
Height General health Last year’s Days Days
(2-5 year) health missing In bed
D 3.128 -0.182 0.967 -0.006 0.122
(3.803) (0.742) (0.751) (0.046) (0.098)
A -0.465 -0.556*** q 3 3 4 *** -0.004 -0.051
(0.765) (0.130) (0.108) (0.079) (0.157)
Age 0.842*** -0.005*** -0.002 -0.005*** -0.001
(0.071) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Age2 -0.003*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Urban 0.851*** 0.140*** 0.025 0.047 -0.024
(0.286) (0.050) (0.042) (0.031) (0.068)
Male 0.914*** -0.054 -0.013 0.002 0.039
(0.257) (0.044) (0.037) (0.029) (0.062)
Hhsize -0.159* 0.005 0.035*** 0.005 0.016
(0.083) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.017)
Lhh_expenditure 0.888*** -0.225*** -0.109*** 0.031 0.007
(0.244) (0.041) (0.035) (0.026) (0.055)
Mother_secondary 0.137 -0.021 -0.112*** -0.044 -0.107
(0.297) (0.051) (0.043) (0.032) (0.068)
Mother_high school 0.909* -0.119 0.008 -0.082 -0.237*
(0.497) (0.091) (0.078) (0.060) (0.138)
Water_system 0.110 0.230*** 0.017 0.064 -0.062
(0.432) (0.074) (0.062) (0.044) (0.095)
Garbage_system 1.136** -0.238*** 0.009 -0.017 -0.053
(0.467) (0.083) (0.070) (0.050) (0.111)
Wet_season 0.001 -0.059 -0.018 0.000 0.058





Time dummies yes Yes yes yes Yes
Regional dummies yes Yes yes yes Yes
Observation 2624 10962 10375 10960 10959
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%; For models 2,3,4 and 5: the negative sign for the coefficient 
indicates that the individual is healthier.
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Table 4.13 shows the impact of specific natural disasters such as big earthquakes, 
small earthquakes and floods on child health. There are no significant impacts o f all 
disaster variables (Affected_big earthquake, Big_earthquake_region, Affected_small 
earthquake, Small_earthquake_region, Affected_floods, and Floods_region) on height of 
child at 2-5 years, number of days missing and number o f days in bed in Models 1, 4 
and 5. On the other hand, general health condition has a positive correlation with big 
earthquake region dummy.
The results indicate that children in a big earthquake region were healthier at the time 
of survey than children in a non-big earthquake region. In addition, Affected_big 
earthquake and Floods_region are also significant at 1 % with last year’s health 
condition. Affected_big earthquake dummy has a positive sign and Floods_region 
dummy has a negative sign. It shows that children who were affected by a big 
earthquake were less healthy last year than those who were not affected by a big 
earthquake, while children in a flood region were healthier last year than those 
children in a non-flood region.
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T a b le  4 .1 3 :  th e  I m p a c t  o f  S p e c i f ic  N a tu r a l  D is a s te r s  o n  C h i ld  H e a lth
Difference in Difference
OLS Ordered Logit Ordered Logit ZINB ZINB
1 2 3 4 5
height 
(2-5 years)





Big_earthquake_region 2.035 -0.847*** -0.555* -0.021 -0.120
(1.464) (0.265) (0.226) (0.114) (0.208)
Affected_big earthquake -1.458 -0.210 0.556*** 0.051 0.225
(1.244) (0.213) (0.184) (0.144) (0.247)
Small_earthquake_region 0.607 -0.178 0.179 -0.009 -0.211
(1.289) (0.241) (0.200) (0.082) (0.252)
Affected_small
earthquake 1.623 -0.531* 0.105
-0.154 -0.053
(1.938) (0.305) (0.243) (0.199) (0.488)
Floods_region 0.823 -0.150 -0.609*** -0.002 0.114
(1.267) (0.233) (0.197) (0.063) (0.138)
Affected_floods -1.328 0.120 0.430* -0.159 -0.176
(1.738) (0.298) (0.260) (0.157) (0.407)
Additional control yes Yes yes yes Yes
Time dummies yes Yes yes yes Yes
Regional dummies yes Yes yes yes Yes
Observation 2624 10962 10375 10960 10959
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%; For Models 2,3,4 and 5: the negative sign for the coefficient
indicates that the individual is healthier; Additional controls: age, age2, urban, male, 
hhsize, lhh_expenditure, mother secondary school, mother high school, water system, 
wet season, and for OLS estimates plus mother height, father height.
4.9. Further Robustness Checks
We conduct several robustness checks to ensure that our results are robust. First, we 
re-estimated our models excluding the rural child test scores. This was done since 
most o f the income of parents in rural areas come from the agricultural sectors. So 
crop failure is associated with decreasing test scores. The results are presented in 
Table 4.14. All results confirm that the coefficient of variables o f interest is close to 
the OLS results obtained without excluding the rural area data. As we can see from
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Column 1, using OLS estimation, all variables of interests (A and D) are highly 
significant at 1%. Secondly, according to Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) 
there is a potential serial correlation problem in the DiD model. We examine this by 
collapsing the time into two periods - before and after disasters - then re-estimating.




























Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%;
Another check for serial correlation is by aggregating the time dimension o f child test 
scores. We aggregated year test when the children were tested into two periods: before 
disasters and after disasters. We re-estimated across these two periods and these are 
reported in Table 4.15. Our result shows that the effect o f disasters for both variables 
o f interest is statistically significant at the 1% level, and the coefficient o f those
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variables is similar. This suggests that our estimates are not a result o f serial 
correlation.
Table 4.15: The Impact of Natural Disasters on Child Test Scores 
by Aggregating Data


































Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%; Column 1 is the original OLS regression; column 2 is for 
aggregating data.
4.10. Conclusion
One major finding of this research that differs from the previous literature is that the 
effects o f disasters can be divided into two parts. The first effect is calculated for 
individuals in disaster regions, both those who are affected and those who are 
unaffected by disasters, while the second effect is an additional effect for those who 
have been directly affected by disaster. In addition, we also calculated these effects for
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the impact o f specific natural disasters (big earthquakes, small earthquakes and 
floods). For the impact on child test scores, we also estimate the impacts on children 
who took the test just after the disasters and also when they took the test a year after 
the disasters.
Our main findings are as follows. The first major finding is related to the effects of 
disasters on child test score. Natural disasters affect all of the children in disaster 
regions, both those who are affected and unaffected by disasters, by reducing their test 
score. Those who are affected by disasters had an additional lower test score than 
those who were not affected. Moreover, children who took the test just after the 
disaster have a lower test score than children who took the test more than a year after 
the disaster. There are also different impacts of different types o f natural disasters and 
only terrifying and destructive natural disasters are associated with lower test score for 
all children in the disaster region. Being in a region that is hit by natural disasters has 
the biggest impact on child test score in the lowest quantile of test scores. Moreover, 
the largest additional impact of natural disasters to those who have been affected by 
disasters is on children at the median of the test score distribution.
The second major finding is on the impact of disasters on child health. We found that 
disasters have no serious impacts on child health. This finding is confirmed by all the 
estimation results, using height of child or self-reported health measures. For height of 
child, none o f the children who have been affected by disasters have a lower height 
compared to those who are not affected by disasters. The same result is obtained on 
the impact of specific natural disasters on child health. The result from self-reported 
health data is also similar to results from the height data. Only the dependent variable
2 00
which uses last year’s health condition has a significant disasters impact. It indicates 
that children in a disaster region and those who are affected by a disaster have a bigger 
probability o f being unhealthy. In conclusion, child test scores are significantly 
affected by disasters, but there are no serious impacts o f disasters on child health. It 
implies that since disaster is a temporary event, so all the government and state 
agencies provide good compensation for the short term impacts such as child health, 
but less attention for the long-term impacts such as child education.
In terms o f gender, there is no different impact of disasters on girls’ child test score 
and boys’ for those who lived in a disaster region and were directly affected by 
disasters. In terms o f area, the impacts o f disasters on child test scores show that 
children in rural areas suffered more than children in urban areas. In the long term, 
related with child education, we recommended that the government should give more 
consideration and priority to rural than urban areas, and quickly rebuild school 
buildings and facilities for children. By providing enough assistance for the victims, 
especially children, we hope that human capital outcomes o f children are not badly 
affected by the shock that was caused by disasters, as future lives o f children are 
definitely influenced by the outcomes from when they were young.
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Chapter 5 
Natural Disasters, Family Expenditures and Food Demand
5.1. Introduction
Natural disasters are always associated with the disruption o f local economies and 
injuring local people. Disasters are likely to be negatively correlated with human 
capital outcomes and also to have a negative effect on the local economy. The 
destruction o f property, assets, infrastructure and crop loss will affect the local 
economy and the well-being o f households who are directly affected. All these direct 
impacts of disasters disturb the flow of goods and services and also the production 
process as a result of scarce resources. Consequently, these conditions cause the price 
o f goods and services to increase. Households usually respond to those difficulties by 
cutting their consumption, especially for non-essential goods. For low income elasticity 
essential goods such as food, households will try to smooth their consumption, 
although the price o f food may also increase due to the reduction in food supply, 
arising from crop loss, and disruption to distribution channels.
We have several objectives in this chapter. First, we look at the way households 
respond to natural disasters by adjusting household expenditure. Since the demand 
and/or supply may be shifted because of a disaster and its aftermath. In addition to 
household expenditures, we also estimated the impact o f disasters on wage. The 
second main objective is to examine whether there are different impacts from different 
types of disasters. We observe three types of disasters: big earthquakes, small 
earthquakes and floods. The third objective is to observe the price and expenditure 
elasticities o f food demand by estimating a Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand
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System (LA-AIDS) as a structural model o f expenditure. Related to the change in food 
prices, we also use our structural model to examine the effect o f disasters on living 
standards o f households, and whether there is any different impact for the poor and the 
rich. Lastly, we attempt to find out whether there is any different effect of disasters on 
household expenditures, with and without controlling for market prices.
This chapter contributes to the international literature in several respects. First, 
compared to other literature that discusses the impact o f disasters on expenditures, this 
study uses a variety household expenditure and considers to impact on income (wages). 
In addition, for food expenditures we provide separate estimates for those who get food 
from market purchases and those who get food from their own production. Second, we 
also investigated the net effect of disasters on expenditure shares o f main food items 
such as rice, vegetables, fish and meat. Here, the impact o f disasters can be observed in 
two ways: disasters increase the price of these items and disasters affect household 
spending independently o f their effect on food prices. Finally, we also estimate the 
impact o f disasters on living standards at different levels o f household total 
expenditure.
As natural disasters have increased in number and in their intensity o f destruction in the 
last few years in Indonesia, it becomes very important to examine the impacts of 
disasters on human beings and the local economy in disaster regions. There are several 
types o f disasters that have often occurred in Indonesia, from the less harsh to the very 
destructive ones, such as floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides, wind storms, 
droughts and volcanic eruptions. Natural disasters always leave serious problems for 
the people in disaster regions, especially for a country like Indonesia which is highly
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populated. A lot o f literature has confirmed that disasters are negatively associated with 
many aspects o f people’s lives, such as human capital outcomes, consumptions, the 
local economy and others. Considering all these factors, studies o f the impact of 
disasters - especially for Indonesia - are needed and become very important in order to 
have a better response when disasters occur in the future.
For our empirical analysis, we have determined the disaster regions as DI Yogyakarta, 
DKI Jakarta and West Sumatra. We picked these three provinces based on the highest 
percentage for both dead and evacuated people in the region. Furthermore, natural 
disasters can be determined more specifically based on the occurrences o f disasters in 
each disaster region. Yogyakarta, with big earthquakes, has the highest percentage for 
numbers o f both dead and evacuated people. In terms of the percentage o f evacuated 
people, West Sumatra, with small earthquakes, is above average, and in terms o f the 
percentage o f dead people, although West Sumatra is below average with a value just 
below DI Yogyakarta, which is quite high compared to other provinces. DKI Jakarta 
has problems with floods, and although the percentage o f deaths is quite low the 
percentage o f evacuated people is above average, and another big factor is that DKI 
Jakarta experiences floods almost every year and always presents severe problems.
This study uses panel data from Indonesian Family Life Survey IFLS4 (2007) and 
IFLS3 (2000), the same data set from the previous chapter, which is the main source of 
data for estimating the impact of disasters on family expenditures and food demand. In 
addition, there are two other data sets used: an official disaster data base from the 
National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB=Badan Nasional Penanggulangan 
Bencana) o f Indonesia and statistics of Indonesia data from the Central Bureau of
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Statistics o f Indonesia (BPS=Badan Pusat Statistik). In comparison with Chapter 4, in 
this chapter we employ IFLS data at household level but not at individual level.
Moreover, we used two different methods for estimation. The first method is difference 
in differences (DID) analysis. We used DiD method for estimating the impact of 
disasters on household expenditures. DID is used to estimate the potential outcome of 
the treatment group when there is no data on what would have happened to individuals 
affected by natural disasters if the disasters had not occurred. Besides DID, we employ 
the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System (LA-AIDS) model. In LA-AIDS 
model we look at the impact of disasters on food share expenditures, controlling for 
prices. We use the parameter estimates from the LA-AIDS model to calculate the price 
and expenditure elasticities. LA-AIDS corresponds to a well-defined preference 
structure, since it is derived from a consumer expenditure function, which allows us to 
conduct welfare analysis. Many studies (see, for example Blundell et.al (1993)) 
demonstrated the usefulness of AIDS for such work.
Our main findings are as follows. The first finding is related to the effect o f disasters on 
total household expenditures. We find that being in a disaster region, whether a 
household is affected by the disaster or not, has no impact on total household 
expenditure. For the impact of disasters on food expenditures, there are differences 
between market-purchased and own-produced expenditures for households who are 
affected directly by disasters. Disasters are positively associated with market-purchased 
expenditures, but negatively associated with own-produced expenditures. Crop loss 
results in higher market prices and higher market demand. For educational expenditure, 
only households who are directly affected by disasters have lower educational
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expenditure. In addition, there appear to be no significant impacts o f disasters on 
wages. Moreover, looking separately at different disasters, only households who are 
affected directly by big earthquakes and floods reduced household expenditure and 
educational expenditure, and there is no significant impact for those who are directly 
affected by small earthquakes.
Furthermore, we found that in general, all proportions o f total share expenditures on 
food in disaster regions (expenditure share on rice, vegetables, fish and oil) are 
negatively affected by disasters. In addition, for market-purchased food, expenditure 
share on rice, fish and oil are negatively affected by disasters, while for own-produced 
food, only the expenditure share o f rice is negatively affected and significant. Overall, 
there are no additional impacts for households in disasters regions that are directly 
affected by disasters in all expenditure types. With regards to the elasticities, all own- 
prices elasticities are negative, as we expected. Moreover, all income elasticities are 
positive and less than 1.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents a review of the literature 
on the effects o f natural disasters on income or expenditure and food demand. The third 
section is about data sources and is followed by the methodology with discussion on 
difference in differences (DiD) model. The fifth section discusses the research finding 
using the DiD model. The sixth section uses the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal 
Demand System (LA-AIDS) model, and is followed by the discussion o f the empirical 




A considerable amount of literature has been published on the effects o f disasters on 
welfare, especially on income or expenditure. Some studies use income as the outcome 
variable, other studies use household expenditure. The most influential study on the 
effects o f disasters on family income is Ureta (2005) which examined the impact of 
Hurricane Mitch in Nicaragua in November 1998 on family budgets and child 
schooling. Using the Living Standards Measurement Survey Data 1998 and 2001 for 
Nicaragua, where the 1998 survey provided the pre-treatment data and the 2001 survey 
provided the post-treatment data, Ureta defined a control group as the area that was hit 
by Mitch but in which households were not affected, particularly in rural areas, and the 
treatment group as the area affected by Mitch.
Ureta estimated the impact o f disasters on family income using the difference in 
differences approach. The estimation was run separately between rural and urban areas 
and the findings reported that the impact on family income was different between rural 
and urban areas. In rural areas, family income of households affected by hurricanes 
decreased from C$ 19,316 to C$ 18,705 in a year after a disaster, or approximately 3%, 
but in 2001 family income increased significantly in real terms, by almost 16%. 
Moreover, for urban areas, households affected by hurricanes suffered a greater loss in 
income than rural areas, from C$ 36,563 to C$ 23,720. This was about 35% lower than 
before the disaster occurred. Two years after the disaster, household income was back 
to the pre-disaster condition at 1998 income levels. The most interesting feature of 
Ureta’s study was that households in urban areas were more badly affected by disasters 
than households in rural areas.
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A recent study by Jacobsen (2012) examined the impact of Hurricane Mitch 1998 on 
households’ income in Nicaragua, especially on rural income generation or agricultural 
productive assets. Using the same data set as Ureta (2005) - Nicaraguan Living 
Standards Measurement Studies (LSMSs) - Jacobsen estimated the impact of disasters 
by using a difference in differences model. Although Jacobsen used the same data as 
Ureta, Jacobsen developed some important analysis that was not used by Ureta. He 
measured the relative impact of the hurricane among affected households. In addition, 
he also verified whether a geographical poverty trap existed in the disasters area. 
Jacobsen found that households were not affected seriously by disasters in their ability 
to generate income based on their productive asset, therefore they could maintain their 
consumption levels after the disasters occurred. Furthermore, he also confirmed that 
households at the lower end of the wealth distribution were more sensitive and 
vulnerable to the shocks. The poorest households were badly affected.
Another study on the effect of disasters on expenditure was conducted by Kochar
(1999). He explored the impact of crop shock on consumption in rural India. Using a 
panel data set from Indian Farm Households from 1979 to 1984, Kochar (1999) applied 
a dynamic model by considering the agricultural season in two stages: the planting 
stage and the output stage. Each stage was influenced by the price o f output, female 
and male family labour hours, and the time of crop shock. This study used information 
on aggregate household consumption, labour hours of family members, gender, place 
o f work of family members (whether they worked only for the farm or somewhere 
other than the farm), and other observed covariates. The important finding from this 
study was that households could smooth their consumption during the time of crop
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shock by increasing their hours of work and shifting from own-farm production to the 
labour market.
An interesting study on the impact o f disasters on consumption and expenditure was 
conducted by Cameron and Worswick (2001). This research is interesting since they 
analyse whether households could adjust their consumption during hard times in 
respond to permanent income and transitory income. For expenditures, they only 
focused on educational expenditure, to avoid measurement error in total expenditure 
because o f the poor reported of non-food expenditures. Cameron and Worswick 
studied the impact o f crop loss due to weather shocks and drought on household 
education expenditure in Indonesia.
Cameron and Worswick (2001) estimated a model of educational expenditure in 
response to crop loss. First, they estimated permanent and transitory income separately. 
Then, they estimated the total expenditure equation as a function of permanent income, 
transitory income and household characteristics. Households who could smooth their 
consumption during the time of crop loss have a marginal propensity to consume out of 
permanent income near one while that for transitory income was zero. Therefore, a zero 
coefficient on transitory income was evidence that households could smooth their 
consumption. Using Indonesian Family Life Survey data from 1993, Cameron and 
Worswick (2001) examined educational expenditure. In contrast to Kochar (1999), they 
found that households were not able to smooth consumption during the time of crop 
loss so they were most likely to reduce educational expenditure, especially for girls.
209
A study by Baade, Baumann and Matheson (2007) focused on estimating the economic 
impact o f Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast of the USA on 29 
August 2005 by using the experiences of two other disasters in 1992: Hurricane 
Andrew in Miami and the Rodney King riots in Los Angeles. They used taxable sales 
data in order to get a good indicator o f economic wellbeing. Taxable sales data is 
highly correlated with economic activity, such as personal income and with gross 
domestic regional product at the city level. They found that social disasters (riots) had a 
long-term negative effect on the Los Angeles economy, while natural disasters 
(Hurricane Andrew) had a short-term positive effect on the Miami economy. Using the 
results o f the two previous disasters, they applied their experiences to New Orleans 
following Hurricane Katrina.
Baez and Santos (2008) examined the effects of two strong earthquakes in 2001 on
household income and poverty in El Salvador. They explored the long-term
consequences of disasters on human and economic welfare. Using 700 households from 
a longitudinal survey of rural households and linear probability difference in difference 
models, they found that earthquakes caused households’ income to fall by one third. 
Furthermore, in the long term, the earthquakes had negative effects on potential 
earnings through reduction in physical and human capital accumulation. Poor 
households were more likely to take their children out of school in the face o f disasters. 
This conclusion is similar to Cameron and Worswick’s (2001) study in Indonesia, 
where households were more likely to cut educational spending on education,
especially for girls’ education, during hard times. Overall, disasters are negatively
associated with economic development.
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Dorosh and Smith (2003) examined the impact of floods in 1998 in Bangladesh on 
household income, consumption and nutritional outcomes. They also observed the 
impact of price changes due to disasters on household food security. Using a panel data 
set covering 757 rural households, they observed how households in Bangladesh cope 
with disasters in several ways: reducing expenditure, selling assets and borrowing. 
More than 60% of poor people borrowed money immediately following the flood. They 
used the money borrowed to purchase food and to finance other expenses, such as 
health, education and production. In addition, using an econometric analysis of 
household calorie consumption with household fixed effect, they examined the impact 
of price changes on household food security. They estimated that expenditure elasticity 
o f demand for calories (rice) is 0.363 and the rice price elasticity is -0.142. Further 
interesting finding is that Bangladesh imported rice from India in order to stabilize the 
price of rice. Without this import, they predicted that the price of rice would have 
increased by around 19%.
Study by Zhang and Law (2010) also confirmed that disasters caused food price 
inflation in China. They found that various food expenditure elasticities were positive, 
especially the expenditure elasticities for meat and poultry; were over one. They 
indicated that pressure on food price inflation is likely to be more intense in developing 
economies when demand rises, since expenditure elasticities on luxury food items like 
meat are larger than in advanced economies. They also observed that in addition to 
food yields, food production costs and global commodity prices in supply side factors, 
natural disasters also affected food price inflation, but not as a major driver.
211
5.3. Data Sources
This study uses panel data of Indonesian Family Life Survey IFLS4 (2007) and IFLS3
(2000), the same data set from the previous chapter as the main source o f data for 
estimating the impact of disasters on family expenditures and food demand. In addition, 
there are two other data sets used: an official disaster data base from the National 
Disaster Management Agency (BNPB=Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana) of 
Indonesia and statistics of Indonesian data from the Central Bureau of Statistics of 
Indonesia (BPS=Badan Pusat Statistik). In contrast to Chapter 4, in this chapter we 
employ IFLS data at household level, not at individual level.
The data used in this chapter are household expenditures data, prices data and other 
household characteristics data. As we study the impact of disasters on household 
expenditures and food demand, disasters data are also used in this chapter, but we do 
not discuss it again in this chapter since this has already been explained in Chapter 4 in 
Sections 3 and 4.
5.3.1. Disasters
As we already discussed in Chapter 4, IFLS defines households as being affected by a 
disaster if the disaster was severe enough to cause death or major injuries to household 
members, cause direct financial loss to the household, or cause household members to 
relocate. IFLS reports several types of natural disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, 
landslides, floods, volcanic eruptions and windstorms. Another important definition is 
‘disaster region’. Since most of the regions in Indonesia experienced disasters, it is 
important to determine which disaster region is a treatment. A disaster region is defined 
as a region which has bigger disasters than other regions. Neumayer and Plumper
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(2007) suggest that it is better to use the ratio of dead people to the population rather 
than the total number of deaths to categorize disaster regions. Yet this study uses two 
measures the percentage of the number of people killed to the total population, and the 
percentage o f the number of people evacuated to the population. The reason is to 
capture the effect of disasters like floods: although they result in only a few deaths, 
almost every year, some regions regularly experience floods and they always present a 
problem in terms of big numbers of evacuated people.
We have determined disaster regions as Yogyakarta, Jakarta and West Sumatra. We 
picked those three provinces since only those three provinces are completely covered in 
the IFLS survey data12. Furthermore, a specific natural disaster can be identified in each 
disaster region. Yogyakarta, with a big earthquake in May 2006, has the highest 
percentage for both percentages of dead and evacuated people. In terms of the 
percentage o f evacuated people, West Sumatra with a small earthquake in early 2007 is 
above average, and in terms of the percentage of dead people, although West Sumatra 
is below average, the value is just below Yogyakarta, which is quite high compared to 
other provinces. Jakarta, with floods in January 2007, has a percentage of death people 
which is quite low but the percentage of evacuated people is above average, and 
another big factor is that Jakarta experiences floods almost every year and always 
presents severe problems.
Based on the disaster information above, we define dummies D (disaster regions) and 
dummies A (being affected by disaster). D is equal to 1 if individuals are in a disaster 
region after the time of the disaster and A is equal to 1 if individuals are in a disaster
12 Detailed explanation about how to determine disaster regions is already explained in Chapter 4
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region and were affected by the disaster. As explained above, if there were individuals 
who suffered financial loss or had one or more household member who died or suffered 
major injuries, this is defined as being affected by disaster. Table 5.1 presents the 
number o f households affected and not affected by disasters in each o f the three 
disaster regions. Yogyakarta, with a big earthquake, has a bigger number o f affected 
households, with almost 50% of households affected by disasters, while the percentages 
o f households affected by disasters for Jakarta and West Sumatra are not bigger than 
15%.
Table 5.1: The number of households in disaster regions reported in IFLS survey
Not affected Affected Total number o f HH
number % number %
West
Sumatra 875 86.5 136 13.5 1,011
Jakarta 1,450 89.2 176 10.8 1,626
Yogyakarta 628 50.6 612 49.4 1,240
5.3.2. Household Expenditures
This study uses three main types of household expenditures: total household 
expenditure, educational expenditure and food expenditures. All values o f household 
expenditures are calculated monthly. Total expenditure is defined as all expenditures, 
including food expenditures and non-food expenditures. Food expenditure is 
constructed from two main components: market-purchased and own-produced food 
expenditures. Market-purchased expenditure is calculated from household food 
consumption which is purchased, while own-produced expenditure is calculated from 
the total values o f food obtained from own-production or gift or other assistance.
214
Table 5.2 presents the comparison of average expenditures in 2000 and 2007. All 
values are in real terms with 2002 as the base year. The average total household 
expenditures in the year 2000 was about 1,200,000 rupiahs per month, and increased by 
approximately 2% in 2007. For educational expenditures, in 2000 the average 
educational expenditure was 134 thousand rupiahs, and increased by around 23% in 
2007. Furthermore, for food expenditures, market-purchased expenditure was about 5 
times the own-produced expenditure. In 2000, consumption of food from market 
purchases was about 550,000 rupiahs and from own-produced food was around 
110,000 rupiahs. In 2007, consumption of food from market purchases increased by 
approximately 2%, while for own-produced food, consumption decreased by less than 
1%. In comparison with other expenditures, educational expenditure has the highest 
growth rate.
Table 5.2: Household expenditures per month (thousand rupiah)
Type of expenditures Average HH Expenditures per
expenditures person
2000 2007 2000 2007
Total expenditures 1,243 1,267 341 410
Educational expenditures 134 165 36 54
Food expenditures (market-purchased only) 559 566 149 178
Food expenditures (own-produced only) 118 117 36 41
Note: mean o f household size in 2000=5.1, mean of household size in 2007=4.7
Furthermore, in order to get the real figure of the growth in household expenditure, 
household expenditure per person is provided. In Table 5.2, since the mean household 
size decreased between 2000 and 2007, the average o f total household expenditure per 
person increased by approximately 20%, and by the same percentage for market- 
purchased food expenditures. The growth o f educational expenditure per person seems
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quite high at about 50%. These phenomena indicate that in general, all types of 
household expenditures are higher in 2007 than in 2000.
Figure 5.1: The average of total expenditures in 2000 and 2007 by provinces
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Figure 5.1 presents the average of total expenditures in real values in 2000 and 2007 
across the provinces. As we expected, Jakarta has the highest values o f total 
expenditures in both years at approximately 2.5 million rupiahs per month in 2007 and 
around 2.2 million rupiahs per month in 2000. Bali and South Sulawesi have a higher 
growth in total expenditures from 2000 to 2007 than other regions. In addition to 
Jakarta, Yogyakarta and West Sumatra as disaster regions have average levels of 
expenditures. It seems in general that the averages o f total expenditures are not 
seriously affected by disasters, especially in Jakarta and West Sumatra. Meanwhile, 
Yogyakarta, with a big earthquake, had a low growth of total expenditures.
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T a b le  5 .3 :  S h a re  o f  h o u s e h o ld  e x p e n d i tu r e s  o n  fo o d  in  2 0 0 0  a n d  2 0 0 7
Types of share expenditures 2000 2007
Market-purchased consumption
Share expenditure o f rice 0.077 0.081
Share expenditure of vegetables 0.050 0.038
Share expenditure of meat 0.047 0.039
Share expenditure of fish 0.038 0.030
Share expenditure of oil 0.019 0.025
Own-production consumption
Share expenditure of rice 0.032 0.028
Share expenditure of vegetables 0.016 0.013
Share expenditure o f meat 0.008 0.008
Share expenditure of fish 0.006 0.005
Share expenditure of oil 0.002 0.001
Total food consumption
Share expenditure of rice 0.109 0.109
Share expenditure of vegetables 0.066 0.051
Share expenditure of meat 0.055 0.048
Share expenditure o f fish 0.044 0.035
Share expenditure o f oil 0.021 0.026
Note: categories of share expenditures are only for 5 foods.
On the other hand, for share of food expenditures, we can see from Table 5.3 that the 
largest share is rice, comprising around 11% of total household expenditures and is 
followed by the share on vegetables and meat, comprising around 6% and 5%. The 
share o f market-purchased rice is approximately 8%, while own-produced is only 3%. 
The shares are similar for vegetables and meat. For instance, the share o f market- 
purchased vegetables is 5%, while for own-produced vegetables it is only 1%. This 











































Figure 5.2: Share o f  household  expenditures in 2000 and 2007
a. Share of market-purchased expenditures
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For illustration, Figure 5.2 presents the share o f  expenditures on five foods. In general, 
expend itu res on rice are the biggest proportion o f  food expenditure  for both m arket- 
purchased  and ow n-produced , and expenditures on oil are the sm allest. L ooking at the 
share expend itu re  on foods, Figure 5.3 presents the m arket-purchased  and ow n- 
produced expenditures in 2000 and 2007. The con tribu tions o f  food from  ow n 
production  seem s very sm all if  we com pare it to m arket-purchased  consum ption  across 
the provinces. Jakarta  is the province w ith the h ighest m arket-purchased  expenditure  
and sm allest share o f  ow n-produced  expenditure. T his is not surprising  since Jakarta  is 
the capital city and is highly  urbanised.
F igure 5.3: Food expenditures: m arket-purchased  and ow n-produced  expenditures 
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In addition, non-food expenditure is categorized into tw o groups: frequently  purchased  
goods and services and less frequently  purchased. For frequently  purchased goods and 
services, the expenditures include electricity , w ater, phone, personal to ile tries and o ther
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household items that are always consumed on a regular basis. For less frequently 
purchased goods and services, expenditures are calculated from goods and services that 
are relatively infrequently consumed, such as clothing, medicine and furniture.
5.3.3. Educational Expenditures
Educational expenditure was calculated from all formal educational costs for children 
living in the household and outside the household, and covers educational costs for 
children at any level o f education, from primary school to higher education. Moreover, 
this expenditure is calculated from all spending on school fees, school supplies and 
transportation. School fees are a sum of tuition fees, registration fees, exam fees, school 
contributions and laboratories’ fees. School supplies are calculated from uniforms, 
books and other schooling needs. For transportation costs, pocket money is included in 
this cost. Furthermore, for children who live outside the household, there is boarding 
house spending. All these costs are based on the previous year and the values are 
divided by 12 in order to create monthly figures.
Table 5.4 presents the variety of average real expenditures on education. In general, the 
biggest portion of educational expenditure is for transportation and pocket money, 
followed by school fees; the smallest portion is for school supplies. There is a similar 
pattern o f expenditure o f children living both in the household and outside the 
household. In addition, school fees for children living in the household have the highest 
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1
For those households with children living outside the household, which is less than 
15% o f the total number o f households, allocation for educational expenditure is much 
bigger than households with children living only in the household. This may be true 
because these households usually pay school fees for higher education, which is more 
expensive than primary and secondary education. In addition, for those who live far 
away from the school, they also have to pay housing rent, since higher education 
institutions are mostly located in the big cities.
Figure 5.4: The average of real educational expenditures in 2000 and 2007
by provinces
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Figure 5.4 presents the average of real educational expenditures in 2000 and 2007 
across the provinces. Almost all provinces show that the average educational 
expenditures in 2007 are greater than 2000; only Jakarta has a similar average of 
educational expenditures. In addition, Jakarta also has higher educational expenditures 
than other provinces in both years. This indicates that as the biggest city in Indonesia, 
all costs in Jakarta are higher than other regions, including education costs.
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5.3.4. Price of Goods
This study used two different sources for prices of goods: prices o f goods from 
households (household price) and prices of goods from the market (market price). Since 
there is no direct information about prices of goods at household level in IFLS data, 
prices of goods from households are calculated from total expenditures on good x 
divided by total quantity purchased of good x. On the other hand, price of goods from 
the market level can be obtained directly from IFLS data. Thus, household prices are 
instrumented by using market prices for minimize the measurement errors.
Table 5.5: The average of household and market prices in 2000 and 2007 (Rupiah)
2000 2007
Household Market Household Market
Price of rice (per kg) 2,153.56 2,697.73 4,876.31 4,958.76
Price of meat (per kg) 22,744.57 27,743.94 48,859.69 51,995.15
Price of fish (per kg) 11,657.19 10,431.11 13,756.76 13,088.82
Price of oil (per kg) 3,935.46 3,235.83 11,220.06 11,315.14
Price of vegetable (per bunch) 594.81 354.91 1192.66 975.22
Note: market price is retail price, household price is price that HH actually pay
Table 5.5 illustrates the different values o f prices, between the household price which 
was collected from the household level and the market prices which were obtained 
from the market level in each community. There are variations o f price information 
between these two types o f prices in both years. Some are higher in household levels, 
and others are higher in market levels. Table 5.5 has strongly encouraged us to use 
prices at the market level as instruments for prices at the household level.
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T a b le  5 .6 : C o r r e la t io n  c o e f f i c ie n t
Price o f  foods R
Price o f  rice 






Price o f  meat 
Price o f  fish 
Price o f  oil
Note: r is coefficient correlation
To examine whether the prices of foods at the market level are good instruments, we 
present the correlation coefficient and scatter diagram between the prices at market 
level and household level. Table 5.6 presents the correlation coefficient of food prices 
at market level and household level. It seems that the correlation of both prices for 
vegetables and fish are quite low, but if we look at the scatter diagrams in Figure 5.5., 
there is positive correlation between the price of goods at market level and household 
level for each good. Furthermore, we also conducted a test for the instrumental variable 
o f price o f goods at market levels for ensuring that we used valid instruments for price 
o f goods at household levels. The detailed information of the tests is presented in Table
Figure 5.6 demonstrates the variation of prices before and after disasters across the 
provinces. All price values have already been deflated by using the consumer price 
index. Looking at the disaster regions (West Sumatra, Jakarta and Yogyakarta), the gap 
between prices in 2000 and 2007 for all the prices o f goods are similar to the average 
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To deal with the missing data problem on the price of goods, we used mean 
imputation to replace the missing values. As we already explained in Chapter 2, data 
from community facility level and the price of goods at market level were missing 
because o f the sampling methods in the community facility survey. IFLS listed all the 
markets, and they were ranked by frequency of mention. These ranked lists provided 
frames for each stratum, from which a sample of two to four facilities were drawn. In 
all strata, the most frequently mentioned facility was always visited. Here, missing 
values occurred because the markets were not in the sample. In addition, in the case of 
the price o f goods at household level, we generated the price from total expenditure on 
certain goods over the quantity of goods that were consumed by households. It is also 
possible that the missing values could arise because it may be that there were some 
households that did not consume those particular goods, so cannot compute a unit 
price.










Price of rice 12,751 6,401 6,350 20,094
Price of meat 12,359 6,438 5,921 20,094
Price of fish 13,584 5,249 8,335 20,094
Price of oil 12,310 4,868 7,442 20,094
Price of vegetables 
Household Price
12,151 6,612 5,539 20,094
Price of rice 8,296 7,758 538 20,079
Price of meat 9,913 9,602 311 20,085
Price of fish 6,294 6,033 261 20,015
Price of oil 8,338 8,117 221 20,089
Price of vegetables 7,029 6,289 740 20,086
Table 5.7 shows the number of missing values for each price o f good and the number 
o f values which were solved by using village and district imputation. In general, 
prices of goods at the household levels have less missing values than the prices of
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goods at the market levels. Here, if the price of goods is missing, then each missing 
value will be substitued by the average price o f goods from the smallest and closest 
community level to the households, which is village level. If there is still any missing 
value, the imputed price value is based on the average at district level, a higher 
community level than the village level. For instance, if the price o f rice is missing, we 
imputed the price o f rice from the average price o f rice in the village level at the same 
time that the survey was conducted. If there was still any missing values, we used the 
average price of rice at the district level to impute the missing values of the price of 
rice. We did the same for both prices of goods, at household level and market level.
5.4. Methodology: DID Model
This section outlines the research methodology used in this chapter to examine the 
effects of natural disasters on family expenditures and food demand. We used two 
different methods for estimating. The first method is difference in differences (DID) 
analysis. We used this analysis for estimating the reduced form impact of disasters on 
household expenditures.
Besides DID, we employed the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System 
(LA-AIDS) model that is discussed in Section 5.6. In the LA-AIDS model we impose 
a structure that allows us to isolate the impact of disasters on food share expenditures, 
controlling for prices. We use the parameter estimation from the LA-AIDS model to 
calculate the price and expenditure elasticities.
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5.4.1. The Concept of DID Model
The detailed explanation of DID model has already been explained in Chapter 4. 
Conceptually, the DID model can be expanded by including household covariates Xf,t 
and can be written as:
Yht =  a lDht +  a 2^h t  +  *pXht +  u ht (5.1)
Thus, the equation (5.1) estimates the effect o f disasters (aj + ai) on the potential 
outcome of household h in time t  (Yht) as measures by using household expenditures 
by controlling household covariates Xht such as area, household size, parental 
education background, number of household member per age categorized, and also 
region and year fixed effects respectively.
5.4.2. Household Expenditure Equation
All the equations o f DID models that are used in this chapter have the same variables 
on the right hand side, and we separately estimated all equations by using OLS. The 
complete DID model in this study can be written as:
Lhhexpht = a 01 + a 41Dht +  a 21A ht + +  y lr  +  v l t  +  elht (5.4)
L buyexpht = a 02 +  a 12Dht +  a 22A ht +  ip2Xht +  y 2r +  v 2t +  s2ht (5.5) 
Low nexpht = a 03 +  a 13Dht +  a 23A ht +  ip3x ht +  K3r +  v3t +  £3ht ( 5-6) 
Leducexpht =  a 04 +  a 14Dht +  a 24Aht +  ip4Xht +  y4r +  v4t +  s4ht (5.7) 
L w agesht = a 05 +  a 15Dht +  a 25A ht +  ipsXht +  y 5r +  v5t + s5ht (5.8)
The dependent variables in the equations above are Lhhexph,, Leducexpht, Lbuyexpht, 
Lownexpht, and Lw agesht. Lhhexpht is log of total household expenditure. Leducexpht 
is log o f educational expenditure. Lbuyexpht is log of food expenditure from market 
purchases. Lownexphr is log of food expenditure from estimating values of own
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production. Lw agesht is log of head of household wages. All household expenditures 
and wages are measured using monthly household expenditures. The main 
explanatory variables are Dht and Aht, which capture the natural disaster variables. Dhrt 
is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if household h was in the disaster region with 
expenditure after disaster. At,, is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if household h was in 
the disaster region and was affected by a disaster. In addition, vector X \rt contains the 
other explanatory variables to capture household characteristics such as area where 
they live, household size and number of children or adults in certain age groups. The 
variables yr and v, are region and year fixed effects respectively. The inclusion of the 
regional dummy variables reduces the potential bias from unmeasured regional 
effects. Year dummy variables are useful to control for year specific characteristics 
and control for other changes in the year before and after disasters. Moreover, in order 
to see whether different types of disasters have a different impact on household 
expenditure, this chapter replaces the main explanatory variables, which are dummies 
Dht and A h t ,  by using dummy variables of D/u and A / l t , which belong to specific types of 
disasters. There are 3 dummies for Dht (for big earthquake, small earthquake and 
flood), and the same for 3 dummies for A h l . In order to check the sensitivity of dummy 
variables o f interest (Dh, and Ahl), we also estimated the DID model equation by 
dropping all the control variables except Dht and Aht-
5.5. Empirical Results: DID Model
This section discusses the results of the impact of natural disasters on household 
expenditures. There are two main estimation results: (1) the average impact o f natural 
disasters on household expenditures and food expenditures, and (2) the impact of 
natural disasters on educational expenditure and wages. We present the results o f the
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impact o f disasters on share expenditures and food demand using the LA-AIDS 
demand system model in Section 5.7.
5.5.1. The Impact of Disasters on Total and Food Expenditures
In the DID model, we estimated separately the impact of disasters on the types of 
expenditures using OLS. Total household expenditures and food expenditures 
(market- purchased and own-produced expenditures) are presented together, since 
food expenditures have a bigger share of total expenditures. Educational expenditure 
and wages are presented separately. Table 5.8 presents the estimation results for total 
and food expenditures. There is no negative effect of being in a disaster region after a 
disaster. This is indicated from all of the coefficients on D. Households increased 
their expenditures of own-produced food by approximately 20% on average, 
significance at the 10% level. This could arise because these households were not 
directly affected but preferred to consume more from their own production, since the 
price o f foods in the market probably increased, due to the disaster. On the other hand, 
for households who were affected directly by the disaster, their own production 
expenditures were lower following, perhaps because of the destruction of their farm. 
Therefore, these households purchase more food from market, although the values 
were not significant.
Moreover, looking at other explanatory variables, total household expenditures and 
market- purchased expenditures in urban are higher than in rural, but own-produced 
expenditure in urban is lower than in rural. This is true because all farms are located in 
rural areas. For household size, all values are positively correlated with expenditures 
and are highly significant. It shows that the bigger the number o f total household
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members, the greater the household expenditures will be. In general, the father’s 
education background has no effect on expenditures, but maternal education 
background seems to have a positive and significant effect on total and market- 
purchased expenditures, but is negatively correlated with own-produced expenditures. 
This may arise, because household expenditures are usually managed by the mother, 
and the higher is maternal education the greater these expenditures will be, as the 
higher the maternal education, the wealthier they are, and thegreater variety o f goods 
may be demanded, especially luxury goods. In addition, more highly-educated 
mothers are less likely to be farm workers so they may have lower own produced 
food.
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T a b le  5 .8 :  R e s u l ts  o f  th e  Im p a c t  o f  N a tu r a l  D is a s te r s  o n  T o ta l  H o u s e h o ld
E x p e n d i tu r e s  a n d  F o o d  e x p e n d i tu r e s
Total HH exp Food exp: buy only Food exp: own prod
1 2 3 4 5 6
D -0.000792 0.0283 -0.00799 0.0236 0.172* 0.182*
(0.0663) (0.0532) (0.0663) (0.0488) (0.0817) (0.0851)
A -0.00743 -0.101 0.0951 -0.00134 -0.192*** -0.197***
(0.0507) (0.0592) (0.0615) (0.0731) (0.0597) (0.0628)
Urban 0.324*** 0.282*** -0.203***
(0.0229) (0.0270) (0.0424)
Household size 0.136*** 0.156*** 0.0456***
(0.00745) (0.00848) (0.0135)
Father secondary
school -0.0742 -0.128 -0.194
(0.140) (0.103) (0.285)
Father higher
education 0.399 -0.0231 0.289
(0.340) (0.0798) (1.128)
Mother secondary
school 0.235*** 0.178 -0.168
(0.0766) (0.109) (0.255)
Mother higher
education 0.521 0.675** -0.252***
(0.336) (0.291) (0.0285)
Number of HH
member age: -0.0993*** -0.0583*** -0.0692***
Under 6 (0.0109) (0.0124) (0.0165)
6 to 12 -0.0578*** -0.0558*** -0.0522**
(0.00716) (0.00777) (0.0222)
13 to 18 -0.00621 -0.0493*** 0.0192
(0.00761) (0.0111) (0.0121)
19 to 23 0.0246** 0.00565 0.0252
(0.00870) (0.00788) (0.0158)
24 to 60 0.0591*** 0.0683*** 0.0206*
(0.00565) (0.00643) (0.00980)
Over 60 -0.101*** -0.123*** 0.0200
(0.0105) (0.00635) (0.0192)
Region dummies yes yes Yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes Yes yes yes yes
Observation 20,791 20,791 20,682 20,682 15,797 15,797
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical 
significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%
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Total households members in each household up to 18 years old and over 60 years old 
are negatively correlated with all expenditures, especially total and market-purchased 
expenditures, while the total numbers of adults in households between 19 to 60 years 
old are positively correlated with expenditures. This indicates that the age group of 
household members under 18 and over 60 do not require a lot o f expenditures, 
especially for those aged under 18 - they are still o f school age and do not account for 
a lot o f expenditure, while household members aged between 19 to 60 need more 
expenditure, since those household members typically to have jobs and usually their 
needs are more varied.
Table 5.9: Results o f the impact o f specific disasters on household expenditures
Total HH exp Buy only Own produced
1 2 3 4 5 6
B ig_earthquake_regi on 0.0903** 0.0587* 0.134*** 0 ] ] 4*** 0.0353 0.0326
(0.0332) (0.0326) (0.0375) (0.0329) (0.0577) (0.0547)
Affected_big earthquake -0.111*** -0.190*** -0.0422*** -0.133*** -0.206*** -0.205***
(0.000) (0.00235) (0.000) (0.00234) (0.000) (0.00650)
Small_earthquake_region 0.0844** 0.123*** 0.0138 0.0508 0.281*** 0.325***
(0.0332) (0.0313) (0.0375) (0.0320) (0.0577) (0.0531)
Affected_small
earthquake 0.145*** 0.0412*** 0.282*** 0.196*** -0.0470*** -0.0360***
(0.000) (0.00560) (0.000) (0.00675) (0.000) (0.00973)
Floods_region -0.0996** -0.0419 -0.0939** -0.0357 0.206*** 0.197***
(0.0332) (0.0328) (0.0375) (0.0327) (0.0577) (0.0558)
Affected_floods 0.0121*** -0.0187*** 0.105*** 0.0658*** 0.0314*** 0.0154*
(0.000) (0.00257) (0.000) (0.00296) (0.000) (0.00740)
Additional controls no yes No yes no yes
Region dummies yes yes Yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes Yes yes yes yes
Observation 20,791 20,791 20,791 20,791 15,797 15,797
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%; Additional controls: urban, household size, parental educations, number 
of household members.
Table 5.9 presents the impact o f specific natural disasters on household expenditures. 
The results show that households in a big earthquake region who were affected
234
directly by a big earthquake were badly affected. This is shown from the coefficient of 
all expenditure categories which are negatively correlated with A in ‘Big earthquake’. 
There was no significant effect from small earthquake disasters; in fact, those 
households who were not affected directly by a small earthquake in a small 
earthquake region have positive and significant impacts o f disasters on total household 
expenditures, and those households who are affected directly by disasters also have 
positive impacts of disasters on total expenditures and market-purchased expenditures. 
Disasters are only negatively correlated with own-produced expenditure for those 
households who are affected directly by a small earthquake. This is very true since the 
farms o f households who are affected directly were often destroyed during small 
earthquakes. Moreover, for households in a floods region, there was positive and 
significant impact of floods on own-produced expenditures for those households who 
live in a flood region but were not directly affected. This could arise because those 
who were directly affected by floods suffered destruction o f their farms, which led to 
a reduction in production and caused an increase in the price of foods. For those who 
are not directly affected by floods, then, they could provide for their food needs from 
their own production instead of buying from the market. In addition to own-produced 
expenditure, for households in flood regions, floods will have caused lower total and 
market-purchased expenditures.
5.5.2. The Impact of Disasters on Educational Expenditure and Wages
The results o f the impact o f disasters on educational expenditure and wages are quite 
different from food and total expenditures. Especially for educational expenditure, 
disasters have reduced educational expenditure for those who are affected directly by 
disasters. As presented in Table 5.10, the impact o f disasters on educational
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expenditures shows that the results in Columns 1 and 2 for D and A variables were 
negatively associated with educational expenditures, but only the A variables are 
significant. It indicates that all households that live in disaster regions and are not 
affected directly by disasters have no serious impacts on educational expenditures. On 
the other hand, for households who are directly affected, they are more likely to 
reduce educational expenditures in smoothing their consumption on food, since Table 
5.8 shows that food expenditures, especially for market- purchased expenditures, are 
not affected by disasters.
Table 5.10: Results o f the Impact o f Natural Disasters on Educational Expenditure
log educational expenditure

















Additional controls no yes no yes
Region dummies yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Observation 12,383 12,383 12,383 12,383
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%; Additional controls: urban, household size, parental educations, number 
of household members.
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Furthermore, Columns 3 and 4 show the impact of specific disasters on educational 
expenditures. The results show that only households in big earthquake and flood 
regions and those that were affected directly by big earthquakes and floods have lower 
educational expenditures. These phenomena could be true because only large disasters 
are negatively associated with educational expenditures. In fact, for households who 
live in flood regions, their educational expenditures are also affected by floods. This 
might arise because some goods were destroyed by the floods, so in order to smooth 
food consumption, they cut educational expenditures.








B ig_earthquake_region 0.155* 0.139
(0.0917) (0.0864)










Additional controls no yes No yes
Region dummies yes yes Yes yes
Time dummies yes yes Yes yes
Observation 17,481 17,371 17,481 17,371
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical 
significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%; Additional controls: urban, household size, 
parental educations, number o f household members. Wages is measured from monthly 
income basis.
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Table 5.11 shows the impact of disasters on wages. Columns 1 and 2 are the results of 
the impact o f disasters on wages in general. It seems that disasters are negatively 
associated with wage only for households who are affected directly by disasters. The 
possible explanation for this is that households who were affected directly by disasters 
lost their property or the head of households lost their jobs, causing a decrease in 
wages. On the other hand, there is positive and significant impact o f disasters on 
wages for those households in disaster regions who were not directly affected by 
disasters. This indicates that for survivors, there was a shock positive to labour 
demand because there was a clean-up and reconstruction work to be done after a 
disaster. In the case of specific natural disasters, all variables are not significant. Only 
D in big earthquake without controlling for other variables is positively associated 
with wages, although it is only significant at 10%.
In addition, it is important to report about the disaster relief or aid after disasters, since 
it could affect the income of the victims. Soon after disaster occurred, in the first 
week, an immediate aid was distributed to the disaster region such as foods, tents, and 
cloths by the government and other agencies. It was followed by an intermediate aid 
that was distributed in cash to the victims whose houses were destroyed by disasters to 
reconstruction and rebuild it. It took at least 6 months until these aids were distributed. 
For instance, in the case of big earthquake in Yogyakarta, each household whose 
house was destroyed received money approximately 15 million rupiahs. Thus, 
considering the results from table 5.11 that shows individuals in disaster region 
especially in big earthquake region have a higher wages, it seems that aids do not 
affect the wages since, the survey was conducted from November 2007 to April 2008
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and it was around 18 months after the disaster. The wages itself was measured from 
the last month income from the time survey.
5.6. Methodology: LA-AIDS Model
There are four important aspects that are explained in this section: the concept o f the 
LA-AIDS model, elasticities, the estimation procedure, and welfare effects.
5.6.1. The Concept of the LA-AIDS model
This study employs the demand specification which was proposed by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980) and referred to as the Almost Ideal Demand System model. Deaton 
and Muellbauer defined preferences by a representation o f the cost or expenditure 
function. The AIDS specification yields household expenditure share for good i 
defined as:
where is price for good i, qt is quantity for good i , and X  is the total expenditure 
on all goods in the demand system, can be written as:
where w* is the share o f total expenditure allocated to the i th good, Pj is the price of 
the j th good within the group, X  is total expenditure on the group o f goods being 
analysed, P is the price index, a , p , y  are parameters, and the subscripts i and j  denote 
goods (* ,;= 1,..., n).
The price index (P) is defined as:
(5.9)
(5.10)
InP =  a 0 +  T,k <*k lnpk +  E/c Ykj lnPk lnPj (5.11)
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Substituting 5.11 into 5.10 results in a highly nonlinear model, and Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980) suggest known as a linear approximation to the price index using 
Stone’s price index. Stone’s price index (P*), which is used as a linear approximation 
to 5.11, can be written as:
Where w k is the share to good k in total expenditure. However, this price index may 
cause a simultaneity problem because the wk is item on both sides o f the share 
equation, we use share expenditure as a measurement o f wk. To avoid this problem, 
following Haden(1990), we use the mean of shares across all households instead of 
household shares for wk .
where P* is Stone’s price index, wk is the mean of share expenditure, Pk is the price 
o f good. Therefore, the approximation o f the AIDS demand function in budget share 
is:
Blanciforti, Green and King (1986) named this model as the “Linear Approximation 
o f the Almost Ideal Demand System” (LA-AIDS).
Economic theory imposes three sets o f restrictions on the parameters o f the AIDS 
model.
1. Adding up:







Y u  =  Yjt (5 .17)
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where the coefficient o f 7^ represents the changes in relative prices, while Pi 
coefficient represents the changes in real expenditure. The /?; coefficient sums to zero 
and Pi are positive and less than 1 for necessities, more than 1 for luxury goods and 
negative for inferior goods. If restrictions 1,2 and 3 hold, then the LA-AIDS share 
expenditure equation above represents a system of demand functions, with the adding- 
up condition that the total share expenditure is equal to one ( Z w i = 1 ). Moreover, 
homogeneity and symmetry imply that the demand functions are homogeneous o f the 
degree zero in prices and total expenditure, and must satisfy Slutsky symmetry13. The 
adding-up condition implies that one of the demand equations can be dropped from 
the system, so the estimation is performed on the remaining demand (n-1) equations.
5.6.2. Elasticities
Income (expenditure) elasticities o f the LA-AIDS model can be written as:
—  =  1 +  (— ) M  (5.18)
,1>X dlnX dlnX 1 v '
Using Stone’s price index (P*), and = /?* , the expenditure elasticities can be 
expressed as:
r)i,x = 'L + P i/w i  (5-19)
Uncompensated demand elasticity o f AIDS and LA-AIDS (77^ ) can be written as:
6« =  - * « + S f - ^ <  (5-20)
With Sij is the Kronecker delta where <5^  =  1 for i =  j  and Sij = 0 for i #  j .
13 The Slutsky sym m etry restriction com es from the fact that the Hicksian (com pensated) demand o f  the
cost function is a sym m etric matrix. Hicksian is from the change o f  Marshallian (uncom pensated)
demand in the Slutsky equation, which com pensates to maintain a fixed level o f  utility. According to
Haag et al. (2009), m axim ization o f  utility im plies that consum er demand system s have a Slutsky
matrix, which is sym m etric everywhere. Demand system s with non-linear Engel curves and Slutsky
sym m etry could be im posed with linear or non-linear cross-equation restrictions.
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5.6.3. LA-AIDS estimation procedures
In estimating the LA-AIDS model, there are 6 equations o f budget share expenditures 
on rice, vegetables, meat, fish, oil and all other goods (everything else) with their 
respective prices and real expenditures. The LA-AIDS demand system can be written 
as:
Wrice =  +  Y l l ln P ^ e  +  Y l l ^ K e g  +  Yl 3 ^ C t  +  Y l M ^ h  +  Yi s ^ K u +
Yl6^n Pothers + P M  ( £ )  +  A A irt +  P lM r t  +  ^1 U rbanhrt + (5.21)
Wveg = (*2+ Y z M P ^ e  +  Y22^ P ^ g  +  Y23^ P ^ t +  Y2A^Pf^h  +  7 2 5 ^ ^ 1  +
y2 6 ^ Pothers +  P M  ( £ )  +  d2Dh rt +  p 2^ h n  +  <J2U rbanhrt +  [l2 (5.22)
wmeat “  f  Yzi^Price  T  Y32^Pveg T Y33^Pmeat T Y3A^Pfish T  Y3S^Poil T
YselnPrtters +  As to ( £ )  +  G3Dhrt +  p 3A hrt +  o3U rbanhrt +  p 3 (5.23)
Wfish -^4 T YlM P nce  T Y42^Pveg T YA3^Pmeat T YAA^Pfish T YaS^PoiI T 
YtelnPrtters + P M  ( £ )  +  64Dhrt +  pAA hrt +  a4U rbanhrt +  p 4 (5.24)
^oi£ ^5 "h YsM-Pnce Ys2^Pveg T Y53^Pmeat T  YsA^Pfish  T Yss^Poil  T 
K setoP^T rs +  /?5to ( £ )  +  9sDhrt +  p sA hrt +  as U rbanhrt +  p 5 (5.25)
Wothers =  f  Ysi^Price  T Y62^Pveg T Y63^Pmeat T Y64^Pfish  *h Y65^Poil ~f
YeelnPrtters +  P M  ( £ )  +  A A zn  +  M / m  +  (r6U rbanhrt +  p 6 (5.26)
Where 0Ci,pi,Yij> @i>Pi> °i are parameters to be estimated, are error terms. For share 
expenditures, we have: wr;ce is share expenditure on rice, wpe5 is share expenditure 
on vegetables, wmeat is share expenditure on meat, Wfish is share expenditure on fish, 
woii is share expenditure on cooking oil, and wothers is share expenditure for 
everything else (all other goods). For the price of goods, we used log o f price from a
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linear prediction (log price hat). In tha IFLS data, we generated the price o f goods at 
the household level by dividing expenditures o f certain goods with the quantity 
purchased. Since we used this price o f goods from household levels, we are concerned 
about measurement error in the prices, so we instrumented the price o f goods at the 
HH level using the price o f goods at the market level. Here, we estimated the price for 
LA-AIDS model by using the following equation:
InHHPi = S0 +  SxlnMPi +  6iDht +  piAht +  aiU rbanht +  yr +  v t +  (5.27)
Where InHHPi is log price of good i at HH level, lnMPt is log price o f good i at 
market level. In addition, we add other explanatory variables in the model, including 
dummy disaster regions ( Dht ), and dummy affected by disasters ( A ht). An urban 
dummy is also included on the model, and variables yr and v, are used to control for 
regions and year-fixed effects respectively. Once we obtain the estimates from is 
regression, then we can obtain the linear prediction of the log price o f goods to use in 
the LA-AIDS model. Therefore, we have lnPrice for price o f rice, lnPveg for price of 
vegetables, l n P ^ t for price of meat, InP^  for price o f fish, lnP^a for price of 
oil, and l n P ^ ^ rs for price for other goods. We assumed that other goods are the 
numeraire good, so P^thers= 1 anc* prices o f other goods are defined relative to 
Pothers• When we estimated the LA-AIDS model, P ^ Z - s  w iU be omitted since the log 
o f 1 is zero.
By imposing homogeneity, adding-up and symmetry, the equation for w others is 
dropped to avoid singularity due to the adding-up condition. All equations above are 
estimated jointly using Zellner’s Semingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) in Stata 12.
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5.6.4. Measuring Living Standard
According to Deaton and Muellbaur (1980), the demand system can be derived from 
the expenditure function.
\og E(p, U) = A(p) + B (p)U  (5.28)
Where:
A{p)  =  'Zi'ZjYijlogPi logPj +  I l ia ilogPj  (5.29)
fi(p ) =  n ! L i f f ‘ (5.30)
The corresponding indirect utility function:
u  = logE-m  
B ( p )
U is an indirect utility o f LA-AIDS model or living standard, it can be poor or rich and 
can be measured by using money metric o f utility; p is the price o f foods, E is the total 
expenditure. We have two conditions (before disasters and after disasters) which 
influence the value o f price, and we assume that before disasters the price is equal to 
1, and after disasters the price is equal to 1 plus the change o f price that we can 
measure from price estimation without controlling for price at market level. According 
to the above condition, we can write before disasters as: A(Pq) = 0, B(P0) =1, then 
U =  logE,  and after disasters as: j4(Pi) = certain values, P (P 1)=certain values, then 
the value o f U depends on the category o f U as poor or rich. For poor, we used the 
income definition from the Central Bureau Statistics of Indonesia o f 250,000 rupiahs 
per month and we also calculated for the poorest, which is obtained from the lowest 
income o f income distribution at 15,000 rupiahs per month. For the rich, we used an 
income o f 5 million rupiahs. Then we calculated for the welfare effect o f disasters as: 
D isas te r  e f f e c t  =  E(PV U) -  E(P0l U) =  A(P±) - A(P0) +  [ P ^ )  -  B(P0)]U.
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5.7. Empirical Results: LA-AIDS Model
The LA-AIDS model was estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) in 
STATA 12. The purpose of estimating using this model is to isolate the effect of 
disaster induced prices changes from other effects. In contrast DID regression is 
reduced form and captures the total effect but does not isolate the price effect from 
other effects.
5.7.1. F irs t Stage Regressions: P redicting Household Prices 
Table 5.12 presents the first stage least square regression for the prices o f goods. The 
table shows the regression o f price o f goods at market level, and D and A variables on 
price o f goods at household level. The predicted values o f household prices from this 
regression are used in the second stage regression o f the LA-AIDS model. Almost all 
prices o f goods at market level are significant and positively correlated with the price 
o f goods at household level, only fish has no significant value but is still positively 
associated with the price at household level. D is positively correlated with the price 
o f goods at household level for rice, vegetables, fish and oil. It indicates that the price 
o f goods tends to increase when disasters occur. On the other hand, there are negative 
correlations o f A on the price o f rice and fish, and positive correlations of A on the 
price o f vegetables, meat, and oil. The results especially for rice would be consistent 
with aid agencies bringing enough staple foods to disaster regions to stabilize prices.
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T a b le  5 .1 2 :  F i r s t  s ta g e  le a s t  s q u a re  r e g r e s s io n  f o r  p r i c e  o f  g o o d s
Dept var:
Log of household price Rice Vegetables Meat Fish Oil
log market price 0.0332*** 0.0736*** 0.0425* 0.00680 0.0348***
(0.00696) (0.00812) (0.0250) (0.00714) (0.0124)
D 0.00308 0.221*** -0.126*** 0.204*** 0.00667
(0.00994) (0.0212) (0.0136) (0.0150) (0.0108)
A -0.0382*** 0.0673** 0.0324* -0.0391* 0.0570***
(0.0141) (0.0302) (0.0193) (0.0212) (0.0153)
Urban 0.0872*** 0.0171** 0.0686*** 0.0386*** 0.0153***
(0.00393) (0.00836) (0.00534) (0.00587) (0.00423)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observation 19,574 19,574 19,574 19,574 19,574
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%
Table 5.13 shows the results of price regressions without controlling for the price at 
the market level. This is to investigate the transmission mechanism of the disaster 
effect on the price of goods. By controlling for market prices, as in Table 5.12, we are 
able to identify the additional effect of disasters on household prices beyond their 
impact on market prices.
Table 5.13: The effect o f disasters on price without controlling market price
Dept var:
Log of household price Rice Vegetables Meat Fish Oil
D 0.00614 0.227*** -0.124*** 0.203*** 0.00899
(0.00975) (0.0209) (0.0134) (0.0147) (0.0106)
A -0.0395*** 0.0626** 0.0354* -0.0386* 0.0410***
(0.0138) (0.0296) (0.0189) (0.0209) (0.0151)
Urban 0.0889*** 0.0249*** 0.0695*** 0.0400*** 0.0152***
(0.00384) (0.00823) (0.00527) (0.00579) (0.00418)
Time dummies yes Yes yes yes yes
Regional dummies yes Yes yes yes yes
Observation 20,079 20,085 20,015 20,089 20,086
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical 
significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%
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Here, we want to observe the total effect o f disasters on the prices which households 
pay. This will be used later in evaluating the welfare impact o f disasters. The results 
show that prices of rice, vegetables, fish, and oil are positively associated with 
disasters.
5.7.2. Parameters of the LA-AIDS model
Table 5.14 shows the parameters o f the LA-AIDS model with homogeneity and 
symmetry restrictions imposed. It can be seen from the level o f significance o f each 
parameter that almost all parameters are significant at 1% and a few are at 5%. Almost 
all shares expenditures are negatively correlated with D and are highly significant. 
Only share expenditure on meat is positively correlated with D but it is only 
significant at 10%. Only the meat and fish shares are negatively associated with A. It 
seems that households reduce their expenditures on meat and fish when the disasters 
occured, as those two goods are not staple foods. Almost all estimates show that urban 
has negative effect on the shares of all food expenditures. It means that all household 
food expenditures in urban areas are lower than in rural areas.
We also estimated the LA-AIDS model using the original prices o f goods at the 
household level. This estimation does not instrument the prices o f goods at the 
household level. In general, the results are not very different, especially for the price 
and expenditure elasticities, and the effect o f disasters on living standards is only 
slightly different. The detailed results are presented in the Appendix. The complete 
tables o f those LA-AIDS models are in Tables A5.1 to A5.4.
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Share equations of total expenditures 




Yu 0.0340*** -0.00990*** -0.00378*** -0.0244*** 0.00403***
(0.00256) (0.00143) (0.000661) (0.00109) (0.00149)
Yi2 -0.00990*** -0.0179*** -0.00173*** 0.0278*** 0.00179**
(0.00143) (0.00131) (0.000322) (0.000742) (0.000741)
Yl3 -0.00378*** -0.00173*** -0.000520 0.00285*** 0.00319***
(0.000661) (0.000322) (0.000634) (0.000271) (0.000556)
Yu -0.0244*** 0.0278*** 0.00285*** 0.00484*** -0.0111***
(0.00109) (0.000742) (0.000271) (0.000807) (0.000607)
Yis 0.00403*** 0.00179** 0.00319*** -0.0111*** 0.00208
(0.00149) (0.000741) (0.000556) (0.000607) (0.00131)
Pi -0.0373*** -0.00376*** 0.00131*** -0.00231*** -0.00516***
(0.000906) (0.000440) (8.96e-05) (0.000441) (0.000225)
0i -0.0124*** -0.00502*** 0.000505* -0.0108*** -0.00175***
(D) (0.00265) (0.00127) (0.000259) (0.00126) (0.000649)
Pi 0.00839* 0.00985*** -0.00153*** -0.00599*** 0.00431***
(A) (0.00488) (0.00233) (0.000471) (0.00231) (0.00119)
<Ti -0.0426*** -0.00948*** 2.06e-05 -0.0108*** -0.00708***
(Urban)
F statistics of 
excluded 
instruments: 
Price of rice 
Price of vegetables 
Price of meat 
Price of fish 










Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%; F statistics of excluded instruments is a test of the joint 
significance o f the excluded instruments in the first stage regression.
Moreover, Table 5.14 also presents the F-statistics to test the excluded instruments 
from the first stage regression. The value of F statistics are the same for all share 
equations, since we used exactly the same endogenous variables instruments and other 
covariates on the right hand side o f the share equation. For comparison, we also 
estimated the LA-AIDS model using data with missing values. In fact, with the
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number o f only 5,849 observations, which is less than the estimation with imputation 
o f the missing values o f 19,574 observations, the results are similar, especially for the 
elasticities, and for the effect of disasters on living standards there is only slightly 
different value. This suggests that the missing values do not bias the results. The 
complete results are presented in Appendix tables A5.5 to A5.8.
Table 5.15: Parameters o f LA-AIDS Demand System with Homogeneity and 
Symmetry Restriction on the Impact o f Specific Natural Disasters
Share equations of total expenditures
1 2 3 4 5
Parameters rice Veg meat fish Oil
Yi i 0.0343*** -0.0100*** -0.00379*** -0.0245*** 0.00404***
(0.00259) (0.00146) (0.000674) (0.00110) (0.00153)
Vi2 -0.0100*** -0.0187*** -0.00179*** 0.0283*** 0.00224***
(0.00146) (0.00134) (0.000335) (0.000751) (0.000776)
Yi3 -0.00379*** -0.00179*** -0.000467 0.00287*** 0.00319***
(0.000674) (0.000335) (0.000632) (0.000276) (0.000573)
Yu -0.0245*** 0.0283*** 0.00287*** 0.00455*** -0.0112***
(0.00110) (0.000751) (0.000276) (0.000809) (0.000625)
Yis 0.00404*** 0.00224*** 0.00319*** -0.0112*** 0.00174
(0.00153) (0.000776) (0.000573) (0.000625) (0.00137)
Pi -0.0373*** -0.00362*** 0.00131*** -0.00243*** -0.00513***
(0.000908) (0.000441) (8.95e-05) (0.000440) (0.000225)
e t (D) -0.0186*** -0.000732 0.00113** -0.0190*** -0.000492
Big earthquake (0.00544) (0.00260) (0.000522) (0.00257) (0.00132)
Pi (A) 0.0121 0.00924*** -0.00283*** -0.00157 0.00402**
Big earthquake (0.00742) (0.00354) (0.000704) (0.00350) (0.00178)
6t (D) 0.00429 -0.0102*** 0.000676 0.00533** 0.00230**
Small earthquake (0.00442) (0.00211) (0.000427) (0.00209) (0.00108)
Pi (A) 0.0161 0.00788 0.000466 -0.000149 0.00120
Small earthquake (0.0117) (0.00558) (0.00111) (0.00552) (0.00281)
Gi (D) -0.0218*** -0.00296 0.000116 -0.0191*** -0.00549***
Floods (0.00383) (0.00186) (0.000378) (0.00182) (0.000950)
Pi( A) 0.00529 0.000650 -0.000395 -0.00378 0.00315
Floods (0.0106) (0.00505) (0.00100) (0.00500) (0.00254)
° i -0.0416*** -0.00972*** 3.96e-05 -0.00996*** -0.00684***
(Urban) (0.00140) (0.000669) (0.000141) (0.000659) (0.000354)
Observation 19,574 19,574 19,574 19,574 19,574
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%
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Table 5.15 presents the result o f the LA-AIDS model from the impact o f specific 
natural disasters on food shares. Similar to Table 5.13 above, almost all parameters are 
significant at 1%. Almost all A variables from each type of disasters are not 
significantly correlated with the food shares. Only A for big earthquakes in 
vegetables, meat and oil shares are significant. Vegetables and oil shares are positively 
correlated with A but meat share is negatively correlated with A. In addition, for D 
variables from each type of disasters, there are several values with negative and 
significant correlation to household food shares, and few are positive. For big 
earthquake, only D in rice and fish shares has negative sign and is significant. For 
small earthquake, vegetables share has negative sign and is significant, while fish and 
oil shares has positive sign. For floods, D in rice, fish and oil shares are negative. 
Those phenomena could be true because different type o f disasters have different 
impacts on different foods.
5.7.3. Price and Expenditure Elasticities
Table 5.16 shows the price and total expenditure elasticities obtained from the LA- 
AIDS estimates in Table 5.14. For price elasticities, all values in bold are own-price 
elasticities and other coefficients in the matrix o f commodities are cross-price 
elasticities. All own-price elasticities are negative, as we expected from the theory of 
demand.
Rice is price inelastic as expected because it is a staple good. Fish is also price 
inelastic. Vegetables and meat are price elastic. Oil is price inelastic reflecting its 
status as a necessity. For cross-price elasticities, negative values show that both 
commodities are complements, while positive values indicate that both commodities
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are substitutes. For instance, rice has a complementary relationship with fish (-0.620), 
and meat has a substitution relationship with fish (0.073). In expenditure elasticities 
for rice, when incomes increase by 10%, households would like to increase 
expenditure on rice by approximately 8%. In addition to rice, when incomes increase 
by 10%, households would like to spend more on vegetables, meat and oil, by around 
9%. Fish has a unit total expenditure elasticies.
Table 5.16: Price and expenditure demand elasticities
Price elasticities Rice Vegetables Meat Fish Oil Other
Rice -0.650*** -0.071*** -0.034*** -0.211*** 0.045*** -0.079**
(0.024) (0.013) (0.006) (0 .010) (0.014) (0.033)
Vegetables -0.164*** -1.306*** -0.030*** 0.483*** 0.032** -0.015
(0.025) (0.023) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.039)
Meat -1 733*** _0 799*** -1.231*** 1.234*** 1 394*** 0.134
(0.292) (0.142) (0.280) (0.119) (0.245) (0.508)
Fish -0.620*** q 7]7*** 0.073*** -0.873*** -0.283*** -0.014
(0.028) (0.019) (0.007) (0.021) (0.016) (0.043)
Oil 0.194*** 0.088*** 0.135*** -0.460*** -0.907*** -0.051
(0.063) (0.031) (0.024) (0.026) (0.056) (0.096)
Other 1 972*** 0.371** 0.086 -1 173 * * * -1.281*** -0.975*
(0.302) (0.149) (0.281) (0.125) (0.253) (0.522)
Expenditure 0.818*** 0.897*** 0.938*** 1.036*** 0.916*** 1 041***
Elasticities (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.018)
Budget shares 0.109 0.058 0.051 0.039 0.024 0.720
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%; All values on bold are own price elasticities; £ ? = iwt =  
i ; E ”=i WiTji = l ;  - w j  = Tu=1w t e tj
For the effect o f disasters on households’ standard o f living, we used the information 
from our price estimation in Table 5.13 without controlling for market price to get the 
total effect o f a disaster on the price that households pay for their foods. As we have 
discussed in Section 5.6.4 o f this chapter, we used equation 5.28 to estimate the 
impact o f disasters on the standard o f living. By assuming that prices before disasters 
are 1, and prices after disasters are 1 plus the change in price that we obtained from
our price estimation, we can calculate the effect o f disasters on the standard o f living 
using indirect utility function. We classified the standard o f living into three levels: 
poorest, poor and rich. For the poor standard o f living, as an extreme expenditure 
value o f the poorest, we pick the minimum value o f household expenditure at 
approximately RP 15,000 per month. Another expenditure value for comparison is the 
poverty line from the Central Bureau of Statistics with RP 250,000 per month. For the 
rich standard of living, we used the expenditure measure o f RP 5 million per month. 
The effect o f disasters of each level of households5 standard o f living is in Table 5.17. 
For the poorest households, their living standard is lower by 2.42% and for the poor 
households it is lower by 2.22% than their living standard before the disasters. On the 
other hand, for the rich households, their standard living is lower by 2% than before 
the disasters. As we expected, poor households suffered more than rich households, 
although the differences are small. The overall effects o f disasters are small compared 
to average annual changes in the incomes on average. Thus we can conclude that there 
is no different effect o f disasters in term percentage terms between the poor and the 
rich on income. This effect was measured as medium term effect that may be smaller 
than immediate effects.
Table 5.17: The effect of disasters on living standard




Note: Note: 1 US$ = RP 10,000; * Indonesian poverty line on July 2012
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5.8. Conclusion
This paper finds that there are no significant effects o f disasters on total household 
expenditures for households living in disasters regions, whether they are affected 
directly by disasters or not. In the case o f food expenditures, for households who are 
affected directly by disasters, there are negative and significant impacts o f disasters on 
own-produced expenditures, but a positive impact on market-purchased expenditures. 
For educational expenditures, only households who are affected directly by disasters 
have lower educational expenditures. Furthermore, there is no significant impact of 
disasters on wages. In addition, the results show that only large natural disasters are 
associated with lower household expenditures, so the different types o f disasters have 
different effects on household expenditures. In comparison with the results that 
control for prices, we obtained the net effects of disasters on household expenditures 
in addition to their impact on prices. In general there is negative and significant 
impact o f disasters on expenditures after controlling for prices.
In the case o f food demand estimates, the results show that rice and oil have price 
inelastic demand, while vegetables, meat and fish are price elastic. In addition, the 
total expenditure elasticity of demand for rice is less elastic than other foods at 
approximately 0.8. Expenditure elasticity of demand for vegetables, meat and oil are 
about 0.9, while expenditure elasticity for fish is unity. Using the prices, our estimates 
suggests that the impact o f disasters on living standards are more negative for poor 
households than for rich households, although the difference is quite small. The small 
estimated price impact in associated with disasters suggests that disaster relief is 
relatively effective. However we are not able to estimate what the effect would have 
been in the absence o f disasters relief.
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion and Policy Implications
This thesis contains a series of related studies about the human capital outcomes for 
children arising from school subsidy reform and natural disasters. The first study is 
about an evaluation o f the impact o f the school operational assistance program on 
child test scores. The second is an examination of the impact of natural disasters on 
child test scores and child health. The third is a study on the impact o f disasters on 
household expenditures and food demand. The last study is indirectly related to 
human capital outcomes for children through educational expenditures, as well as on 
food demand. All studies in this thesis rely on the Indonesia Family Life Survey data 
2000 and 2007.
In Chapter 3, an attempt was made to look at the impact o f government policy on 
school subsidy, the school operational assistance program (BOS), on children’s 
outcomes. All the estimation using OLS, IV and PSM methods suggest that the BOS 
program has a positive and significant effect on child test scores. Students who receive 
subsidies have higher test score. OLS estimation suggested that test scores can 
increase by 0.358 points, and IV estimation resulted in a much larger value of 3.3 
points. PSM also suggested that the BOS program in Indonesia raises test scores by 
0.26 points. We interpret the IV results as a local average treatment effect. Overall, in 
the early program, BOS successfully improved student performance. We also 
produced some suggestive estimates of a long-term effect, because child test scores 
are associated with higher future earnings.
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Chapter 4 examined the impact o f disasters on child test scores and child health, and 
Chapter 5 inspected the impact o f disasters on household expenditure and food 
demand. In chapter 4, we used a DID model to predict the missing counterfactual. For 
child health, we used two types of data: child height under 5, and self-reported general 
‘health condition. In addition to the DID estimates of the impact o f disasters on child 
health analysis we also used zero inflated negative binomial, and also ordered logit 
model for analysing the self-reported information on child health. The results confirm 
that child test scores are significantly affected by disasters, but there are no significant 
impacts of disasters on child health.
This study finds that child test scores are significantly affected by disasters, but there 
are no serious impacts from disasters on child health. For child test scores outcomes, 
natural disasters affect all child test scores of the children in disaster regions, both 
those who are affected and those who are not affected directly by disasters, by 
reducing their test score. Those who are affected by disasters had an additional lower 
test score than those who were not affected. Moreover, children who took the test just 
after the disaster have a lower test score than children who took the test more than a 
year after the disaster. There are also different impacts o f different types o f natural 
disasters and only terrifying and destructive natural disasters are associated with lower 
test scores for all children in the disaster region.
For child health outcome, we found that disasters have no serious impacts on child 
health. This finding is confirmed by all the estimation results using height o f child or 
self-reported health measures. For height o f child, none o f the children who have been 
affected by disasters have a lower height or growth compared to those who are not
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affected by disasters. The same result is obtained on the impact o f specific natural 
disasters on child health. The result from self-reported health data is also similar to 
results from the height data. Only the dependent variable which uses last year’s health 
condition has a significant impact from disasters. It indicates that children in a disaster 
region and who are affected by disaster have a bigger probability o f being unhealthy.
Finally in Chapter 5, for estimation, we employed a difference in differences (DID) 
model in this chapter to estimate the total impact o f disasters on various types of 
household expenditures. In the DID model we did not control the price o f goods. For 
comparison, we used a Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System (LA-AIDS) 
model to estimate the net impact o f disasters on expenditures, as in LA-AIDS model 
we controlled for the price of foods. Furthermore, LA-AIDS model also estimated 
price elasticity o f demand and expenditure elasticity o f demand. Those two elasticities 
explained the pattern o f food consumption, which is very important for economic 
analysis.
This chapter finds that there are no significant total effects o f disasters on total 
household expenditures for households living in disaster regions, whether they are 
affected directly by the disasters or not. In the case o f food expenditures, for 
households who are affected directly by disasters there are negative and significant 
impacts o f disasters on own- produced expenditures, but a positive impact on market- 
purchased expenditures. For educational expenditures, only households who are 
affected directly by disasters have lower educational expenditures. Furthermore, there 
is positive and significant impact o f disasters on wages for those households in 
disaster regions who were not directly affected by disasters. This indicates that for
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survivors, there was a shock positive to labour demand. Furthermore, looking at the 
impact of disasters on living standards, poor households are more likely to have a 
greater negative impact than rich households, although the effect is quite small. 
Overall, there is no impact o f disasters on total household expenditures, but we found 
net negative impact o f expenditures by controlling for prices.
Overall, there is negative impact of disasters on educational expenditures, and no 
impact o f disasters on total household expenditures. Yet, we found a net negative 
impact o f disasters on expenditures by controlling for prices. Hence, in order to 
maintain children’s education, especially for those who went to primary school and 
secondary schools, the Government should pay attention to the schooling process soon 
after a disaster, when conditions return to normal, since it is possible for some 
households to decide not to send their children to school, as they do not have funding 
for educational costs such as transportation costs and pocket money. Moreover, for 
household consumption, especially food consumption, in the time of disasters, 
controlling the price o f goods to be stable is very important to help support households 
to maintain consumption at the time of disasters, as disasters cause the prices of goods 
to increase.
This thesis contributes to the international literature in this area in several aspects. 
First, compared to other literature generally, this study uses survey data with self- 
reported information. In Chapter 3, this study uses self-reported information on 
whether children get school subsidies from the government. This allows us to estimate 
the impact o f the treatment rather than the intention to treat. Chapters 4 and 5 use self- 
reported data on whether they are affected by disasters or not. In the main data set that
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is used in this thesis, the IFLS survey, individuals are categorized as affected by the 
disasters if they reported that their households experienced death or major injuries to a 
household member, direct financial loss to the household, or relocation o f a household 
member. To the best of my knowledge, almost all earlier studies defined an affected 
individual only by measuring the policies or shock before and after, and there is no 
definition that describes an individual as affected or unaffected.
Second, this study used a measure of school quality, test scores, as a measure of 
educational outcomes, while most o f the earlier studies used a quantity measure o f 
schooling, such as school enrolment, school attendance, number o f years completed or 
drop-out rate. Chapter 3 examines the impact o f school subsidies on test scores, and 
Chapter 4 investigates the impact of disasters on child test scores.
Thirdly, the BOS program is an example of a specific school subsidy program aiming 
to support basic education in Indonesia. The subsidy for each student who is eligible is 
distributed to the school directly and will be managed by the school for operational 
expenses so that the students will be free from all kinds o f fees during their schooling. 
The students themselves only receive a small amount o f money for their transportation 
allowance. An evaluation o f this school subsidy policy may also have relevance for 
other countries considering adopting similar ideas.
Fourthly, in Chapter 4, we examine the impact o f disasters across the distribution of 
test scores using Quantile Regression, so we can see in detail the effects o f disasters 
by groups o f outcomes. Fifth, this study presents the impact o f disasters on child 
health using two different measures o f child health: height o f child as an objective
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measure and self-reported health condition as a subjective measure. The purpose of 
using these two measures that height is a permanent effect whereas self-reported 
health is likely to be a short effect.
Sixth, in Chapter 5, compared to other literature that discusses the impact o f disasters 
on expenditure or budget, this study uses a variety o f data o f household expenditures 
and also o f income (wages). In addition, regarding food expenditures, we allow for 
those who get food from market purchases and those who get food from their own 
production from their farm. Seventh, we also investigate the net effect o f disasters on 
expenditures o f main foods, such as rice, vegetable, fish and meat. Another important 
contribution is about the consequences o f natural disasters on food demand. Here, the 
impact o f disasters can be manifested in two ways: through increases in the price of 
goods and through an affect independent o f food prices. Lastly, we also provided the 
impact o f disasters on living standards regarding different levels o f household 
expenditure.
Furthermore, we realize that there is also a limitation o f our study. The availability of 
IFLS data is the first thing that we should consider about. For analysis the impact of 
BOS on child test score, we only have short period observation since BOS was 
implemented in 2005. In addition, for the impact o f natural disasters on child test 
scores and child health are also used short period o f time. Although we can see the 
change o f environment that surrounds children, such as policies or shocks, can affect 
their outcome in the short term. The results o f these, imply crucial inputs in terms of 
the impacts of government policy (BOS) and natural shocks (disasters) that children 
experienced. Moreover, an important area for further research regarding human capital
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outcomes for children, especially on child education and health that it could be worth 
measuring the impact o f disasters on children’s outcome in the long term, if there is 
enough historical data of disasters, and also children’s earnings in adulthood. 
Regarding child health, we can also measure the impact of disasters on health in the 
long term when the child becomes an adult. Moreover, if we have panel data with 
more time series, it would be nice to measure the impact o f disasters on permanent 
and transitory income.
Moreover, for analysis the impact of BOS on child test scores, it is also possible to re- 
estimate and focus using Instrumental Variable regression with comprehensive 
analysis. For example, we can try to use any possible instrument for BOS that we can 
generate such as an interaction between village decision maker and the original 
poverty index, or we can try to estimate poverty index using ordered logit/probit first, 
and then use the result from ordered logit/probit as poverty index. Furthermore, for 
analysis the impact o f disasters on children outcomes and household expenditure, we 
can only focus on the biggest disasters (big earthquake), since this disaster resulted the 
most significant impact than other type o f disasters.
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Table A3.1 is OLS estimation using child test score with imputation for missing 
values.
Table A3.1: The impact o f BOS on child test score




































BOS*Poor (satisfied 3 criteria)
(0.874)
-1.665*
BOS*Poor (satisfied 4 criteria)
(0.879)
-1.473*
BOS*Poor (satisfied 5 criteria)
(0.888)
-1.155
































Standard errors in parentheses 





















Table A4.1 is DID estim ation for the im pact o f  disasters on child test scores using
child test score with imputation for missing values.


























Year dummies yes yes
Region dummies yes yes
Observations 9,867 9,858
R-squared 0.072 0.103
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A5.1 to A5.4 are LA-AIDS Estimation using original price o f goods at 
household level (without instrumented price of goods at household level).
Table A5.1: Parameters o f LA-AIDS Demand System with Homogeneity and
Symmetry Restriction
share equations of total expenditures
1 2 3 4 5
Parameters rice veg meat fish oil
Yu 0.0147*** -0.00356*** 0.000166 -0.0100*** -0.00132***
(0.000961) (0.000535) (0.000151) (0.000560) (0.000420)
Yi  2 -0.00356*** -0.00265*** -0.000166** 0.00722*** -0.000848***
(0.000535) (0.000467) (8.47e-05) (0.000349) (0.000236)
Yi3 0.000166 -0.000166** 7.82e-05 0.000630*** -0.000708***
(0.000151) (8.47e-05) (0.000127) (9.24e-05) (0.000129)
Yi4 -0.0100*** 0.00722*** 0.000630*** 0.00649*** -0.00432***
(0.000560) (0.000349) (9.24e-05) (0.000503) (0.000248)
Yis -0.00132*** -0.000848*** -0.000708*** -0.00432*** 0.00719***
(0.000420) (0.000236) (0.000129) (0.000248) (0.000381)
Pi -0.0350*** -0.00697*** 0.00111*** -0.00202*** -0.00434***
(0.000901) (0.000428) (7.02e-05) (0.000443) (0.000217)
Oi -0.00920*** -0.0102*** 8.32e-05 -0.00955*** -0.000562
(D) (0.00265) (0.00126) (0.000204) (0.00129) (0.000631)
Pi 0.00925* 0.00977*** -0.000930** -0.00696*** 0.00391***
(A) (0.00490) (0.00232) (0.000375) (0.00238) (0.00116)
<*i -0.0428*** -0.00890*** -0.000269** -0.0112*** -0.00675***
(urban) (0.00138) (0.000656) (0.000107) (0.000673) (0.000330)
Observation 19,574 19,574 19,574 19,574 19,574
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%
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Table A5.2: Param eters o f LA-AIDS Demand System with H om ogeneity and
Sym m etry Restriction on The Im pact o f  Specific N atural D isasters
share equations of total expenditures
1 2 3 4 5
Parameters rice veg meat fish oil
Yii 0.0148*** -0.00365*** 0.000160 -0.00996*** -0.00133***
(0.000962) (0.000535) (0.000151) (0.000560) (0.000420)
Yi2 -0.00365*** -0.00264*** -0.000145* 0.00727*** -0.000833***
(0.000535) (0.000467) (8.49e-05) (0.000349) (0.000236)
Yi3 0.000160 -0.000145* 7.92e-05 0.000632*** -0.000726***
(0.000151) (8.49e-05) (0.000127) (9.24e-05) (0.000129)
Yi4 -0.00996*** 0.00727*** 0.000632*** 0.00634*** -0.00429***
(0.000560) (0.000349) (9.24e-05) (0.000502) (0.000248)
Yis -0.00133*** -0.000833*** -0.000726*** -0.00429*** 0.00717***
(0.000420) (0.000236) (0.000129) (0.000248) (0.000382)
Pi -0.0350*** -0.00683*** 0.00112*** -0.00221*** -0.00432***
(0.000903) (0.000429) (7.04e-05) (0.000443) (0.000218)
Q i  (D) -0.0145*** -0.00242 0.00155*** -0.0218*** -0.000531
Big
earthquake (0.00546) (0.00259) (0.000419) (0.00265) (0.00130)
Pi (A) 0.0129* 0.00672* -0.00275*** -0.000397 0.00449**
Big
earthquake (0.00745) (0.00353) (0.000570) (0.00361) (0.00177)
6 i  (D) 0.00768* -0.0137*** 0.000121 0.00518** 0.00311***
Small
earthquake (0.00443) (0.00210) (0.000339) (0.00215) (0.00105)
Pi (A) 0.0152 0.00621 0.000646 0.00243 0.000996
Small
earthquake (0.0117) (0.00556) (0.000899) (0.00570) (0.00279)
6 i  (D) -0.0192*** -0.0114*** -0.000644** -0.0147*** -0.00331***
Floods (0.00382) (0.00182) (0.000294) (0.00186) (0.000910)
Pi( A) 0.00490 -0.00113 -0.000254 -0.00191 0.00331
Floods (0.0106) (0.00503) (0.000813) (0.00515) (0.00252)
°i -0.0419*** -0.00899*** -0.000245** -0.0105*** -0.00654***
(urban) (0.00140) (0.000661) (0.000107) (0.000677) (0.000333)
observation 19,574 19,574 19,574 19,574 19,574
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%
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Table A5.3: Price and expenditure dem and elasticities
Price
elasticities rice vege meat fish oil other
rice -0.829 -0.014 0.002 -0.080 -0.005 -0.074
(0.009) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012)
vege -0.049 -1.039 -0.003 0.130 -0.012 -0.028
(0.009) (0.008) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.014)
meat 0.020 -0.102 -0.967 0.259 -0.324 0.113
(0.067) (0.037) (0.056) (0.041) (0.057) (0.118)
fish -0.252 0.189 0.016 -0.831 -0.110 -0.012
(0.015) (0.009) (0.002) (0.013) (0.006) (0.022)
oil -0.036 -0.025 -0.030 -0.176 -0.691 -0.043
(0.018) (0.005) (0.010) (0.016) (0.029)
other 0.146 -0.009 -0.020 -0.302 0.141 -0.956
(0.072) (0.041) (0.056) (0.045) (0.060) (0.125)
Exp elasticities 0.818 0.897 0.938 1.036 0.916 1.041
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.018)
Budget shares 0.109 0.058 0.051 0.039 0.024 0.720
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: * 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%; All values on bold are own price elasticities; J]?=i w i 
Willi = 1; -Wy =  I?=1 Wi  E i j
Table A5.4: The effect of disasters on living standard




Note: Note: 1 US$ = RP 10,000; * Indonesian poverty line on July 2012
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Table A5.5 to A5.8 are LA-AIDS Estimation using price o f goods at household level 
by instrumented using price o f goods at market level without imputation for missing 
values.
Table A5.5: Parameters o f LA-AIDS Demand System with Homogeneity and
Symmetry Restriction
share equations o f  total expenditures
1 2 3 4 5
Parameters rice veg meat fish oil
Y u 0.0107* -0.000788 0.000134 -0.00864*** -0.00139
(0.00642) (0.00395) (0.00251) (0 .00322) (0.00345)
Y i 2 -0 .000788 -0.0353*** -0.0105*** 0.0382*** 0.00850***
(0.00395) (0.00381) (0.00177) (0.00270) (0.00211)
Yi3 0.000134 -0.0105*** -0.00888*** 0.00605*** 0.0132***
(0.00251) (0.00177) (0.00201) (0 .00199) (0.00127)
Yi4 -0 .00864*** 0.0382*** 0.00605*** -0.00394 -0.0316***
(0.00322) (0.00270) (0.00199) (0.00318) (0.00189)
Yi5 -0.00139 0.00850*** 0.0132*** -0.0316*** 0.0113***
(0.00345) (0.00211) (0 .00127) (0.00189) (0.00249)
P i -0.0301*** -0.00694*** -0.00360*** -0.00597*** -0.00461***
(0.00130) (0.000543) (0.000710) (0.000545) (0.000352)
0 i -0.0111*** 0.00101 0.00002 -0.00827*** 0.00157
(D) (0.00397) (0.00186) (0.00218) (0 .00174) (0.00116)
P i -0.00005 0.00152 -0.00647 -0.00274 0.000621
(A) (0.00779) (0.00322) (0.00425) (0 .00322) (0 .00208)
<*i -0.0483*** -0.0105*** -0.00203 -0.0132*** -0.00370***
(urban) (0.00265) (0.00122) (0 .00149) (0 .00123) (0.000843)
Observation 5,849 5,849 5,849 5,849 5,849
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: ***
1%, ** 5%, * 10%
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Table A5.6 : Param eters o f  LA-AIDS Dem and System with H om ogeneity and
Sym m etry Restriction on The Im pact o f  Specific Natural Disasters
share equations of total expenditures 
1 2 3 4 5






























































































































































Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%
281
Table A5.7 : Price and expenditure dem and elasticities
Price elasticities rice vegetable meat fish oil other
Rice -0.872*** 0.009 0.015 -0.068*** -0.006 -0.078
(0.059) (0.036) (0.023) (0.029) (0.032) (0.085)
Vegetable -0.001 -1 5 9 9 *** -0.175*** 0.660*** 0 149*** -0.033
(0.068) (0.066) (0.031) (0.046) (0.036) (0.115)
Meat 0.010 -0.201*** -1.169*** 0.120*** 0.259*** -0.020
(0.049) (0.034) (0.039) (0.039) (0.025) (0.085)
Fish -0.206** q 9 9 i*** 0.164*** -1.096*** -0.811*** -0.043
(0.083) (0.070) (0.051) (0.082) (0.049) (0.153)
Oil -0.038 q 373 * * * 0.574*** -1.340*** -0.515*** -0.055
(0.147) (0.090) (0.054) (0.080) (0.106) (0.225)
Other 0.106 -0.574*** -0.410*** 0.724*** -0.076 -0.771**
(0.198) (0.141) (0.093) (0.133) (0.129) (0.319)
Expenditure 0.724*** 0.881*** 0.930*** 0.846*** 0.804*** 1 071***
elasticities (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.029)
Budget shares 0.109 0.058 0.051 0.039 0.023 0.719
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and asterisk denote statistical significance: *** 
1%, ** 5%, * 10%; All values on bold are own price elasticities; X5l=1wi =  
i;Z ? = i w t f i  =  ~ w j  =  t v
Table A5.8: The effect o f disasters on living standard




Note: Note: 1 US$ = RP 10,000; * Indonesian poverty line on July 2012
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